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Abstract 
Social psychology depends on assumptions about the cultural context in which an experiment 
takes place. Cross-cultural psychology identifies and explains differences not accounted for in 
these assumptions. However, comparability does not come easy; there are numerous 
challenges that come with expanding the surrounding context both in the development of 
theory and execution of methods. This dissertation will review the history of cross-cultural 
psychology and strive to experimentally rectify some of its shortcomings. Part one will take 
on the theory behind one of the most researched cross-cultural topics: collectivism, which is 
traditionally contrasted to individualism. I further differentiate between relational and 
categorical collectivism, and investigate similarities and differences at a country level as well 
as at the individual level of self-construal. Part two will address methodological issues in 
cross-cultural psychology: 1) by looking at the mode in which data is collected; comparing 
paper/pencil, web/computer-based, and smart-phone, and finding differences across modes 
which are not explained by country or age alone, and 2) by exploring the fundamental 
comparability of psychological measures with invariance testing, and by using different 
methods of testing, such as multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis and alignment, for 
measurement invariance with the goal to facilitate comparing measures across numerous 
countries. In conclusion, these experimental explorations both improve and draw attention to 
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Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
 
Die Sozialpsychologie ist zu Annahmen über den kulturellen Kontext gezwungen, in 
welchem ein Experiment stattfindet. Die kulturvergleichende Psychologie identifiziert und 
erklärt Unterschiede, die in diesen Annahmen häufig nicht berücksichtigt sind. 
Vergleichbarkeit ist dabei ein zentrales Thema und kann selten einfach angenommen werden; 
mit der Vergrößerung des einbezogenen Kontextes entstehen zahlreiche Herausforderungen, 
sowohl bezüglich der Entwicklung von Theorien, als auch in der Anwendung von Methoden. 
Diese Dissertation leistet eine Übersicht über die Geschichte der kulturvergleichenden 
Psychologie und trägt mit einem experimentellen Ansatz dazu bei, einige ihrer Defizite zu 
korrigieren. Der erste Teil der Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit einem der einschlägigsten 
kulturvergleichenden Themen: Kollektivismus, welcher traditionell dem Individualismus 
gegenübergestellt wird. Darüber hinaus unterscheide ich zwischen relationalem und 
kategorialem Kollektivismus und untersuche Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede auf 
Länderebene, sowie auf einem individuellen Level der Selbstrepräsentation. Teil zwei 
adressiert methodologische Herausforderungen der kulturvergleichenden Psychologie: 
Erstens, indem Modi der Datenerhebung (schriftliche Befragung, Befragung am Computer, 
Befragung am Smartphone) betrachtet und Unterschiede zwischen ihnen identifiziert werden, 
welche nicht auf Herkunftsland oder Alter der Teilnehmenden zurückgeführt werden können. 
Zweitens, indem die fundamentale Vergleichbarkeit von psychologischen Messinstrumenten 
per Invarianztestung exploriert wird. Hierbei werden verschiedene Methoden der Invarianz-
Testung (die „Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis“ und die „Alignment“-Methode) 
verglichen, um das Vergleichen von Messwerten über mehrere Länder hinweg zu erleichtern. 
Schlussendlich machen diese experimentellen Untersuchungen auf bestimmte Limitationen 
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Kapitel 1: „Eine Übersicht über das Feld: Was bislang getan wurde und was wir in 
Zukunft tun müssen“: Was ist kulturvergleichende Sozialpsychologie und wieso ist sie von 
Bedeutung? Ein kontextueller Vergleich führt nicht nur zu einem besseren Verständnis der 
Ergebnisse der traditionellen Sozialpsychologie, welche vor allem in westlichen 
Gesellschaften gefunden wurden, sondern erweitert auch unseren Blick und unser Verständnis 
über Grenzen hinweg. Gleichwohl ist das Erreichen dieser Ziele leichter gesagt als getan und 
die Basis auf der wir aufbauen möchten ist nicht so stabil wie wir hoffen würden. Wie in allen 
Bereichen der Psychologie muss die kulturvergleichende Sozialpsychologie fundamentale 
Fragen zur Replizierbarkeit ihrer Ergebnisse und ihrer theoretischen Tiefe beantworten. In 
Kapitel 1 wird zunächst die Geschichte der kulturvergleichenden Sozialpsychologie skizziert, 
wobei auf die Individualismus- versus Kollektivismus-Dichotomie als Grundpfeiler vieler 
Theorien der kulturvergleichenden Psychologie fokussiert wird. Hiernach werden die 
methodologischen Herausforderungen von cross-kulturellen Vergleichen diskutiert, welche 
die Validierung von Befunden erschweren. 
Kapitel 2: „Kulturell bedingte Unterschiede in relationaler und gruppenkollektiver 
Selbstrepräsentation und ihre Bedeutung für Reaktionen auf beobachtete Ungerechtigkeit“: 
Mentale Repräsentationen des „Selbst“ bestehen sowohl aus individuellen Aspekten (also 
inwiefern sich jemand von anderen Menschen unterscheidet) und kollektiven Aspekten (also 
in welcher Beziehung man zu anderen Menschen steht). Kollektive Aspekte bestehen 
wiederum aus interpersonellen Beziehungen (dem „relationalen Selbst“) und der 
Zugehörigkeit zu sozialen Gruppen (dem „gruppenkollektiven Selbst“). Manche Forschende 
gehen von einer universalen motivationalen Hierarchie in den Selbstrepräsentationen aus (mit 
dem relationalen Selbst als relevanter als das gruppenkollektive Selbst). Andere Forschung 
legt nahe, dass die relative Wichtigkeit der verschiedenen Selbstrepräsentationen zwischen 
Kulturen variiert. In Kapitel 2 teste ich die Hypothese der motivationalen Hierarchie der 
Selbstrepräsentationen cross-kulturell. Hierfür wurden emotionale Reaktionen (Ärger, Wut 
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und Racheintentionen) auf die Beobachtung einer Viktimisierung eines kollektiven oder 
relationalen Gruppenmitgliedes in Deutschland, Japan und den USA untersucht. Im Einklang 
mit der Vermutung einer konsistenten Hierarchie über Kulturen hinweg fanden wir, dass in 
allen drei Ländern das relationale Selbst vorrangiger ist als das gruppenkollektive Selbst. 
Kapitel 3: „Erweiterung des Selbst bei der Reaktion auf Ungerechtigkeit gegenüber 
anderen: Kategorisches versus relationales Selbst“: Wann beschäftigt Menschen die 
Ungerechtigkeit gegenüber anderen am meisten? Aufbauend auf Befunden der 
Selbstrepräsentations-Literatur stellen wir die Hypothese auf, dass Menschen die 
Ungerechtigkeit gegenüber anderen am meisten beschäftigt, wenn eine Passung zwischen 
ihrer Selbstrepräsentation und der Art der Beziehung zum Opfer besteht. Das heißt, dass 
Beobachter von Ungerechtigkeit am meisten Empörung erleben sollten, wenn bei ihnen eine 
relationale Selbstrepräsentation gebahnt wird und das Opfer ein relationales Gruppenmitglied 
ist; oder wenn bei ihnen eine individuelle Selbstrepräsentation gebahnt wird und das Opfer ein 
Gruppenmitglied ist, mit dem man dieselbe Kategorie teilt. In einer experimentellen 
Laborstudie mit chinesischen Studierenden (N = 141) verwendeten wir eine neue Methode zur 
Manipulation der relationalen sowie der kategorischen Gruppen unter Verwendung eines 
„Minimal Group“ Paradigmas. Darüber hinaus manipulierten wir die Selbstrepräsentationen 
der Teilnehmenden. Auch wenn wir unter Betrachtung der Manipulation der 
Selbstrepräsentationen keine Evidenz für unsere primären Hypothesen finden konnten, zeigte 
sich doch eine indirekte Bestätigung in der gemessenen Selbstrepräsentation der 
Teilnehmenden. So zeigte sich eine Interaktion zwischen einer interdependenten 
Selbstrepräsentation der Teilnehmenden und dem Typ des kollektiven Bezugs zum Opfer in 
der Vorhersage der Empörung bei der Beobachtung der Viktimisierung.  
Kapitel 4: „Fragebogenmodi und Datenqualität: Ein Blick auf sorgloses Ausfüllen in 
drei Modi und drei Kulturen“: Ein Großteil psychologischer Forschung hängt von der Sorgfalt 
von Versuchsteilnehmenden beim Ausfüllen von Materialien (wie Tests und Fragebögen) ab. 
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Gleichwohl sind nicht alle Teilnehmenden motiviert das Material sorgfältig zu bearbeiten, 
wodurch es zu häufig unbeachteten Problemen in der Datenqualität kommt. Unsere Frage 
lautet: Wie beeinflussen unterschiedliche Modi der Datenerhebung (schriftliche Befragung, 
Befragung am Computer, Befragung am Smartphone) die Sorgfalt der Teilnehmenden und 
dadurch die Datenqualität? Ergebnisse früherer Studien legen nahe, dass die unterschiedlichen 
Modi der Datenerhebung eine vergleichbare Häufigkeit von sorglosen Antworttendenzen mit 
sich bringen. Da sich die Technologie jedoch weiterentwickelt und Daten in immer 
heterogeneren Populationen gesammelt werden, muss diese Frage erneut angegangen und 
darüber hinaus um die Berücksichtigung kultureller Unterschiede erweitert werden. Die 
vorliegende Forschung untersucht die Effekte der Modi der Datenerhebung auf sorglose 
Bearbeitung der Materialien in drei Wellen eines messwiederholten Designs. Empfehlungen 
aus der Literatur folgend, berechneten wir einen Index, der aus acht Indikatoren 
zusammengesetzt ist, die jeweils Aspekte sorglosen Bearbeitens erfassen. In einer Stichprobe 
von Erwachsenen im Arbeitsleben in China fanden wir, dass Versuchsteilnehmende 
signifikant weniger sorgfältig waren wenn sie das Untersuchungsmaterial Online bzw. am 
Computer bearbeitet haben, im Vergleich zu einer Bearbeitung mit Papier und Stift. In einer 
studentischen deutschen Stichprobe zeigten sich Teilnehmende wiederum signifikant weniger 
sorgfältig, wenn sie das Material mit Papier und Stift bearbeitet haben, im Vergleich zu einer 
Bearbeitung am Smartphone. In einer Stichprobe von chinesisch sprechenden Studierenden 
fanden wir hingegen keine Unterschiede zwischen den Modi der Datenerhebung. In diesem 
Kapitel wird diskutiert, wieso unsere Ergebnisse von vergangenen Ergebnissen zum Einfluss 
von Modi der Datenerhebung abweichen. Darüber hinaus werden Hypothesen über mögliche 
kulturelle Unterschiede aufgestellt. 
Kapitel 5: „Methoden der Messinvarianztestung: Acht Kulturen, acht 
Messinstrumente“: Messinvarianz (MI) ist unabdingbar für jegliche Vergleiche heterogener 
Gruppen. Die „Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis“ (MG-CFA) ist die Standard-
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Methode um Messinvarianz zu testen, geht aber mit wohlbekannten Limitationen einher, 
insbesondere bei einer großen Anzahl von Gruppen, bei denen eine strikte Invarianz im Sinne 
dieser Methode schwer bis unmöglich zu erreichen ist. Neuere Methoden, insbesondere die 
„Alignment“-Optimierungsmethode, bringen eine erhöhte Flexibilität und neue Möglichkeiten 
für Vergleiche zwischen einer hohen Anzahl von Gruppen mit sich. Dieses Kapitel vergleicht 
MG-CFA mit der Alignment-Methode zur MI-Testung anhand eines Beispiels von acht 
Ländern, sowie acht verschiedenen Messinstrumenten. Es zeigt sich, dass in Situationen in 
denen strikte MI mit der MG-CFA problematisch ist, die Alignment-Methode Vergleiche der 
Gruppen ermöglicht. Darüber hinaus vergleichen wir die inhaltlichen Implikationen der 
relativen Differenzen zwischen den von den unterschiedlichen Methoden ausgegebenen 
Mittelwerten. In diesem Vergleich zeigt sich, dass es in den meisten der acht Messinstrumente 
bei Verwendung der Alignment-Methode weniger signifikante latente 
Mittelwertsunterschiede gibt als bei Verwendung der MG-CFA. Insgesamt zeigt sich, dass die 
Alignment-Methode eine vielversprechende Lösung darstellt, um mehr Vertrauen in die 
Vergleichbarkeit von Messinstrumenten in gruppenvergleichender Forschung zu 
gewährleisten.  
Kapitel 6: Schlussfolgerung: Mithilfe einer großen Vielfalt von Studien ist in der 
vorliegenden Arbeit eine umfangreiche Betrachtung wichtiger Themen der 
kulturvergleichenden Sozialpsychologie gelungen. Die Beiträge dieser Arbeit sind vielfältig: 
1. Aufzeigen von Ähnlichkeit in der Hierarchie der Selbstrepräsentationen, für welche 
Theorien der kulturvergleichenden Psychologie Unterschiede annehmen würden. 2. Während 
die meiste Forschung bisher lediglich Fragebogen verwendet hat, wurde in einer Laborstudie 
die relationale Gruppenzugehörigkeit manipuliert, wobei die Ergebnisse insbesondere auf die 
Bedeutung der gemessenen Selbstrepräsentation (im Vergleich zur manipulierten 
Selbstrepräsentation) hindeuten. 3. Eine Untersuchung des Zusammenspiels von 
Kulturunterschieden und sorgloser Studienteilnahme. Hierbei zeigten sich Unterschiede 
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zwischen den Modi der Datenerhebung, welche abhängig von der Nationalität und dem Alter 
der Teilnehmenden sind. Zuletzt wurden ältere und neuere Methoden verglichen, welche zum 
Sicherstellen von Messinvarianz genutzt werden; eine Voraussetzung für jedweden 
Gruppenvergleich. Die damit genommenen Hürden sind wichtig und – obwohl noch mehr zu 
tun ist – ist jede dieser genommenen Hürden ein bedeutender Schritt auf dem Weg zu einem 
besseren Verständnis der kulturvergleichenden Sozialpsychologie. 
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I. Chapter 1: A Review of the Field- What has Been Done and What We Need to Do 
 
Abstract 
What is cross-cultural social psychology and why does it matter? Having a contextual 
comparison not only leads to a better understanding of conclusions of traditional social 
psychology, which have been explored primarily in Western societies, but also expands our 
view and comprehension beyond borders. However, achieving these goals is easier said than 
done, and the base from which we want to build is not as sturdy as we would hope. As in all 
areas of psychology, cross-cultural social psychology needs to ask fundamental questions 
about the replicability of our results and the depth of our theory. Chapter 1 will go over a brief 
history of cross-cultural social psychology, focusing on the common theme of individualism 
versus collectivism dichotomy as a pillar of theory in cross-cultural psychology. This will be 
followed by addressing the methodological challenges of cross-cultural comparisons that 
hinder the verifiability of findings. 
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What is cross-cultural psychology?  
Social psychology investigates how social interactions shape how we think, feel, and 
act, that is, how our existence as social animals shapes our cognitive reality. Cross-cultural 
social psychology looks at how cultures further influence these processes. What is culture? 
Simply put, culture is a shared system, produced and perpetuated by a group. To further our 
understanding, we look to others in the field who define culture as the following: 
 
“The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group 
or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9)  
 
“… a unique meaning and information system, shared by a group and transmitted 
across generations, that allows the group to meet basic needs of survival, pursue 
happiness and well-being, and derive meaning from life.”  (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008, 
p. 12)  
 
“… it [culture] represents a coalescence of discrete behavioral norms and cognitions 
shared by individuals within some definable population that are distinct from those 
shared within other populations. These normative beliefs and behaviors provide 
resources for realizing individual and collective goals, and so are often 
institutionalized in a variety of formal and informal ways. Moreover, there exist means 
for transmitting beliefs and behaviors to new members of the cultural population, so 
that the norms defining a culture may persist over very long periods of time.” 
(Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004 p. 690) 
 
Cross-cultural social psychology (CCSP) is in the fabric of social psychology itself, 
the influences of which are defined as culture aligned with what social psychologists seek to 
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explore. However, CCSP is differentiated by comparing two or more different cultural 
contexts or groups. Cultural groups are not necessary defined by national boarders, cultural 
groups also include people differentiate by age, gender or religion. All psychological 
processes take place in a cultural context; traditionally that context in psychological research 
is North American and Western European college-educated white people. This limitation has 
seen its fair share of criticism in the overdependence on Western, Educated, Industrialized, 
Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies as samples in scientific research (Arnett, 2008; 
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), CCSP looks to expand this. Beyond just including 
more groups, CCSP investigates if, how, and why different cultural contexts influence 
psychological processes.  
It is a particularly important research topic today because social psychology research 
faces a replicability crisis. This crisis came out of work that showed that a significant majority 
of results in social psychology could not be replicated (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 
From this crisis grew a debate that asked why this is the case and what we can do about it. 
Especially relevant is the spotlight on the importance of context or boundary conditions (Van 
Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 2016) - an important aspect of that being culture. 
From this, it is recognized that the field does not know the full extent of cultural context’s 
influences on psychological processes or even how to measure cultural differences.  
The challenges brought to light from the replicability crisis are helpful in 
understanding where cross-cultural psychology belongs in the framework of social 
psychology – namely, the focus on differences in replication environments and the question of 
applicability and replicability across the world. Therefore, cross-cultural psychology 
addresses the fundamental question: do our theories have boundary conditions that are 
culturally bound? Additionally, the cross-cultural perspective facilitates confronting the blind 
spots in the primarily western perspective of psychological concepts, which increase 
limitations in theory and approach (Chen, 2010). 
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The inherent value of cross-cultural psychology for social psychology as a whole is 
apparent but CCSP has some unique challenges compared to other sub-fields of social 
psychology that must be addressed. For example, because culture is embedded in specific 
human psychological contexts, there is difficulty establishing causal relationships. 
Furthermore, due to research conducted in different contexts there are more extensive 
problems with cross-cultural bias, which can broadly be defined as “any systematic source of 
distortion that challenges the validity of cross-cultural comparison” (Leung & van de Vijver, 
2008, p. 148). Without addressing these issues, the field cannot adequately address relevant 
questions. As Leung and van de Vijver (2008) proclaimed “…causal inferences in cross 
cultural research are most convincing when supported by diverse evidence based on a sound 
theoretical basis, multiple source of data, different research methods, and explicit refutation of 
alternative interpretations” (p. 145). 
In completing our understanding of CCSP we should differentiate it from other related 
approaches to the study of culture and psychology. Cultural psychology focuses on 
understanding the underlying meaning of cultural phenomena, while cross-cultural 
psychology focuses on causal inferences of culture (Leung & van de Vijver, 2008). 
Indigenous psychology identifies unique psychological processes without Western concepts as 
a starting point and assumes some lack of comparability, contrasting with cross-cultural 
psychology, which focuses on the comparison between groups. Intercultural psychology 
focuses on understanding the interaction between different groups in comparison contrary to 
CCSP that compares differences between groups (Smith, Fischer, Vignoles, & Bond, 2013).  
In the next section, I will go over a brief history of the field of CCSP, followed by a 
review and critique of fundamental theories and conclude with a closer look at 
methodological challenges. 
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Brief history  
Anthropological explorations of cultural comparisons can be traced back to early 
explorers (Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). Additionally, observed and recorded cultural differences 
through the approach of cultural psychology can be seen as early as the 20th century (Lonner, 
2013; Smith et al., 2013). However, social psychologists avoided culture for some time 
because of their commitment to experimental methods and the view of cross-cultural research 
as being primarily descriptive (Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). This started to shift in the 1960’s 
with the first publications of cross-cultural psychology journals and in 1972 with the 
inaugural conference for International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. According 
to Lonner (2013), a pioneer in the field, the development was as follows: “If the 1960s can be 
viewed as the seminal decade, the 1970s and 1980s can be considered a period that solidified 
cross-cultural psychology as a revolutionary development in the discipline.” (p. 5).  
For a window into the evolution of the field as a whole, Cretchley, Rooney and 
Gallois’s (2010) systematic review of topics in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 
demonstrates the evolution of the journal over time. They reported constancy throughout the 
history of the publication with a strong emphasis on experimental psychology. As far as the 
progression of topics goes, in the early years there was a focus on child development, while in 
more recent years there has been an emphasis on aspects of culture such as values, orientation, 
and acculturation. This leads in turn to current times, where social psychology and personality 
are more central areas of publication. 
 In the early 1980’s Hofstede brought wide attention to the field by systematically 
mapping countries in terms of psychological constructs. The relevance at the time was the 
emergence of international businesses and the lack of research on work culture; therefore, 
Hofstede filled the demand for guidance in this area (Søndergaard, 1994). To this day, 
organizational applications of cross-cultural differences remain a popular practical 
application. Because of the expansion of interest in cross-cultural studies and Hofstede’s 
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work, especially in the area of social psychology, came efforts to investigate psychological 
mechanisms behind observed country-level differences. Markus & Kitayama (1991) 
exemplify this approach in their conceptualization of independent and interdependent self-
construal as the mechanisms behind observed cultural differences. These concepts defined 
decades of cross-cultural research and therefore it is necessary to thoroughly understand these 
theories. 
Problems with the concepts and theories in cross-cultural social psychology: focus on 
Individualism and Collectivism 
One of the pillars of good research is having a strong theoretical argumentation. In 
CCSP, the theoretical framework on which the field is entrenched has primarily been 
analyzing the differences between individualism and collectivism, or independent versus 
interdependent self-construal, which were popularized by Hofstede (1980a, 1984), Triandis 
(1985, 1995) and Markus & Kitayama (1991) and others. Individualism and collectivism 
dichotomy also emerged as the primary framework because it fits the fact that most research 
in CCSP is a comparison of Western countries and East Asian countries (Cross, Hardin, & 
Gercek-Swing 2011; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In this section we will 
explain more in-depth what the core theories entail as well as their limitations.  
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions  
Hofstede’s 1980 and 1984 books were highly influential in the field of CCSP and are 
often synonymous with CCSP itself (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006; Tsui, Nifadkar, & Ou, 
2007). Currently, his 1984 book has over 54,900 citations, far and above anything else in 
cross-cultural research. Even when researchers are interested in other aspects of culture or not 
looking at his constructs directly, Hofstede’s ranking is often used for selecting samples 
(Taras et al., 2014). Therefore, it is important to look at the role and contribution of his work, 
specifically pertaining to individualism and collectivism, which shapes the direction of cross-
cultural research to this day.  
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 In his own words, Hofstede describes his research as follows: “In the 1970s this 
author – more or less by accident – got access to a large survey database about values and 
related sentiments of people in over 50 countries around the world (Hofstede, 1980). These 
people worked in the local subsidiaries of one large multinational corporation: IBM. Most 
parts of the organization had been surveyed twice over a four-year interval, and the database 
contained more than 100,000 questionnaires.” (Hofstede, 2011, p. 6). From this data set, 
Hofstede factor analyzed a matrix of 32 value related questions from an initial 40 countries, 
and later 53 countries, and found values clustering around 4 dimensions: 
Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance. He 
later added two additional dimensions: Long/Short Term Orientation and Indulgence/Restraint 
(Hofstede, 2011). From this happenstance data, a profoundly influential theory of cultural 
difference was established. 
 Individualism and collectivism (IND-COL) garners more attention specifically 
because of its popularity and influence. As described by Taras et al., (2014), in a large meta-
analysis of the effects of culture in the workplace, it was found that 88% of all effects in 
cross-cultural literature reported individualism and collectivism measures (Taras, Kirkman & 
Steel, 2010). Hofstede defined IND-COL as one dimension that measures “…the degree to 
which people in a society are integrated into groups” (Hofstede, 2011, p. 11). More 
specifically, individualism is “a loosely-knit social framework in which people are supposed 
to take care of themselves and of their immediate families only,” while collectivism “is 
characterized by a tight social framework in which people distinguish between ingroups and 
outgroups, they expect their ingroup to look after them, and in exchange for that they feel they 
owe absolute loyalty to it” (Hofstede, 1980b, p. 45). The measure was conceptualized as polar 
ends of a scale. Although Hofstede was not the first to use these categorizations, he 
popularized them in an explanatory role and is regarded as the father of IND-COL (Taras, 
Steel, & Kirkman, 2012). 
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Although extremely influential, there is also a lot of criticism of Hofstede’s work (Kim 
& Sharkey, 1995; Levine et al., 2003; Voronov & Singer, 2002). First, in regards to the 
happenstance of the data: no cohesive theory existed before the collection of the data, only a 
series of post-hoc explanations which relied on factor analysis. This means that although the 
analysis could show which items belong together, it does not guarantee construct validity and 
is limited by the items in the original scale (Kagitcibasi, 1997). In his own defense, Hofstede 
claims this is not a problem due to extensive replications: “The number of external validations 
kept expanding, and the second edition of Culture’s Consequences (Hofstede, 2001, Appendix 
6, pp. 503-520) lists more than 400 significant correlations between the IBM-based scores and 
results of other studies.” However, correlations to other studies do not necessarily mean that 
these other studies identified underlying factors as he described. Furthermore, other 
replication studies do not back up Hofstede’s confidence in replications. For example, in 
Søndergaard’s (1994) study analyzing 61 replications, only four replicated Hofstede’s 
dimensions in their entirety and 15 showed partial confirmation. More recently in a meta-
analysis, Taras, Kirkman and Steel (2010) found limited predictive values of Hofstede’s four 
original dimensions, highlighting that personality traits and demographics were significantly 
better predictors of organizational outcomes. Hofstede defended any lack of replication by 
predicting that cultures will shift over time (Hofstede, 2011; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 
2010). However, this points to further criticism of the work, that it is not clear if and when, or 
how much culture changes (McSweeney, 2002). These theoretical weaknesses have 
contributed to the ongoing confusion for the role of Hofstede’s work in cross-cultural 
psychology. 
Although there are widespread criticisms as mentioned above, Hofstede’s model 
continues to be the center of research that focuses on cultural issues. Many recently published 
articles highlight the way in which the vague theoretical understanding of the dimensions is 
an ongoing issue (e.g. Kotlaja, 2018; Reyes, 2018). Although Hofstede himself emphasizes 
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the limitations of the theory, especially in regard to the level of analysis, in that these are 
cultural level dimensions and not individual level ones, there remains much ambiguity in its 
theoretical application. In practice, IND-COL is often conflated with self-construal or 
individual level cultural differences, which defenders of Hofstede agree is not what he intends 
to be measuring (Hofstede, 2011; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). It is common for 
researchers to take parts of Hofstede’s definition that fit their own hypothesis and ignore the 
parts that do not. For example, studies often use Hofstede’s country level scores as an 
independent variable. However, the measures described by Hofstede do not match how the 
authors conceptualize the variable. Since cross-cultural research has become synonymous 
with IND-COL, it is used with increased frequency, which leads to even more usage overtime, 
while the research that follows is still not addressing the fact that the theoretical concepts are 
still lacking. 
More recently, Minkov et. al. (2017) proposed a new “valid” measure of IND-COL; 
however, looking at the measures themselves, it is still not clear what IND-COL in fact mean. 
The Minkov et. al. (2017) publication describes IND-COL as a multifaceted dimension with 
conformism and social ascendancy aspects, with such items as “I am very religious – I rarely 
observe religious rules”, “I respect all rules of my society – I decide which rules to respect” 
and “I would like to achieve fame – I see fame as useless”. It is unclear how this is 
conceptually related to Hofstede’s definition of IND-COL: “the degree to which people in a 
society are integrated into groups” (Hofstede 2011, p. 11) or the items from Hofstede’s 
original scale, such as “have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to the job” at 
the individualistic pole, and “have training opportunities (to improve your skills or learn new 
skills)” at the collectivist pole (Hofstede, 2010, p. 92-93). Therefore, we can conclude that 
Hofstede’s IND-COL dimension is not very useful in that it is not clear what exactly is 
measured and what country rankings on this scale mean beyond a post-hoc explanation. The 
indiscriminate use of IND-COL means the terms lose their utility.  
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   10 
 
         10 
Self-Construal Theory  
Following Hofstede was research on cross-cultural difference in the concept of self. 
Markus & Kitayama’s (1991) independent and interdependent self-construal framework 
epitomizes this approach. An extremely popular foundational theory, it has over 21,300 
citations to date. As defined by Markus and Kitayama (1991), independent self-construal is 
when “view of the self derives from a belief in the wholeness and uniqueness of each person's 
configuration of internal attributes” (p. 226) and interdependent self-construal is when “view 
of the self and the relationship between the self and others features the person not as separate 
from the social context but as more connected and less differentiated from others” (p. 227).  
Although Markus and Kitayama (1991) explicitly stated that these were only two of possibly 
many self-representations, self-construal became virtually synonymous with “how individuals 
see themselves in relation to others” (Cross et al., 2011 p. 143). Over the years there has been 
a plethora of research in this area on a wide variety of topics from cognition to affect to 
effects on motivation (see for a review: Cross, et al., 2011; Gudykunst & Lee, 2003; Smith, et 
al., 2013).  
The relationship between Hofstede’s IND-COL and independent and interdependent 
self-construal are most commonly described as follows: IND-COL represents the country 
level variable while self-construal represents the individual level variable (Cross et al., 2011). 
That is, people from a collectivist culture tend to be interdependent while those from an 
individualistic culture tend to be independent. However, there are still basic questions of how 
the individual level corresponds to the country level (Kagitcibasi, 1997). Other researchers in 
the field describe the relationship of independent and interdependent self-construal as facets 
of a larger cultural construct of IND-COL (Triandis, 1995). 
There is a variety of measurement tools for self-construal, primarily those developed 
by Gudykunst and colleagues (1996), Kim and Leung (1997), Oyserman (1993), Singelis 
(1994), Takata (1993), and Triandis (1994). However, the extent of differences between these 
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scales is not clear and which, if any, best represent the concept at hand. Furthermore, results 
from research using these different scales tend to be inconsistent (Cross et al., 2011). For 
example, highlighting the problems, meta-analysis results showed that western people are not 
more individualistic, which is the core base of cross-cultural research theory. (Levine et al., 
2003; Oyseman et al., 2002; Takano & Osaka 2018, Voronov & Singer 2002). This was 
startling to the field and some have declared that culture does not in fact reliably predict self-
construal in the way the theory predicts (Matsumoto, 1999). For other researchers this was a 
catalyst for a new wave of questions. The literature has since reflected both on the problems 
and solutions to these measurement concerns.  
The differentiation of the theoretical frameworks that emerged out of the criticism of 
Hofstede’s original theory was that IND-COL is not a unidimensional construct but two 
orthogonal constructs (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, 1993; Singelis, 1994; 
Triandis, 1995). That is to say that independent self-construal and interdependent self-
construal are unique constructs and therefore the degree to which an individual is higher or 
lower in one dimension is independent of the other. However, the literature has shown this 
discussion to be far from settled (Hardin, Leong, & Bhagwat, 2004; Taras et al., 2014; 
Vignoles et al., 2016). For example, Taras and colleagues (2014), in their observation of 
published works, explained that even though the concepts are considered orthogonal, the 
functional definitions and proceeding hypothesis are almost always paired opposites. Across 
six commonly used scales, 40 out of 45 attributes were postulated with an explicit opposite. 
Furthermore, in their meta-analysis of research that used these instruments, Taras and 
colleagues (2014) found that the dimensionality of the two concepts, looking at scales which 
describe both IND-COL and self-construal, depends on a number of factors: 1) the instrument 
used; 2) the characteristics of the sample, such as region; and 3) the level of analysis. This is 
very problematic because uncertainty about the relationship between IND and COL and 
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independent and interdependent self-construal leads to uncertainty in the interpretation of data 
as well as comparability of results. 
Regarding limitations of the construct, researchers have tried to address solutions with 
various approaches. In the next sections I will outline some of those approaches. One 
approach is a theoretical clarification of the meaning of individualism and collectivism, 
another is a move away from the dual model of selfhood, and a third approach is that some of 
these discrepancies may be explained methodologically. 
A promising area of inquiry to explain the discrepancy of findings is to understand the 
meaning of collectivism. Primary to the definition of collectivism is connection to one’s 
group, but what is meant by the group? From this question a third dimension of self-construal 
was first proposed by Brewer and Gardner, (1996) and Kashima et al., (1995), that is the 
relational-self. This is the extent to which people define themselves in terms of close 
relational others, thus differentiating from the self, which is defined in terms of large groups 
and group membership. This differentiation was further highlighted by Brewer and Chen 
(2007). To approach the discrepancies in the literature and the mean of the collective, Brewer 
and Chen content-analyzed commonly used scales to categorize the content of the scale items. 
Two dimensions are specified – the first relates to elements of the items, that is, self-
representations, beliefs, or values. The second is the target of the items, that is, who is the 
collective: the individual, a relational other, or a collective group? They found that clarifying 
these distinctions contributes to an understanding of the limitations of the interpretation of 
past research. Other researchers have also called to make this distinction and have found 
convincing results in areas such as gender difference in self-construal, and cross-cultural 
differences in intergroup trust (Cross, Bacon & Morris, 2000; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Yuki, 
Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005). Nonetheless, most research continues to focus on the 
more general dichotomous IND-COL and independent interdependent self-construal (Cross et 
al., 2011). Therefore, although this approach has potential, more research is needed. 
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Another way to tackle the limitations of the construct found in the literature outlined 
above is a more general look at the structure of the overall construct and if there are additional 
models of selfhood. Hofstede claimed that using six dimensions to describe cultures was the 
best way because it was not too few and not too many, and the dimensions used were all bi-
polar (Hofstede, 2011). However, this does not necessarily reflect the reality of cultural 
differences. Triandis (1995) proposed that IND and COL are in fact multidimensional 
constructs, differentiating between vertical aspects of IND-COL that focus on hierarchies, and 
horizontal aspects of IND-COL that focus on egalitarian values. More recently, Vignoles and 
colleagues (2016) argue that the existing focus on independent versus interdependent self 
comes out of the focus on North American and East Asian samples; and that if we take a 
wider view of the world, we will find more diverse definitions of the self. With large samples 
from a diverse group of countries, they found a seven-dimensional model of selfhood. 
However, this work was limited in that questions were derived from existing measures. 
Furthermore, this work needs to be expanded to understand the implication of multiple 
dimensions of selfhood rather than IND-COL dichotomy.  
Regarding where the theoretical construct of IND-COL and self-construal fit overall in 
cross-cultural research, I think there is utility in the concepts and there is a lot of past research 
with compelling findings that have enriched our understanding of cross-cultural differences. 
However, there is also a dearth of replication and a glut of research that perpetuates a lack of 
clarification. The theoretical formulation as of now is a large umbrella that everything fits 
under. However, the conceptualization in research involves picking and choosing relevant 
concepts, which will not lead to strong theory building. Instead, we need to work on refining 
our definition and replicating past findings, thereby clarifying concepts resulting in more 
concise theories. In addition, we need to be sure that our methods are sound. This is an 
equally important aspect which I will discuss in the next section.  
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Problems with Measurement  
Another pillar to sound research practice is firm research methods; as is clear from the 
above review, this has also been a problem with IND-COL research. However, the research 
method limitations go beyond the definition and measurement of one scale. In general, CCSP 
reflects social psychology’s overall methodological concerns; therefore, methodological 
challenges of cross-cultural research are similar to those in all research, with regards to 
internal and external validity, etc. However, there are some aspects that are particularly 
challenging for CCSP, as successful CCSP goes beyond merely using the same materials to 
collect data in another context.  
Particularly, issues in cross-cultural research are those related to biases in both 
sampling and measurement equivalence. Bias in general is when an outcome variable does not 
correspond to the concept one wants to measure. Although all areas of psychology need to be 
aware of the ramifications of sampling, this can be particularly precarious when comparing 
cross-national groups because of unintended confounding factors. For example, using 
convenience samples of college students in developed countries and developing countries 
might not be as comparable as a research team expects because university attendance might 
be correlated to wealth in different ways in different countries (Cohen, 2007). Another issue is 
that otherwise comparable cultural groups might have different familiarity with research 
methods, therefore resulting in differences due to measurement errors and not the questions at 
hand. 
The idea of comparability is the foundation of CCSP; however, we must question if 
we are really comparing the same thing across different groups since the lack of measurement 
equivalence can produce methodological artifacts. Therefore, it is important to take steps to 
insure comparability both in the preparation of a study and in verifying the statistical 
comparability after the fact.  
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A large source of potential methodological issues is with the translation process. 
Language is a very prominent feature of culture and translation often results in a 
transformation of meaning. The standard translation-back translation (Brislin, 1970) process 
is considered the best practice to minimize translation error; however, this is not foolproof. 
Direct translations also need to be conceptually comparable. An increasingly discussed hot 
topic among cross-cultural researches is if translations-back translations by a native speak 
who is naive to the construct really captures a construct or if there is a better way. 
In addition, regarding assessment of comparability in CCSP, response styles is an 
important aspect to consider. Response styles are systematic tendencies in the manner in 
which one responds to rating scales, in that observed scores will be unrelated to the true 
scores of the individual (Fischer, 2004). Some types of response styles are modest or extreme 
responding, such as acquiescence, which is selecting extreme answers, shifting responses to 
either end of the scale (Fischer, 2004).  In cross-cultural research, these response styles can be 
seen as error artifacts or as aspects of the cultural differences at hand (Smith, 2011). For 
researchers who view response styles as method bias in cross-cultural studies, it is common to 
follow standardized ipsatization procedures as a way of controlling for country level 
acquiescence. This has been the approach in many large scale cross-cultural research projects 
(i.e. Gelfand, 2011; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 2004). However, this 
approach is insufficient because not only does it require excluding potentially relevant 
information, but it is also statistically problematic (Cheung & Rensvold, 2000; Fischer, 2004).  
Therefore, it is important to test for measurement equivalence rather than depend on 
standardization procedures. Testing for measurement invariance, which more precisely, 
evaluates the comparability of scales across heterogonous groups is increasingly 
acknowledged as a necessary part of cross-cultural research (Cheung and Rensvold, 2000). 
However, this is still not universally done, in that studies show only 17% of cross-cultural 
research studies test measurement equivalence (Boer, Hanke, & He, 2018; Chen, 2008). 
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Invariance testing is still not widespread because of inadequate education in execution of 
invariance testing, and because finding invariance by traditional means is often unattainable 
for many groups (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2017; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). 
Beyond these general challenges for equivalence in the literature, there are also 
specific methodological responses to the limitations and unexpected findings of IND-COL 
literature. For example, Heine, Lehman, Peng, and Greenholtz (2002) focus on the issues with 
the Likert scale, in that the lack of expected cross-cultural differences is due to references 
group effects. Survey questions require participants to reflect on the question with a degree of 
judgment. For example, a question asking the participant if a statement describes them “very 
much” or “very little” on a continuum requires a reference point. The most likely reference 
point will be to compare to similar others (Heine et al., 2002). For example, if participants in 
Japan are asked if they are tall, they will compare themselves to other Japanese people and 
give a different answer than if explicitly asked to compare themselves to American people. 
With this reasoning, Heine and colleagues (2002) found that when you manipulate the 
reference group to explicitly reference other cultures, there is an enhanced effect of expected 
cultural differences with regards to IND-COL.  Also, He, Buchholz, and Klieme (2017) found 
that by using anchoring vignettes as a means to reflect reference group effects, there was 
increased comparability and predictive validity for a large scale multi-nation study. 
Current work 
From this general review of the literature, it is clear that there are many areas of 
research that we need to further explore. The following chapters’ record experimental 
research that tackles specific projects related to the broad challenges outlined above.  
Part one will focus on self-construal and how we define our groups. As discussed 
above in cross-cultural social psychology, the understanding of the self with Hofstede’s 
simplistic bi-polar dimension is limited in its utility, and other approaches, while promising, 
need more refinement and clarification. Although specification of the relational self has been 
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acknowledged as distinct since the 1990s, the tools of measurement and theory continue to 
underutilize the distinction (Cross et al., 2011).  Therefore, in this section will take on the 
approach of identifying the differences between the collective self: the relational self as 
defined by relationships to close others and the collective or categorical self defined by 
connection to categorical groups. Across two studies, I will look at similarities and differences 
in how the in-group is defined both within and between cultures and how that is reflected in 
observed victimization. Chapter 2 reports on a vignette study which seeks to experimentally 
differentiate the relational self and group collective self by looking at the emotional reaction 
to another person’s injustice in three cultures. This study clarifies ambiguity in the research in 
regard to cultural similarities or differences in relative importance of self-representations. 
This design improves on past studies by clearly distinguishing between the relational self and 
the group collective self for which there is often overlap. Further, this study uses a culturally 
neutral task in order to account for other additional cultural influences apparent in past 
research.  
Chapter 3 also investigates the question of differences between groups and how they 
are incorporated in the self in the context of others injustice. In contrast to past research, this 
study uses novel methods to focuses on within-culture differences in measured and 
manipulated self-construal. Regardless of overall cultural norms, there are individual and 
situational differences in the relative importance of self-construal, this study aims to look 
specifically at those difference within one non-Western country. Further, this study can 
contribute of the clarity of connection between relational self and categorical/collective self 
and types of groups’ membership, again distinguishing between the possible overlap between 
group types, using minimal group paradigms. 
Part two will take on methodical challenges, in both understanding the depths of those 
challenges and proposing potential solutions: Firstly, by investigating a different aspect of 
response style that has previously been neglected in cross-cultural research, namely cultural 
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difference in careless responding; and secondly, by looking at limitations and new methods of 
measurement invariance.   
Although researchers have taken a variety of approaches to methodological differences 
in conducting cross-culture studies, very few have looked at data quality, mode of data 
collection and culture together. Although there is some acknowledgement of the influences of 
variance in familiarity of taking part in studies (Cohen, 2007), this has not been systematically 
investigated. Chapter 4 fills this gap by brings attention to the problem in differences in data 
quality. Differences in data quality may have influenced the proceeding literature in unseen 
ways, especially in the sense that much of our understanding of cross-cultural difference 
comes from self repost surveys that give an inaccurate comparison if there is cross-cultural 
variability in responding carelessly. Further, with the emergences of increasingly diversity in 
the use of technology in data collection, the role of differences between modes should be 
reexamined especially across different cultures. This study further contributes to the literature 
by taking into account not only cross-national cultural groups but also different age groups by 
looking at students in Germany and both students and adults in China. 
Finally, Chapter 5 further builds on the fundamental methodological issues concerned 
with the literature’s focus on survey data. This study does a secondary data analysis of data 
collected across eight countries and eight measures to compare traditional and new 
approaches to establishing measurement comparability. Necessary for any cross-cultural 
research is the comparability of the materials; however in practice this is not always done. 
Therefore this investigation is vital in expanding our understanding on new methods and how 
these new methods relate to previous ones. 
 
  
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   19 
 
         19 
References 
Arnett, J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less 
American. American Psychologist, 63, 602‐614. 
Boer, D., Hanke, K., & He, J. (2018). On detecting systematic measurement error in cross-
cultural research: A review and critical reflection on equivalence and invariance tests. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 49, 713-734. 
Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y. R. (2007). Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward 
conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism. Psychological review, 114, 
133-151. 
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “We”? Levels of collective identity and 
self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83–93. 
Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. Journal of cross-cultural 
psychology, 1, 185-216. 
Byrne, B. M., & van de Vijve, F. J. (2017). The maximum likelihood alignment approach to 
testing for approximate measurement invariance: A paradigmatic cross-cultural 
application. Psicothema, 29, 539-551. 
Chen, F. F. (2008). What happens if we compare chopsticks with forks? The impact of 
making inappropriate comparisons in cross-cultural research. Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 95, 1005-1018. 
Chen, S. X. (2010). From emic to etic: Exporting indigenous constructs. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 364-378. 
Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2000). Assessing extreme and acquiescent response sets 
in cross-cultural research using structural equations modeling. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 31, 187-212. 
Cohen, D. (2007). Methods in cultural psychology.  Handbook of cultural 
psychology, 196-236. 
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   20 
 
         20 
Cretchley, J., Rooney, D., & Gallois, C. (2010). Mapping a 40-year history with Leximancer: 
Themes and concepts in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 41, 318-328. 
Cross, S. E., Bacon, P. L., & Morris, M. L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-
construal and relationships. Journal of personality and social psychology, 78, 791-808. 
Cross, S. E., Hardin, E. E., & Gercek-Swing, B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of 
self-construal. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 142-179. 
Fischer, R. (2004). Standardization to account for cross-cultural response bias: A 
classification of score adjustment procedures and review of research in JCCP. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 263-282. 
Gabriel, S., & Gardner, W. L. (1999). Are there “his” and “hers” types of interdependence? 
The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence 
for affect, behavior, and cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 
642-655.  
Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., ... & Aycan, Z. 
(2011). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. Science, 332, 
1100-1104. 
Gudykunst, W. B., & Lee, C. M. (2003). Assessing the validity of self-construal scales: A 
response to Levine et al. Human Communication Research, 29, 253–274.  
Gudykunst, W. G., Matsumoto, Y., Ting-Toomey, S., & Nishida, T. (1996). The influence of 
cultural individualism-collectivism, self-construals, and individual values on 
communication styles across cultures. Human Communication Research, 22, 510-543. 
Hardin, E. E., Leong, F. T., & Bhagwat, A. A. (2004). Factor structure of the self-construal 
scale revisited: Implications for the multidimensionality of self-construal. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 327-345. 
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   21 
 
         21 
He, J., Buchholz, J., & Klieme, E. (2017). Effects of anchoring vignettes on comparability and 
predictive validity of student self-reports in 64 cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 48, 319-334. 
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Peng, K., & Greenholtz, J. (2002). What's wrong with cross-
cultural comparisons of subjective Likert scales?: The reference-group effect. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 82, 903-918. 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the 
world?. Behavioral and brain sciences, 33, 61-83. 
Hofstede, G. (1980a). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related 
Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hofstede, G. (1980b). Motivation, leadership, and organization: Do American theories apply 
abroad? Organizational Dynamics, 9, 42-63. 
Hofstede, G. (1984) Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. 
London: Sage. 
Hofstede, G. (2011). Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. Online 
readings in psychology and culture, Article 8. 
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J. & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
the Mind (Rev. 3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Hogg, M., & Vaughan, G. (2011). Social Psychology. Sixth edition. Pearsons.  
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). (2004). Culture, 
leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies. Sage publications. 
Kagitcibasi, C. (1997). Individualism and collectivism. In J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, & C. 
Kagitcibasi (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Vol. 3. Social behavior and 
applications (pp. 1–49). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   22 
 
         22 
Kim, M. S., & Sharkey, W. F. (1995). Independent and interdependent construals of self: 
Explaining cultural patterns of interpersonal communication in multicultural 
organizational settings. Communication Quarterly, 43, 20-38. 
Kirkman, B. L., Lowe, K. B., & Gibson, C. B. (2006). A quarter century of culture’s 
consequences: A review of empirical research incorporating Hofstede’s cultural values 
framework. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 285-320. 
Kotlaja, M. M. (2018). Cultural contexts of individualism vs. collectivism: Exploring the 
relationships between family bonding, supervision and deviance. European Journal of 
Criminology, 1-18. 
Lehman, D. R., Chiu, C. Y., & Schaller, M. (2004). Psychology and culture. Annu. 
Rev. Psychol., 55, 689-714. 
Lehman, D. R., Chiu, C. Y., & Schaller, M. (2004). Psychology and culture. Annu. Rev. 
Psychol., 55, 689-714. 
Leung, K., & Van De Vijver, F. J. (2008). Strategies for strengthening causal inferences in 
cross cultural research: The consilience approach. International Journal of Cross 
Cultural Management, 8, 145-169.  
Levine, T. R., Bresnahan, M. J., Park, H. S., Lapinski, M. K., Wittenbaum, G. M., Shearman, 
S. M., . . Ohashi, R. (2003). Self-construal scales lack validity. Human Communication 
Research, 29, 210-252. 
Lonner, W. (2013). Chronological Benchmarks in Cross-Cultural Psychology. Foreword to 
the Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural Psychology. Online Readings in Psychology and 
Culture, 1.  
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, 
emotion, and motivation. Psychological review, 98, 224-253. 
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   23 
 
         23 
Matsumoto, D. (1999). Culture and self: An empirical assessment of Markus and Kitayama’s 
theory of independent and interdependent self-construal. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 2, 289-310.  
Matsumoto, D. & Juang, L. 2008. Culture and psychology, 4, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
McSweeney, B. (2002). Hofstede’s model of national cultural differences and their 
consequences: A triumph of faith-a failure of analysis. Human relations, 55, 89-118. 
Minkov, M., Dutt, P., Schachner, M., Morales, O., Sanchez, C., Jandosova, J., ... & Mudd, B. 
(2017). A revision of Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism dimension: A new national 
index from a 56-country study. Cross Cultural & Strategic Management, 24, 386-404. 
Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological 
science. Science, 349(6251). 
Oyserman, D. (1993). The lens of personhood: Viewing the self and others in a multicultural 
society. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 993-1009. 
Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and 
collectivism: evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological 
Bulletin, 128, 3–72.  
Reyes, M. L. (2018). Social mobility attributions in East Asian and Pacific cultures: Power 
distance and individualism as moderators of self-attribution bias. Journal of Pacific Rim 
Psychology, 12. 
Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 580-591. 
Smith, P. B. (2011). Communication styles as dimensions of national culture. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42, 216-233. 
Smith, P. B., Fischer, R., Vignoles, V. L., & Bond, M. H. (2013). Understanding social 
psychology across cultures: Engaging with others in a changing world. London, UK: 
Sage. 
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   24 
 
         24 
Søndergaard, M. (1994). Research note: Hofstede's consequences: a study of reviews, 
citations and replications. Organization studies, 15, 447-456. 
Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Baumgartner, H. (1998). Assessing measurement invariance in 
cross-national consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 78-90. 
Schwartz, S. H. (2004), Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world. In 
Vinken, H., Soeters, J. and Ester P. (eds.), Comparing cultures, Dimensions of culture in 
a comparative perspective. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. 
Takano, Y., & Osaka, E. (2018). Comparing Japan and the United States on 
individualism/collectivism: A follow‐up review. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 21, 301-316. 
Takata, T. (1993). Social comparison and formation of self-concept in adolescent: Some 
findings about Japanese college students. Japanese Journal of Educational Psychology, 
41, 339-348. 
Taras, V., Kirkman, B. L., & Steel, P. (2010). Examining the impact of culture’s 
consequences: A threedecade, multilevel, meta-analytic review of Hofstede’s cultural 
value dimensions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 405-439. 
Taras, V., Sarala, R., Muchinsky, P., Kemmelmeier, M., Singelis, T. M., Avsec, A., ... & 
Hardin, E. E. (2014). Opposite ends of the same stick? Multi-method test of the 
dimensionality of individualism and collectivism. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 45, 213-245. 
Taras, V., Steel, P., & Kirkman, B. L. (2012). The times they are A-Changin’: Improving 
cultural indices and rankings based on a meta-analysis of Hofstede’s dimensions. 
Journal of World Business, 47, 329-341. 
Triandis, H. C. (1994). INDCOL (Unpublished research scale on individualism and 
collectivism). Champaign: University of Illinois. 
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Chapter 1: A Review of the Field   25 
 
         25 
Triandis, H. C., Leung, K., Villareal, M. J., & Clack, F. I. (1985). Allocentric versus 
idiocentric tendencies: Convergent and discriminant validation. Journal of Research in 
personality, 19, 395-415. 
Tsui, A. S., Nifadkar, S. S., & Ou, A. Y. (2007). Cross-national, cross-cultural organizational 
behavior research: Advances, gaps, and recommendations. Journal of Management, 33, 
426-478. 
Van Bavel, J. J., Mende-Siedlecki, P., Brady, W. J., & Reinero, D. A. (2016). Contextual 
sensitivity in scientific reproducibility. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 113, 6454-6459. 
van't Veer, A. E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2016). Pre-registration in social psychology—A 
discussion and suggested template. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 67, 2-
12. 
Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Becker, M., Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. J., Brown, R., ... & Lay, 
S. (2016). Beyond the ‘east–west’ dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of 
selfhood. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 966-1000. 
Voronov, M., & Singer, J. A. (2002). The myth of individualism-collectivism: A critical 
review. Journal of Social Psychology, 142, 461-480. 
Yuki, M., Maddux, W. W., Brewer, M. B., & Takemura, K. (2005). Cross-cultural differences 
in relationship- and group-based trust. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 
48-62. 
Kashima, Y., Yamaguchi, S., Kim, U., Choi, S., Gelfand, M. J., & Yuki, M. (1995). Culture, 
gender, and self: A perspective from individualism-collectivism research. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 925-937
   26 
 
         26 
Part 1: Theory  
 
          27 
 
II. Chapter 2: Relational and Group Collective Self Responses to Observed 
Victimization Across Cultures 
 
Zoe Magraw-Mickelson and Mario Gollwitzer 
Abstract 
Mental representations of the “self” consist of both individual aspects (i.e., how one differs 
from other people) and collective aspects (i.e., how one relates to other people), with 
collective aspects further consisting of interpersonal relations (the “relational” self) and of 
memberships in social groups (the “group collective” self). Some researchers assume that 
there is a universal motivational hierarchy in self-representations (with the relational self 
being more relevant than the group collective self). Other research suggests that the relative 
importance of self-representations varies across cultures. This paper tests the motivational 
hierarchy hypothesis in a cross-cultural context. Emotional reactions (anger, outrage, vengeful 
intentions) to observed victimization of a collective or relational group member were assessed 
in Germany, Japan, and the USA. In line with the motivational hierarchy hypothesis, we 
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Introduction 
Say you observe an instance of victimization, for example, an individual is treated 
unjustly by a third party. How would you feel? In general, most people would be 
uncomfortable with such a situation and believe it is unjust. However, would our degree of 
anger or moral outrage depend on our connection to the victimized individual? Would it make 
a difference whether this individual belongs to our in-group or an out-group? Would it matter 
if we knew the victim personally? To answer these questions, we must look to how the self is 
defined and the literature that differentiates between ways in which others are included in the 
self-concept. Predictions from the “hierarchy of the self” literature would say we always have 
a stronger emotional reaction when the victim is someone within our social network. 
However, cross-cultural research would predict there are cultural differences depending on 
the primacy of differing self-concepts.  
Cultural Differences in Self-Representations 
A recurring theme in cross-cultural psychology is the core definition of the self and 
where its boundaries lie. Broadly speaking, much theory is built on the assumption that 
Western cultures have a self-concept based on individual autonomy, while Eastern cultures 
have a self-concept based on social connection and interdependence with in-group members 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These concepts have fallen under various labels (e.g., 
individualism vs. collectivism, independent vs interdependent self-construal) that have been 
both helpful and limiting (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Two key areas 
necessary for further investigation are: 1) what is meant by “the collective” or “the group”? 
and 2) how do the different selves manifest within an individual? Understanding the nuances 
of group self-concepts, which is often examined in the context of cross-cultural comparisons, 
can enhance and complement looking at cross-cultural similarities. This, in turn, can clarify 
expected similarity or differences in relation to observed injustice. 
Building on Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) independent vs interdependent self-
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construal dichotomy, Brewer and Gardner (1996) presented the concept of, and preliminary 
evidence for, three different self-representations, formulating that the self includes (1) our 
autonomous self as an individual (“individual self-representation”), (2) our personal 
relationships with other individuals (“relational self-representation”), and (3) our formal 
memberships in social groups (“group collective self-representation”). Each self represents 
different levels of inclusiveness. The latter two selves can be differentiated in that the 
relational self consists of social connections: this self-representation includes people one 
personally knows (e.g., friends, colleagues, fellow students). The group collective self 
consists of social categories one belongs to: this self-representation includes people who also 
belong to the same categories (e.g., people working in the same company, studying at the 
same university, living in the same country), but who one does not necessarily know 
personally. 
This general concept leads to two lines of distinct but related questions. First, do these 
concepts help us understand cross-cultural differences in social behaviors? Second, is there a 
“hierarchy of selves,” that is, is one self more important than others? Past work has taken 
these two questions into consideration but has not sufficiently integrated these issues. In the 
present study, we test the motivational hierarchy hypothesis in a cross-cultural context. This is 
important because cross-cultural research adds contextual information to the examination of 
basic processes that are often overlooked. Our study is not the first to test the motivational 
hierarchy hypothesis in different cultural contexts, but, as we will explain below, our 
methodological approach is more convincing than previous studies in this area, in that 
potential overlap of the concepts is minimized. Furthermore, our study is applied in a setting 
that tests the expanding of self-oriented emotions to include others in the context of injustice.  
Relational and Group Collectivism 
Traditionally, cross-cultural research has contrasted individualistic with collectivistic 
societies – which have been defined as societies in which members’ self-concept is 
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interconnected with the group (Triandis, 1995). This definition has been criticized for being 
too narrow and simplistic. More specifically, Oyserman et al., (2002) have argued that the 
term “collectivistic” might be too general and not always useful in our understanding of 
categorizing individuals and cultures. Following Brewer and Gardner's (1996) descriptions of 
the three levels of self-representation (individual, relational, and group collective; see above), 
Brewer and Chen (2007) applied a concrete differentiation between the latter two. More 
precisely, they suggested dividing collectivism into “relational” and “group” collectivism ‒ 
relational collectivism being the connection to a group of people with whom one has a 
relationship on a personal level (such as a family member, friend, or colleague) and group 
collectivism being the connection to the larger collective group with whom one shares a social 
categorization (such as someone from the same city or country; cf. Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Yuki, 2003). It is important to note that the group collective self includes a perceived 
connection with an individual person as well as with the group as a whole (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996). 
Therefore, perceived cultural differences between collectivistic and individualistic 
cultures may be due to the dissimilarity in the terms by which others are included in the self 
and how this dissimilarity contributes to the definition of the self. More specifically, a 
relational self-representation is based on interpersonal connections (e.g., “I am a colleague of 
Dr. Brewer and Dr. Gardner”) whereas a group collective self-representation is based on 
memberships in social categories (e.g., “I am a member of the psychology department”). 
Notably, these self-representations also predict how individuals behave towards others, for 
instance, how they perceive and evaluate other people’s actions. Consequently, group 
memberships (i.e., whether the judged individual belongs to one’s in-group or to an out-
group) are more relevant in “group collectivistic” cultures, whereas personal connections (i.e., 
whether they know somebody personally or not) are more relevant in “relational 
collectivistic” cultures. 
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Evidence for this conceptualization of relational and group collectivism comes from 
looking at trust and group category membership (Realo & Allik, 2009; Yuki, Maddux, 
Brewer, & Takemura, 2005), allocation task in nested groups (Lee, Adair, Mannix, & Kim, 
2012), and the norm of reciprocity (Chen, Chen, & Portnoy, 2009). For instance, Yuki et al. 
(2005) found that US-American students were more inclined to trust other students from their 
own university (i.e., their in-group) than students from another university (i.e., an out-group), 
whereas Japanese students were more inclined to trust students from another university more 
if they knew somebody from that university personally (compared to students from a 
university where they did not know someone personally). In other words, group membership 
was more important to American respondents, who tend to have a strong categorically-defined 
(“group collectivistic”) self-representation, whereas the possibility of a personal relationship 
was more important to Japanese respondents, who tend to have a strong relational self-
representation (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Yuki et al., 2005). 
Hierarchy of the Selves 
These different selves exist across all cultures, but cultures may vary in the relative 
endorsement of the three. As originally conceptualized by Markus and Kitayama (1991), 
people from East Asian cultures would embrace the relational self and people from Western 
cultures would be more strongly inclined toward the individual self, while Brewer and Chen 
(2007) argue that people from Western cultures would also have a stronger group collective 
self. However, Gaertner and colleagues (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Gaertner et al., 
2012; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002) took a different conceptual approach. 
They acknowledge all three self-representations as important facets of identity, but argue that 
these self-definitions are hierarchically structured – regardless of one’s cultural background. 
Across many studies they found evidence for the primacy of the individual over the relational 
self, and for the relational over the group collective self (Gaertner et al., 1999, 2002, 2012). In 
these studies, participants were presented with a threat to the self as an individual, to the 
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relational, or to the group collective self. For example, in earlier studies that compared the 
individual self to the group collective self (Gaertner et al., 1999), university students were told 
that they (individual self) or their university (group collective self) had performed poorly in a 
creativity test, and measured the reaction to this threat through a variety of measures such as 
anger, mood, and belief in the truthfulness of the feedback. They found that participants had a 
stronger adverse reaction to the threat to the individual self compared to the group collective 
self. With operationalizing the three different selves that way, Gaertner and colleagues 
consistently found that people react more strongly to situations that imply a threat to their 
individual self, followed by a threat to their relational self, and, lastly, a threat to their group 
collective self. For example, in a threat avoidance paradigm, participants avoided writing 
about ill fate more when it befell the self than when it befell a person they shared a personal 
relationship with (relational self), followed by a condition in which it befell a member of their 
most important group (group collective self) (Gaertner et al., 2012, Study 2). 
In real life, there is often an overlap between the relational and the collective self. For 
instance, a person I know (i.e., relational self) can also belong to the same company (i.e., 
collective self). It makes sense to assume that reactions to situations that target the relational 
and the collective self are positively correlated when looking at individuals who are relevant 
for a person’s self-representation. Research trying to prove that the relational self is more 
universally relevant than the group collective self needs to work hard to clearly disentangle 
the two selves. Here, we argue that there is room for improvement in the designs used by 
Gaertner and colleagues in this regard. For instance, learning that a friend of mine failed in a 
creativity test might make me more aroused than learning that a fellow student of mine failed, 
but it is hard to say how exactly this difference in arousal can be explained as long as it is 
unclear whether the “friend” belongs to an in- or an out-group, and whether I actually have a 
personal connection to the “fellow student” or not. This is what we aim to achieve with the 
present research. 
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Further, Gaertner et al. (2012) looked at cultural differences in two of their studies. 
These studies included samples from both Western countries (UK or USA) and East Asia 
(China). Although these studies found some evidence for a pan-cultural motivational 
hierarchy of the selves, the results were not definitive in the ability to discount the role of the 
cultural context in both methodology and in the results. For example, the operationalization 
used with the cross-cultural samples measured areas in which an individual has more personal 
control over the outcome and in this way has more direct agency, which favors the individual 
self and disfavors the group collective self. That is, when asked about future goals in reality 
we have more control over our own personal action and are therefore more likely to think of 
goals for which we can directly influence the outcome. 
Beyond these limitations, the authors themselves called for future research to test their 
model in different contexts and with different populations. This is precisely what the present 
paper intends to accomplish. We will apply the questions of self representation primacy to the 
opening situation: how does the primacy of the relational and group collective self influence 
one’s reaction to perceived injustice? Gaertner and colleagues acknowledge past research in 
the area of cross-cultural psychology; however, the focus on similarity between cultures 
leaves out the specificity of the concepts, which are important in cross-cultural contexts. That 
is, the hierarchy established in the research outlined above may depend on the overlap of the 
relational and group collective self-representation.  
The Present Research 
The current study aims to reexamine the hierarchy of the self under more stringent 
definitions of the relational and group collective self. We crossed relational connection, 
defined as someone with whom the participant has a social tie or who is part of their 
interpersonal network, with group collective connection, defined as someone with whom one 
shares category membership. Manipulating relational and group collective connection 
orthogonally is particularly beneficial because we can distinctly measure the unique effects of 
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different types of relationships. Gaertner et al. (2012) also acknowledge the role of 
overlapping self-representations, and investigated the overlap between the individual self and 
the relational self, and between the individual self and the collective self. However, there is 
reason for further investigation because they did not account for the overlap between the 
relational and collective self. Without distinguishing these two overlapping selves, it is 
difficult to say that one is in fact primary to the other.  
In addition, the measurement of vicarious anger with specific people rather than a 
group as a whole was necessary to keep “construal level” constant. Drawing from construal 
level theory, objects or events can be represented more abstractly or more concretely, with 
differences in the level of abstraction being associated with differing judgments and behaviors 
(see McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 2012). A group as a whole would be represented on a higher 
construal level than a specific individual. Therefore, comparing the observed victimization of 
a group would evoke different emotional reactions compared to the victimization of a singular 
relational other. The choice to represent the categorical group with an individual exemplar 
allowed us to compare the self-representations without confounding the level of construal. 
Furthermore, this research addresses the question of the role of culture, which is still 
not conclusively answered. For instance, in Study 4 of Gaertner et al. (2012), the results fit the 
hierarchy of the self with a notable exception: American males showed no difference between 
relational and group collective self. This could fit a cultural context explanation as past 
studies showed that people from East Asian cultures and women are more interdependent 
(Cross & Madson, 1997). Therefore, the results are in line with the idea that women and 
Chinese male participants would show primacy of the relational self over the group collective 
self, and that this difference would diminish for Western men. 
We tested the motivational hierarchy hypothesis by looking at emotional reactions to 
an observed victimization of others. Our central dependent variable was the extent to which 
participants experienced vicarious anger and moral outrage toward what happened to the other 
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person. We decided to investigate participants’ emotional reactions to observed injustice 
because research suggests that proximity ‒ both physical and symbolic ‒ as well as in-group 
membership and similarity are important for sympathy and the desire to help victims 
(Loewenstein & Small, 2007). This is supported by neuropsychological evidence that shows 
through fMRI that the activation of regions associated with one’s own pain mirrors the 
emphatic response toward the pain of a friend, but not a stranger (Beckes Coan, & Hasselmo, 
2013). Further, work looking at justice sensitivity has shown that the sensitivity to feeling like 
a victim is extended beyond the self to include in-group members (Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 
2015). Injustice befalling others can also threaten the self if those others are relevant to the 
individual.  
Participants were sampled in three different cultures: Germany, the USA, and Japan. 
In the literature, Germany and the USA are categorized as more individualistic culturally, 
while Japan is categorized as more collectivistic (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). This allows us to 
reexamine the contextual primacy hypothesis which is predicted by Brewer and Chen (2007), 
and was disregarded by Gaertner et al. (2012). 
To control for individual differences that may influence the response to instances of 
injustice, we included a series of other measures. First, justice sensitivity from the victim’s 
perspective (“victim sensitivity”) has been shown to affect one’s anger/outrage toward 
perceived injustice at one’s own disadvantage (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 
2005; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2015). Next, 
not all people within a culture adhere to cultural norms to the same degree. Therefore, it is 
also important to measure individual differences in the endorsement of the three self-
representations (i.e., individual, relational, group; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Finally, because the 
situations in the vignettes are intended to invoke participants’ reactions to harm done to one’s 
in-group, the degree to which participants identify with the in-group in question is measured. 
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Methods 
Participants  
Participants were sampled in three different countries. In Germany (N = 273, 64% 
female), a university employee list-serve was used to recruit participants, and compensation 
was entry in a lottery for a tablet computer. The American (N = 214, 45% female) sample was 
recruited through the Crowdflower web platform for which participants received $1.00 for 
participating. The Japanese (N = 309, 54% female) sample was recruited through a survey 
service provider, and compensation paid through the service. The ages of German participants 
ranged between 19 and 65 years (MAge = 36.08, SDAge = 11.42); for American participants, the 
ages ranged between 19 and 73 years (MAge = 33.49, SDAge = 10.62); and for Japanese 
participants, the ages ranged between 20 and 75 years (MAge = 45.54, SDAge = 14.13).
1 
Procedure 
After a welcome message, participants were asked to carefully read a series of four 
vignettes which depicted a workplace conflict situation. Each vignette was followed by a page 
with two manipulation check items, and another page with items measuring the dependent 
variable in this study, vicarious anger and outrage. This was followed by the next vignette 
situation. The names of the perpetrator, the target and the specific victimization differed 
across the four vignettes. The order in which the four vignettes were presented was held 
constant for all participants; however, the order in which the four experimental conditions 
appeared was counterbalanced (Greek-Latin square design). Furthermore, participants were 
randomly assigned to a male or female version in which both the perpetrator’s and target’s 
gender were matched (either both male or both female). Following the vignettes and 
dependent variables, participants completed the victim sensitivity, the self-representations, 
                                                 
1 The Japanese and American versions of the survey included two bogus questions, and participants who missed 
either question were excluded from analysis (American sample: N =  123; the Japanese sample number of 
excluded participants was unreported by the data collection company). The exclusion criteria for the German 
sample were based on the manipulation check items described below. 
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and the in-group identification measures. Finally, a number of demographic variables (i.e., 
age, gender, employment status, size of employer, work experience, and type of industry2) 
were assessed. After that, participants were thanked and directed to their reward.  
Vignettes 
All materials were first written in English and included rounds of translation and 
back translation to each of the respective languages3. Each vignette confronted participants 
with a situation describing specific instances of victimization. Each participant read four 
victimization vignettes (due to the relational connection  group collective connection within-
subject design). For example, victimization in the “no relational connection / group collective 
connection” condition was:  
“Imagine you work for a large company. Your boss (let’s call him Mr. Parris) calls in 
someone from your department that you don’t know personally (let’s call him John) to his 
office to discuss their time sheet. There were days in the past month that John worked from 
home. However, Mr. Parris argues that John didn’t have permission to do so, so he discounts 
some of John’s work hours. Mr. Parris was aware that many other colleagues also work from 
home in the past month, but they were not reprimanded.” (see Appendix A for the full text of 
all the vignettes).  
Manipulation Checks 
Following each vignette there were two manipulation check items. In the German 
sample, this took the form of yes/no questions (e.g., “Was John (a) from the same department 
as you or (b) from a different department than you?” and “Do you know John personally? (a) 
                                                 
2 The demographic variables did not affect the findings and are not reported on further. 
3 First, all materials were translated by researcher assistants naïve to the materials from English to the target 
language (German or Japanese) and then back to English by another naïve translator, following the established 
back translational procedure (Brislin, 1970). The back-translated English and the original English materials were 
then compared for discrepancies. These instances were then discussed and the entire document was checked for 
readability by two native speakers familiar with the materials. Next, a second back translation by a naïve 
translator and a check for any further discrepancies followed. If major changes were still needed, the materials 
were again discussed by the committee. If the two English translations were deemed equivalent, the translation 
was ready for use. 
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yes (b) no”). Participants answered 8 of these questions (2 items for each of the 4 vignettes). 
193 participants (68.2 %) answered all 8 manipulation check questions correctly, 81 
participants (28.6%) missed one or two questions, and 10 participants (3.2%) answered 3 or 
more questions incorrectly and were thus excluded from further analyses.  
American and Japanese participants answered the manipulation check questions on a 
6-point Likert type scale (e.g., “To what extent do you feel that John and you belong to the 
same group, the same ‘category’?” from 1 = “not at all” to 6 = “very much;” and “To what 
extent do you feel personally connected to John?” from 1 = “totally unconnected” to 6 = 
“strongly connected”). For the American sample, in the vignette conditions in which 
participants were told they had a relational connection with the victim (M = 4.14, SD = 1.12), 
participants felt significantly more connected than when there was no relational connection 
(M = 3.58, SD = 1.28), t(213) = -5.99, p < .001, d = 0.41. In the vignette conditions in which 
participants were told they belonged to the same group as the victim (M = 4.15, SD = 1.08), 
participants felt significantly more group belonging than in the conditions in which they were 
part of a different group (M = 3.91, SD = 1.11), t(213) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 0.23. For the 
Japanese sample, in the vignette conditions in which participants were told they had a 
relational connection with the victim (M = 2.69, SD = 1.05), participants felt significantly 
more connected than when there was no relational connection (M = 3.10, SD = 1.14), t(308) = 
5.72, p < .001, d = 0.32. In the vignette conditions in which participants were told they 
belonged to the same group as the victim (M = 3.01, SD = 1.11), participants did not feel 
significantly more group belonging than in the conditions in which they were part of a 
different group (M = 2.97, SD = 1.10), t(308) = -0.58, p =  .561. We will come back to this in 
the Discussion section. 
Dependent Variable: Vicarious Anger/Outrage 
Vicarious anger/moral outrage, which was the main dependent variable, was assessed 
with 4 items (αs  .78 across the four vignettes; e.g., “When I think about what Mr. Parris did, 
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I feel personally angry”) on a 6-point rating scale from 1 = “completely disagree” to 6 = 
“completely agree” (see Appendix B for all measures). Other emotions measured here were 
shame, relief, and rumination. These were included as filler items and will not be analyzed 
here. One item measured participants’ vengeful intentions (“If I could, I myself would get 
back at Mr. Parris for what he did”) on the same 6-point rating scale as used for all other 
items. Vicarious anger/moral outrage was only moderately correlated with vengeful intentions 
(rs = .46 to .49 across the four vignettes; all ps < .01). This coincides with the point that these 
variables have a conceptually different meaning. Thus, the vengeful intention item was 
analyzed, separately.   
Potential Moderators 
To measure victim sensitivity (αs > .88), the 10-item scale developed by Schmitt et al. 
(2005, see also Schmitt et al., 2010) was used. To measure self-representations, the 13-item 
scale from Brewer and Chen (2007) was used. Individual self-representation was measured 
with 3 items (αs > .59; e.g., “I am a unique individual”). Relational self-representation was 
measured with 6 items (αs > .71; e.g., “My happiness depends very much on the happiness of 
those around me”), and collective self-representation was measured with 4 items (αs > .60; 
e.g., “The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am”). These items 
were measured on a 7-point rating scale from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree.” 
For in-group identification we adapted Leach et al.'s (2008) 7-item scale (αs > .91; e.g., “I feel 
solidarity with my work group”), which was measured on a 7-point rating scale from 1 = “not 
at all” to 7 = “very much.”  
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Results 
Measurement Invariance 
To test whether our four-item scale measuring vicarious anger/outrage had comparable 
properties across the three cultures (“measurement invariance”), we applied confirmatory 
factor modeling using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2007). We followed the step-up approach 
by Brown (2006) and tested for metric invariance (equal form, equal loadings), which is the 
required level of measurement invariance for correlation-based analysis. First, we tested 
measurement models in each country, separately. All models provided a good fit across the 
four vignettes (ranging from χ2 = 0.11 to 3.71, df = 2, CFI = 1, TLI = 1, RMSEA = .000 to 
.053, see Table 1). Next, we tested configural invariance, which assumes that the factor 
structure across all items is identical in all cultures. This proved to show good fit, with the 
result of the model across the four vignettes, (ranging from χ2 = 1.72 to 8.20, df = 6, CFI = 1, 
TLI = 1, RMSEA = .000 to .037, see Table 2). In the next step, metric invariance was tested, in 
which the loadings of the items were constrained to be equal across cultures. These models fit 
the data well (χ2 = 17.71 to 31.11, df = 12, CFI = .988 to 1, TLI = .982 to 1, RMSEA = .019 to 
.045, see Table 2). The change in chi-square (Δχ2 = 13.52 to 29.38, ps = .000 to .147, ΔCFI = 
.000 to .012) was not significant at p < .005 for all but the fourth vignette. Although the 
change in chi-square was significant here, the change in CFI was very close to the critical 
value of .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Furthermore, the various fit indexes suggest that the 
fit of the model is good in all other cases. We therefore assumed metric invariance for our DV 
across cultures
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Table II-1 
Fit of the single country group solutions model testing for vicarious anger/outrage separated by vignette (Vin 1 – Vin 4) 
   χ2 df RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
USA (n = 214 ) Vin 1 1.40 2 .000 (.000- .122) 0.010 1 1 
 Vin 2 1.82 2 .000 (.000- .132) 0.011 1 1 
 Vin 3 1.63 2 .000 (.000- .128) 0.010 1 1 
 Vin 4 0.11 2 .000 (.000- .022) 0.003 1 1 
Japan (n = 309) Vin 1 1.86 2 .000 (.000–.110) 0.009 1 1 
 Vin 2 2.96 2 .039 (.000–.127) 0.010 1 1 
 Vin 3 3.71 2 .053 (.000–.136) 0.012 1 0.99 
 Vin 4 0.82 2 .000 (.000–.087) 0.007 1 1 
Germany (n = 274) Vin 1 3.33 2 .049 (.000- .139) 0.010 1 0.99 
 Vin 2 0.28 2 .000 (.000- .062) 0.010 1 1 
 Vin 3 2.85 2 .039 (.000- .133) 0.014 1 0.99 
 Vin 4 0.79 2 .000 (.000- .091) 0.007 1 1 
Table II-2 
Measurement invariance testing for vicarious anger/outrage between Germany, USA, and Japan separated by vignettes (Vin 1 – Vin 4) 
   χ2 df χ2/df ∆χ2 ∆df p RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form Vin 1 6.59 6     .019 (.000–.084) 0.009 1 1 
Equal factor loadings  22.08 12 1.84 15.495 6 0.017 .056 (.014–.093) 0.062 0.990 1 
Equal form Vin 2 5.06 6     .000 (.000–.072) 0.009 1 1 
Equal factor loadings  18.58 12 1.55 13.52 6 0.035 .045 (.000–.084) 0.050 1 1 
Equal form Vin 3 8.20 6     .037 (.000–.093) 0.012 1 1 
Equal factor loadings  17.71 12 1.48 9.514 6 0.147 .042 (.000–.081) 0.051 1 1 
Equal form Vin 4 1.721 6     .000 (.000–.014) 0.006 1 1 
Equal factor loadings  31.11 12 2.59 29.384 6 0.000 .077 (.044–.111) 0.072 0.988 0.982 
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Hypothesis Tests 
Vicarious Anger/Outrage. This DV was submitted to a 2 (relational connection: 
yes/no; within-subjects)  2 (group collective connection: yes/no; within-subjects)  3 
(country: Germany, USA, Japan; between-subjects) ANOVA. We found a significant main 
effect of relational connection, F(1, 793) = 35.68, p < .001, partial ² = .043. Vicarious 
anger/outrage was significantly higher when participants knew the victim personally (M = 
4.05, SD = 1.20) than when they did not (M = 3.86, SD = 1.24). This effect was qualified by a 
significant relational connection  culture interaction effect, F(2, 793) = 4.93 p = .007, partial 
² = .012.Breaking down this interaction, the effect of relational connection did not differ 
between German and US respondents (p = .085), but was weaker among Japanese (t(308) = 
1.78, p = .076, d = 0.10) compared to US-American and German respondents combined, 
t(486) = 6.03,  p < .001, d = 0.27 (see Figure 1). 
The main effect of group collective connection was not significant, F(1, 793) = 0.74, p 
=  .389, partial ² = .001. Thus, across all cultures, vicarious anger/outrage did not differ as a 
function of shared group membership with the victim. The group collective connection  
culture interaction effect was also not significant, F(2, 793) = 1.16, p = .314, partial ² = .003. 
Also, the three-way interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 793) = .62, p = .540, partial ² 
= .002.  
Vengeful Intentions. Mean values for this single-item measure were analyzed with the 
same ANOVA model as before. Again, there was a significant main effect of relational 
connection, F(1, 792) = 21.73, p < .001, partial ² = .027. Participants reported a higher 
motivation to vicariously punish the perpetrator when participants knew the victim personally 
(M = 2.85, SD = 1.51) than when they did not (M = 2.68, SD = 1.47). No other main or 
interaction effects were significant. 
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Figure II-1 Relational connection by culture interaction effect. For the participants from Japan, there was less of 
a difference in moral outrage between those with a relational connection versus without compared to the 
difference in moral outrage in Germany and USA. 
To sum up, we were able to corroborate the notion that relational connections are more 
relevant for people’s vicarious responses to unfairness happening to another person than 
formal (“group collective”) connections. This is in line with Gaertner et al.’s motivational 
primacy hypothesis: the relational self-representation is more primary to the core of selfhood 
than the group collective self-representation.  
Additional Analyses: Moderation by Individual Differences 
Due to the lack of measurement invariance for the four individual differences 
measures4, a direct cross-cultural comparison including these measures as moderators of our 
effects is not appropriate. However, it is still worthwhile to look at within-country effects. 
First, we looked at vicarious anger/outrage (see Table 3). While the results of the Japan and 
                                                 
4 The same procedure as above showed non-invariance between cultures for individual self-representation, 
relational self-representation, collective self-representation, and in-group identification measures. The exception 
to this was the victim sensitivity measure which was comparable across cultural groups on a level of metric 
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the US samples yielded no significant interactions, the German sample warrants further 
attention. In the German sample, there is a marginally significant group collective connection 
 individual self-representation interaction effect (see Figure 2). This is in line with Brewer 
and Chen's (2007) interpretation of individualism: the higher participants’ individual self-
representation, the more difference it makes if the victim belongs to the same group as the 
participant or not. Thus, for Germans as a typical Western (“individualistic”) country, 
individual self-representation is important to collective group membership, but not to 
relational connections with the victim.  
Looking at vengeful intentions, the only individual differences variable that had a 
significant moderator effect was victim sensitivity: There was a relational connection  victim 
sensitivity interaction across all cultures, F(1, 791) = 6.75, p = .010, partial ² = .008 (see 
Figure 3). The higher the participants’ victim sensitivity, the more difference it made if they 
knew the victim personally or not. 
 
Figure II-2  German sample, significant collective connection by individual self-representation interaction 
effect. The higher participants’ self-reported individual self-representation, the more difference it makes if the 
group is a collective group connection or not. Individualism is important to collective group categorization in 































Table II-3  
Interaction Effects Between Group Collective and Relational Connection and Victim Sensitivity, Self-Representations, and Identification, Separated by Country 
    Germany   Japan   USA 
    df MS F Sig. Partial ²   df MS F Sig. Partial ²   df MS F Sig. Partial ² 
Group Collective   1 0.437 0.461 0.50 0.002  1 0.272 0.32 0.58 0.001  1 0.001 0 0.97 < 0.001 
     * Individual Self  1 3.405 3.593 0.06 0.013  1 1.588 1.85 0.18 0.007  1 1.432 2.11 0.15 0.01 
     * Relational Self  1 0.065 0.069 0.79 < 0.001  1 2.011 2.34 0.13 0.009  1 0.126 0.19 0.67 0.001 
     * In-Group Identification  1 3.163 3.338 0.07 0.012  1 0.003 0 0.96 < 0.001  1 0.001 0 0.97 < 0.001 
     * Victim Sensitivity  1 0.436 0.46 0.50 0.002  1 0.345 0.4 0.53 0.002  1 0.084 0.12 0.73 0.001 
Error (Group Collective)  268 0.947     254 0.861     209 0.679    
Relational  1 19.47 22.63 0.00 0.078  1 1.472 2.08 0.15 0.008  1 5.93 7.03 0.01 0.033 
     * Individual Self  1 0.27 0.314 0.58 0.001  1 0.091 0.13 0.72 0.001  1 1.523 1.81 0.18 0.009 
     * Relational Self  1 0.635 0.739 0.39 0.003  1 0.741 1.05 0.31 0.004  1 0.13 0.15 0.70 0.001 
     * In-Group Identification  1 0.051 0.059 0.81 < 0.001  1 1.294 1.83 0.18 0.007  1 2.698 3.2 0.08 0.015 
     * Victim Sensitivity  1 2.244 2.609 0.11 0.01  1 0.021 0.03 0.86 < 0.001  1 0.584 0.69 0.41 0.003 
Error (Relational)  268 0.86     254 0.707     209 0.844    
Group Collective * Relational  1 0.001 0.001 0.97 < 0.001  1 0.267 0.38 0.54 0.001  1 0.49 0.73 0.40 0.003 
Error (Collective * Relational)   268 0.899         254 0.709         209 0.673       
 
 




Figure II-3 Relational connection x victim sensitivity interaction across all cultures. For participants high in 
victim sensitivity, there was a greater difference between vengeful intentions for the condition with a relational 
connection compared to those without. 
 
Discussion 
When discussing the psychological meaning of the “self” there is often, but not 
always, an overlap in different self-representations. Our friends, family and co-workers are 
conceivably in our same social collective, be that university, church group, or company. 
However, even with some convergence, the three fundamental selves are conceptually 
distinguishable. If we wish to definitively rank the relative importance or to identify cross-
cultural differences, it is important to experientially parse out the distinct definitions and 
reevaluate the relative primacy. That is precisely what this study has done.  
Brewer and Chen (2007) drew attention to the importance of the definition of the 
group in understanding cross-cultural differences in self-representations. Beyond the 
individual self, which is straightforward, they argued that the collective self needs to be 
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others) and group collective self-representations (based on shared group memberships). The 
present study tested whether relational self-representations are more relevant than group 
collective self-representations (as argued by the motivational primacy hypothesis; cf. Gaertner 
et al., 2012), and whether this holds across different cultures. Most importantly, our study is, 
to the best of our knowledge, the first to test this hypothesis with a stringent design ‒ that is, 
by manipulating relational and group collective connections orthogonally. Under these 
conditions, we found further evidence for the hierarchy of the relational self over the group 
collective self. Participants across three cultures were angrier when a relational other was 
harmed than when a collective group member was harmed. 
There was minimal support for a cultural context explanation given that the only 
significant interaction effect including culture was that Japanese respondents tended to be less 
sensitive to the “relational connection” variation than respondents from the other two 
countries. This is an interesting finding because we would have expected Japanese 
respondents to be more sensitive to relational connections (rather than to group collective 
connections, cf. Yuki et al., 2005). We can only speculate about the reason for this. For 
instance, it could be that for Japanese participants, “work department” might have been too 
small as to be a meaningful social unit. Support for this can been seen in the manipulation 
check where participants from Japan did not feel more belonging when they were in the same 
group compared to a different group. For Japanese participants, it is possible that membership 
in the same work department was not distinctive enough to parse out a relational connection; 
those in a different department are still part of the same company and therefore plausibly still 
in the same social network. Therefore, we might have observed less differentiation across all 
conditions in the Japanese sample. Further research should look to make the collective group 
distinction more concrete, especially in an Asian context. Although this interaction effect 
hints at future exploration of a cultural element in the relative importance of relational 
connections, overall the evidence for a pan-cultural hierarchy is convincing.  




One aspect that may be considered a limitation of the present study was the 
discrepancies between data collection in three samples. More precisely, in the German sample 
participants responded to a call for volunteers with a lottery, while the participants in the other 
two countries were recruited through a third-party platform and all received a small payment 
via that platform. Part of this is due to the challenges of collecting culturally diverse non-
student sample data. However, despite this limitation, we found strong evidence for the 
relational self over the group collective self in each setting. Therefore, the main finding is 
persuasive over any alternative explanations related to sample recruitment.  
Another concern was the lack of a comparable individual difference measure. 
Although different nations are categorized by cultural differences, individuals will adopt these 
cultural norms to different degrees. Therefore, it is important to measure the individual 
endorsement of cultural ideals. In this aspect our study was limited. A more reliable self-
representation measure could better detect individual difference in self-representation, which 
in turn could support the hypothesis of relative importance of the relational self or the group 
collective self in people with different cultural orientations, even if the three tiered hierarchy 
remains intact. 
Finally, although the vignette presented different workplace conflicts, they were of the 
same format and designed specifically for this task; therefore, our vignettes might be 
considered limited in their generalizability. However, this was not unintended. Rather than 
using an established paradigm, this study was designed to be additive to past research and 
present previously unexamined circumstances for which to observe the motivational hierarchy 
of self-representations.  
  




 The inclusion of others in one’s own self-concept can be observed across cultural 
contexts. This can be reflected in the emotional reaction to observed injustice. This paper 
investigated the relative importance of self-representation beyond the individual self that 
includes relational others and those with whom one shares a common group membership. 
Across three cultures, the extent to which participants were relationally connected to a victim 
(i.e., knew the victim personally) was a better predictor of their experiences of vicarious anger 
and moral outrage as well as their inclination to vicariously punish the perpetrator. This is the 
case in both Western and Eastern cultures: the relational self holds primacy over the group 
collective self-representation.  
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Full text of all the vignettes 
1) “A member from another team within your large company (let’s call him Mr. Smith) 
approaches someone from your department that you don’t know personally (let’s call him 
Jack) and asks to switch shifts with him because he needs to see a doctor. Jack agrees and 
takes Mr. Smith’s early-morning shift. Later you hear that Mr. Smith actually never saw a 
doctor (and never intended to do so); he just wanted to sleep in that day because he had been 
partying the night before.” 
 
2) “Imagine you work for a large company. Your boss (let’s call him Mr. Parris) calls in 
someone from your department that you know personally (let’s call him John) to his office 
to discuss their time sheet. There were days in the past month that John worked from home. 
However, Mr. Parris argues that John didn’t have permission to do so, so he discounts some 
of John’s work hours.  Mr. Parris was aware that many other colleagues also work from home 
in the past month but they were not reprimanded.” 
 
3) “Imagine you work in a large company. Employees share a person who helps with 
administrative tasks (let’s call this person Mrs. Park). Mrs. Park is most unhelpful to someone 
from another department that you don’t know personally (let’s call this person Jessica) 
because she dislikes Jessica personally. Every time Jessica asks Mrs. Park to complete a task 
she says she is busy and will attend to it later. However, when colleagues ask for something 
Pearl attends to it immediately. This affects the quality and efficacy of Jessica’s work.” 
 
4) “Imagine you work in a mid-size company. Your boss asks someone from another 
department that you know personally (let’s call this person Jane) to work with another 
employee (let’s call her Mrs. Johnson) on an important report that will raise Jane’s profile at 
the company. The two spend weeks going back and forth collaborating on the report. 
Although they worked well together on  this report, later Jane learns that Mrs. Johnson is 
spreading rumors about her and her work ethic, saying she is lazy and combative in hopes 
Patty will be asked to work on the next report without Jane, further improving Mrs. Johnson’s 
own reputation within the company.” 
  





1. “When I think about what Mr. Smith did, I feel personally angry” * 
2. “I have no strong negative emotions in reaction to this situation” (r) * 
3. “I feel contempt with Mr. Smith’s behavior” * 
4. “Personally, I feel outraged about what Mr. Smith did” * 
5. “I am personally relieved I am not in Jack’s position”  
6. “I feel personally ashamed for Mr. Smith” 
7. “I will ruminate about what happened to Jack for some time now” 
8. “If I could, I myself would get back at Mr. Smith for what he did” † 
9. “What Mr. Smith did to Jack feels as if he did it to me” 
10. “I would not think twice about what Mr. Smith did” (r)  
Completely Disagree 123456 Completely Agree 
* Items for vicarious anger/moral outrage 
† Item for vengeful intentions 
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III. Chapter 3: Expansion of the Self in the Reaction to Injustice of Others: 
Categorical versus Relational Self 
 
Zoe Magraw-Mickelson, Leonie Schmitt, Paulina Stocker and Mario Gollwitzer 
Abstract 
When do people feel the most concern for the injustice towards others? Based on findings 
from the self-construal literature, we hypothesize that people, as observers, are most 
concerned about third-party injustice when there is a fit between their self-construal and the 
kind of relationship that they have with the victim -- in other words, observers will be most 
outraged when primed with a relational self-construal, learn about a relational group member 
being victimized, and when observers primed with an individual self-construal learn about a 
group member with a shared category being victimized. In an experimental lab study with 
Chinese university students (N=141), we took a novel approach to manipulating relational 
groups in addition to categorical groups, using a minimal group paradigm, as well as 
manipulating self-construal using a priming task. Although we did not find evidence for our 
main hypothesis when using the primed self-construal, we found indirect support looking at 
the individuals’ measured self-construal. Specifically, interaction between participants’ 
interdependent self-construal and type of shared group predicted emotional outrage in 
observed victimization of a third party other.  
  





 In unfair situations people are likely to feel concerned about the injustice to oneself, 
but when do people feel the most concern for the injustice towards others? To answer this 
question we first need to focus on who is implied in ‘others’ and how that relates to 
personality characteristics. People will have more concern when the victim has some 
connection to the self, compared to no connection, but what type of connections are 
important? Based on findings from the self-construal literature, people are most concerned 
about third-party injustice when there is a fit between one’s self-construal and the kind of 
relationship that the observer has with the victim. The present study will look at how the 
degree of concern for third-party injustice is influenced by group membership, either 
categorical or relational, in conjunction with self-construal, either independent or relational.  
 Differences in self-construal signify aspects of one’s self definition, specifically the 
degree to which people think of themselves in terms of others. These dispositional traits are 
categorized as independent and interdependent self-construal style5 (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 
2000). Past research has suggested that individuals with a more interdependent self-construal 
include others in the self, while individuals with a more independent self-construal are less 
likely to include others in the self (Gardner, Gabriel, & Hochschild, 2002). However, this is a 
simplistic explanation, especially in that it does not extrapolate on who specifically is 
important for those with an interdependent self-construal. Research also suggests that groups, 
and group bonds are also important to those thought of as individualistic (Social Identity 
Theory: Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, we need to look at the types of group and 
personality factors in conjunction.  
                                                 
5
 Although independent and interdependent self-construal are often theoretically understood as orthogonal 
constructs (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, 1993; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995), the evidence is 
mixed. Meta-analysis has shown that the dimensionality of the constructs depend on a number of factors, such as 
the sample characteristics, the measure being used, and the level of analysis (Taras et al. 2014). Nonetheless, as 
Taras and colleague (2014) point out, even when conceptualized as independent constructs the definitions are 
composed of highlighting the opposite features. We will also refer to the constructs as opposites but consistently 
test both constructs independently. 




This study will look at self-construal, both measured and manipulated, and group type 
using minimal group paradigms in situations of third-party injustice. Concern for third-party 
injustice is the extent to which the unfair-fair difference differs between oneself and another 
person being the victim. This captures concern for the injustice of others as it is contrasted to 
the self, therefore providing insight into who are the relevant ‘others’ when talking about the 
self, group membership and injustice.  
Self-construal  
Self-construal describes ways in which the self is defined; more specifically the self-
construal framework describes independent and interdependent self-construal influences on 
cognition, emotion and behavior. Markus and Kitayama (1991) popularized the two 
complimenting constructs now widely researched in cross-cultural studies. As defined in the 
literature: interdependent self-construal represents individuals who define themselves in terms 
of relationships and integrate others into their self-concept, while individuals with a more 
independent self-construal place less emphasis on social embeddedness with the group 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Each self likely coexists in an 
individual; however, one self-construal is more likely to be more dominant then the other 
(Gaertner et al., 2012; Hannover & Kühnen, 2004; Singelis et al., 1999). Although self-
construal varies between cultures, the relative endorsement of dispositional self-construal also 
varies within cultures (Cross et al., 2000; Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai, 1999; Singelis, 
1994).  
Key to these definitions is the focus on the independence or the integration of the self 
with others or the group, however, it is still not conceptually clear who is meant by ‘others’ or 
‘group’. Brewer and Chen, (2007) convincingly argue that the literature is vague on this point 
and call for differentiation in types of in-group relationships. Inconsistent findings in the 
literature with regard to the construct (i.e., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), also 
gives weight to the notion that there is a necessity to differentiate the meaning of others and 




the group. Specifying what is meant when defining interdependence or collectivism as the 
presence or absence of a connection to the group, will clarify our understanding of self-
construal.  
In more detail, it has been proposed that collectivism should be conceptually divided 
into the relational self and categorical self, to highlight different types of groups or others 
with whom one can be connected. In terms of self-construal, relational self is specified as the 
tendency for the self to be defined by the connection to a group due to a personal relation 
(such as a close friend or family member) while categorical-self is specified as the tendency 
for the self to be defined as the connection to the larger collective group with whom one 
shares a category social (such as, someone from the same university or geographical region; 
cf. Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Yuki, 2003). Therefore, self-construal 
can be defined as “individual self”, “relational self”, and “categorical self”. The relational self 
is more conceptually in line with the original concept of the interdependent self but highlights 
the importance of those with whom one has a personal connection to one’s self-concepts. 
Categorical self, on the other hand, was theorized by Brewer and Chen (2007) to be relevant 
for those traditionally described as independent. Groups can also be defined as “relational”, 
meaning groups of people who have an interconnected relationship, and as “categorical”, 
meaning groups of people who share the same label. With these distinctions we can better 
predict the interaction of personality characteristics and group type. 
Past research has shown an overall motivational hierarchy of the self across cultures 
(Gaertner et al., 1999, 2002, 2012; Magraw-Mickelson & Gollwitzer; 2018). That is, overall 
the individual self is more important than the relational self, and the relational self is more 
important than the collective self. That is, across culture when the different aspects of the self 
are in conflict people are most concern for the individual self and least concerns for the 
collective self. However, the similarity across cultures in the importance of the three self-
representations does not answer the question about the interaction between the relative 




importance of the self and group type. The current study will ask this question by looking at 
self-construal and group type within a Chinese sample. 
Furthermore, although research has found evidence of the differentiation between 
aspects of collective self, there has not been many explicit tests of the relationship between 
individual self-construal and categorical groups. It is theorized that even cultures that are 
more individualistic also care about groups, namely those which they share a group 
membership (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Magraw-Mickelson and Gollwitzer (2018) found that 
within the German sample, participants high in independent self showed more outrage when a 
victim was from their collective group compared to not part of the collective group; however, 
this was not found in the American or Japanese samples. The present study will follow up on 
these results by directly testing the relationship between individual self and categorical 
groups, expecting their relationship to be similarly matched as relational self and relational 
groups. 
Therefore, when we look at for whom one is concerned in situations of injustice, there 
will be most concern when there is an overlap between the self and the other, that is, when 
there is a match between the type of group which is important to the self and the group at 
hand. We will find less outrage if there is a mismatch.  
Minimal – Groups  
In order to investigate group types we will look to the minimal group literature. 
Minimal group paradigms are often used in social identity theory research to investigate in-
group favoritism and are defined as “depersonalized social categories based on arbitrary 
category distinctions between in-group and out-group” (Brewer & Chen, 2007, p. 147). It has 
been found in Western countries that artificially created groups can induce in-group 
favoritism based solely on categorization, demonstrating the dominance of in-group bias in 
intergroup evaluations and allocation behavior (Perreault & Bourhis, 1998; Platow, 
McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990).  




Some research has considered if the relationship between in-group identification and 
in-group bias depends on personality factors such as self-construal. In studies that examined 
whether the identification and in-group bias relationship was moderated by collectivism, 
Capozza, Voci, and Licciardello, (2000) found, counter to predictions based on the 
importance of groups for collectivist, that the bias was stronger and more coherent for 
individualists. These unexpected results were explained as relating to differences in self-
esteem motivation, that is, in-group identification and enhancement contribute to self-esteem 
which is more important to those with an independent self-construal, however this was not 
directly tested. Other studies have found that in Japan, a typical collectivist culture, 
categorization alone did not induce in-group favoritism, rather participants only showed in-
group favoritism in the experimental condition in which there was an expectation of 
generalized reciprocity between in-group members (Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 1998). Further 
research supported this finding that East Asians do not readily engage in outgroup 
discrimination in minimal group settings, when discrimination does not indirectly benefit the 
self (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari 1999). 
However, it is clear that in past research minimal groups relied on only one form of 
group membership, that is, the categorical minimal groups. In these studies researchers 
assigned group membership based on an arbitrary label and found results such as positive in-
group bias and empathy, as well as out-group discrimination (Montalan, Lelard, Godefroy, & 
Mouras, 2012; Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, Ryan, Bizumic, & Subasic, 2007; Rubini, 
Moscatelli, & Palmonari, 2007). In-group favoritism and bias can also occur in groups that are 
relationally formed. It is not unreasonable to assume that people will also show favoritism 
toward those with whom they know even in the absence of a categorical label. Therefore, in 
addition to traditionally formed categorical minimal groups, we also form relational minimal 
groups by inducing a personal relationship between strangers in an experimental setting.  




In addition, minimal groups are advantageous in this design because in real life there 
is often an overlap between group types, that is someone who belong to the same categorical 
group is also someone one knows personally. Minimal group paradigms minimize the noise 
from real group’s membership categories and intersecting relationships. 
Priming Self-Construal  
 Self-construal is an aspect of personality that has been shown to differ between 
cultures; however, there is also within-country variation. Furthermore, self-construal can also 
be experimentally manipulated by making the self-knowledge associated with one or another 
self-construal temporarily accessible. It is theorized that people from individualists and 
collectivists countries respond to personal and group treatment according to mindsets that are 
the cultural “default”. Priming self-construal allows researchers to move away from a reliance 
on national culture as a proxy for self-construal (Cross et al, 2011). Studies have 
demonstrated that situational cues can lead to “frame switching” between the different self-
construal in bicultural participants (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Thus, 
priming can be used to experimentally examine the effects of individual self-construal, 
relational self-construal, and categorical self-construal on behavior (Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-
Swing, 2011). This idea of priming culture such as collectivism and individualism has been 
explored extensively (for a review see Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Counter-cultural priming 
paradigms in cross-cultural research not only show why cultures may differ, they also provide 
a high degree of internal validity (Van den Bos, Brockner, van den Oudenalder, Kamble, & 
Nasabi, 2013). One of the most common priming techniques is the pronoun circling task. The 
concept is that pronouns, such as “we” and “us”, carry emotional significance and meaning, 
and that these characteristics can automatically and unconsciously shape self-construal 
(Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). 
Priming is a useful procedure to delineate the causal relationship of cultural 
differences and psychological dimensions (Van den Bos et al., 2013; Van den Bos, Van 




Veldhuizen, & Au, 2014). However, there are a few limitations to current priming strategies, 
such as the ambiguous nature of current priming techniques, especially in regard to the 
differentiation between priming relational-self and categorical-self which have been attempted 
much less extensively than independent-interdependent self-construal. Most of the 
manipulations used in past studies make salient relational aspects of the self (Gardner , Shira, 
& Lee, 1999) and the way the self is similar to others (Trafimow et al., 1991), excluding 
obligation or duty to the categorical in-group. 
Although some research indicates the effects of priming tasks are similar for East 
Asians, Europeans, and Americans (Oyserman & Lee, 2008), relatively few studies have used 
the priming techniques with non-Western samples. In addition, when priming is investigated 
in non-Western countries it is usually a comparison between a Western sample and a Japanese 
or Korean, or Hong Kong Chinese samples. Therefore, more studies are needed to assess the 
effectiveness of the priming tasks for other non-Western countries and diverse Asian samples 
(Cross et al, 2011). 
Justice sensitivity  
Finally, when investigating perceptions of injustice it is important to include other 
theoretically-related facets of personality. Justice sensitivity describes differences in the 
degree to which individuals are concerned with injustice (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, 
& Baer, 2005). It has been found to be a highly stable and consistent personality trait. A 
heightened sensitivity towards injustice can be from different perspectives, such as from the 
perspective of an observer, victim, beneficiary or perpetrator. Observer sensitivity, which is 
the sensitivity to injustice from the observer’s perspective, is expected to predict the degree of 
concern for the injustice of others regardless of the relationship to the victim.  Therefore, we 
would expect observer sensitivity to have a direct relationship to emotional outrage at 
witnessing others’ disadvantage. Victim sensitivity on the other hand, which is the extent to 
which people react emotionally when confronted with injustice to their own disadvantage and 




the degree to which one is susceptible to feeling like a victim may also be relevant to the 
question at hand in some conditions (Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2014). 
It has been shown that people high in victim sensitivity are sensitive not only to their 
own injustice but also to that of their group members, both for categorical groups (Süssenbach 
& Gollwitzer, 2014) and relational groups (Magraw-Mickelson & Gollwitzer, 2018). The 
concepts of self-construal in conjunction with victim sensitivity means that, especially for 
people high in victim sensitivity, if a self-construal is relevant to an individual, others that 
belong to that category will be included in the self which will result in increased emotional 
outrage when that person is the target of injustice, compared to victims who are not part of 
their expanded self.  
Present research 
The present research will integrate the above concepts to investigate the question of 
when people are most concerned for the injustice of others. The hypothesis here is that people 
are most concerned about third-party injustice when there is a fit between self-construal and 
the kind of relationship that observers has with the victim. This is especially true for those 
high in victim sensitivity. Self-construal is both measured via self-construal scales and 
experimentally manipulated via a priming procedure. The priming manipulation consists of 
three conditions (individual, relational, and neutral control). The control condition is included 
to establish a baseline. Relationship to the victim is defined as whether the victim and the 
observer share a categorical group membership or a relationally-connected group, which is 
defined by personal connections. A minimal group paradigm will be used to make groups 
which are either categorical or relationally defined.  
Our primary research question is whether self-construal and the kind of relationship to 
the victim interact with each other, such that concerns about another person being treated 
unfairly is highest (a) in the individual self / categorical group and (b) in the relational self / 
relational group conditions, That is: 




Hypothesis 1: When primed with an individual self, people will experience stronger 
justice-related emotions (“anger” and “moral outrage”) and show more punitive behavior 
(“punishment” at a cost) when a categorical (vs. relational) group member is harmed 
compared to the control or relational prime conditions. 
Hypothesis 2: When primed with a relational self, people will experience stronger 
justice-related emotions (“anger” and “moral outrage”) and show more punitive behavior 
(“punishment” at a cost) when a relational (vs. categorical) group member is harmed 
compared to the control or individual prime conditions. 
In addition, we explored a secondary research question: To what extent does victim 
sensitivity moderates the main effect.6 
Methods 
Participants 
 Prior to data collection, we conducted a power analysis estimation using G*Power 
3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). This analysis suggested a sample size 
between 116 (ɳ² = .085; α=.05; 1- β =.90) and 180 (ɳ²=.055; α=.05; 1- β =.90) participants. 
Taking possible dropouts and mistakes during data collection into account, 176 participants 
were recruited from a large Chinese university. Thirty-eight participants were excluded from 
analysis using previously establish criteria: not of Chinese nationality (4), missing data (4), 
failed attention check7 (30). Five additional participants were excluded because of an 
experimenter’s errors (e.g., the experimenter did not give the participant the correct 
materials). The remaining sample consisted of 141 participants (57% females, 43% males). 
Participants were between 17 and 28 years old (M=20.70, SD=2.30). Most of the students 
were undergraduates (82%; 13% graduates, 4% post graduates, 1% High school student). 
                                                 
6 See pre-registration of design materials and hypotheses at 
https://osf.io/9qgeh/?view_only=2494c503827a4b1b8cfd1a8ffef3be2b 
7
 The survey portion of the materials contained two attention check items (e.g. “This is an attention-check. 
Please tick “exactly.”). 




Participants were recruited through the university’s online platform, on campus and in classes. 
The advertisement introduced a study that explored the influence of personality traits in 
groups and behavior and stated the possibility to earn up to 16 yuan for participation. 
Experimental procedure 
In total, seven experimenters conducted 50 experimental sessions of 3-5 participants8 
that were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions9. Experimenters followed a 
standardized script, each experimental session lasted 30 minutes and was conducted as 
described in the following. 
To begin, participants signed the informed consent, which assured that participants 
knew about the frame of the study as well as their personal rights within the study. This was 
followed by three pages of questionnaires containing the variables: victim sensitivity, 
observer sensitivity, individual self-construal, interdependent self-construal and identity as 
student group scale (see below for details) and demographic information. 
After the completion of the questionnaires, participants then learned about an 
economic game that they would play in two rounds with an unknown counterpart and were 
given an answer sheet to record how they would play in the games. As part of the cover story, 
participants were told that, depending on the decisions made in these two rounds, they could 
earn additional money. Participants took part in a modified trust game (see e.g. Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) which is played as follows: in the first round of the game, 
participants were assigned the role of the sender. As such, participants received 4 tokens (1 
token = 2 yuan) some of which they could send to an unknown receiver. Any amount of 
tokens they sent would be tripled (e.g. sent 2 tokens, receiver would get 6 tokens). Later, in 
                                                 
8
 In cases where only 2 participants were scheduled for an experimental session a confederate acted as a third 
participant. 
9
 Conditions here refer to the four experimental conditions (individual SC & categorical GT, relational SC & 
categorical GT; individual SC & relational GT, relational SC & relational GT) as well as control conditions 
(neutral SC & categorical GT; neutral SC & relational GT). 




the second round of the game the receiver could decide whether to keep the tokens or share 
them with the sender.  
Minimal group paradigm. After collecting the game responses, the experimenter told 
participants that “I will now leave to get the results of several games and information relating 
to the measures you have completed. While I am gone, I want you to get to know the other 
participants in the room. Talk to all of them and find out whether you have a friend in 
common or how else you might know each other.” The experimenter asked them to sit 
together at one table for that purpose and left the room for 7 minutes. Conversations between 
participants during that time served to create attachment among the participants, which is a 
fundamental feature of a relational group. After that time of getting to know each other, the 
experimenter returned to the room, and the participants were informed that based on earlier 
completed measures, they were assigned to either categorical group A or group B, in a 
minimal group paradigm (see e.g., Reynolds et al., 2007, in fact, all participants were assigned 
to group A). To intensify the categorical group information, participants had to write their 
categorical group (e.g. group A) on each of the following questionnaire pages. In addition the 
experimenter said, “Please note your group. In this experimental session, participants in the 
room are split between the two groups.” 
Priming Self-Concept. To prime self-construal, we used the pronoun circling task 
(Gardner et al. 1999; Kashima, Hardie, Wakimoto, & Kashima, 2011; Kühnen, Hannover, & 
Schubert, 2001). In this procedure, participants were asked to read a paragraph about a day in 
the city (see Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Depending on the condition, the paragraph contained 
either 18 “individual pronouns”, 18 “relational pronouns”, or 17 “vehicle words” (taxis, 
trucks, cars, vehicles) that participants had to circle when they read the paragraph for the 
second time. The description of the manipulation conditions are as follows (see Appendix A 
for full text): 




1. Individual self: The individual prime condition was told from the first-person singular 
perspective, using first-person singular pronouns only (I, me, my). 
2. Relational self: The relational prime condition was told the story from the perspective of 
“my partner and I,” using first-person plural pronouns only (we, us, our). 
3. No prime neutral condition: In the no prime condition, the story was told from a neutral 
perspective.  
Trust Game, round two group manipulation. Immediately after the priming of the self-
construal, the second round of the trust game started. In this round participants saw the results 
of 5 games shown in Table 1. In each game, the sender gave 4 tokens, meaning the receiver 
had 12 tokens to disperse. 
Table III-1  
The results of the trust game for the 5 games 




















Tokens sent back 
to Sender 
2 6 2 6 4 
Tokens kept by 
Receiver 
10 6 10 6 8 
Distributional 
fairness 
Unfair Fair Unfair Fair Unfair 
 
Depending on the conditions, players affected by the game results were either another 
person from their same group A (categorical group) or another person in the same session 
(relational group). For example, the result of game 1 for a participant in the categorical group 
condition read as follows: 
“These are results of a game between a different Group A member (Sender) and a 
different Group B member (Receiver). A Group A member as the Sender gave all 4 of 
the tokens, so the Group B member as the Receiver received 12 tokens (4 tokens 
tripled by the experimenter). The Group B Receiver decided to return 2 tokens to the 




Sender. Result: This Group A player has 2 tokens and the Group B member has 10 
tokens.” 
After each of the five game results, participants filled out measures of anger and moral 
outrage. Participants also had the opportunity to punish the receiver at their own cost, by 
losing 3 tokens for each token they would take away from the receiver. In the final portion of 
the study participants completed a manipulation check for the group manipulation and for the 
priming manipulation, as well as an inclusion of the other in the self (IOS) scale for both 
manipulated groups (see below).  
Debriefing and reward. At the end of the experiment, participants were revealed the 
real purpose of the lab experiment and received money for participation. 
Materials 
Translation process. Original English instructions and measures served as a basis to 
obtain valid Chinese equivalents10.  
 Dependent variables. Anger: Anger was measured via self-report using an adaptation 
of the State-Anger subscale Ärgergefühl of the State-Trait-Ärgerausdrucks-Inventar-2 [State-
Trait-Anger-Expression-Inventory-2] (STAXI-2, Rohrmann et al., 2013). The five items (e.g., 
“I am mad.”) were rated on a 6-point Likert-scale ranging from 0 = “not at all” to 5 = 
“exactly” α = .87. 
 Moral outrage: Moral outrage was measured via self-report using two items adapted 
from Gollwitzer, Braun, Funk, and Süssenbach (2016) and three items developed for this 
study. The five items (e.g. “I am indignant.”) were also rated on a 6-point Likert-scale ranging 
from 0 = “not at all” to 5 = “exactly”. α = .91. 
                                                 
10
 We follow the basic back translation procedure outline in Brislin, (1970). People fluent in both languages each 
engaged in one of the different steps of the following translation process: first the original questionnaires were 
translated from English to Chinese, and then back translated from Chinese to English. In the next step, 
discrepancies between the original English version and the first English back translation were highlighted. If 
those discrepancies were due to mistakes in the Chinese translation, the respective sentences were translated 
(English - Chinese) and retranslated (Chinese - English) until both the original English version and the Chinese 
version were found to be equivalent. Finally, the Chinese questionnaire was pre-tested which resulted in minor 
final improvements of the instructions and measures. 




 Punitive behavior: Punitive behavior was measured by asking participants if and (if 
yes) with how many tokens they wished to punish the receiver considering a punishment rate 
of 3:1 at their own cost. The maximum possible punishment was indicated in parenthesis, as 
the game numbers differed between games (10 vs. 6 vs. 8 tokens). It also served to compute 
the proportional punishment (actual punishment/possible punishment) for each game. 
Hypotheses. 
We expect a two-way interaction effect (priming: individual, relational, neutral) x 
relationship/group type (categorical, relational) on the DV’s (second-order difference score) 
regarding emotional and behavioral reactions;  
H1: Participants primed with an individual-self will experience stronger justice-related 
emotions (“anger” and “moral outrage”) when a categorical (vs. relational) group member is 
harmed compared to the control or relational prime conditions. 
H2: Participants primed with a relational-self experience stronger justice-related emotions 
(“anger” and “moral outrage”) when a relational (vs. categorical) group member is harmed 
compared to the control or individual prime conditions.  
Supplementary variables. 
    Potential moderator. The personality trait victim sensitivity was assessed using the 
Chinese version of the subscale Victim Sensitivity of the Justice Sensitivity Inventory 
(Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005). Participants rated the ten items (e.g., “It makes 
me angry when others receive a reward that I have earned.”) on a 6-point Likert-scale from 0 
= “not at all” to 6 = “exactly”. α = .85. 
Potential covariates. The personality trait observer sensitivity (10-items subscale 
Observer Sensitivity of the Justice Sensitivity Inventory; Schmitt et al., 2005) α = .85, 
independent self-construal style and interdependent self-construal style (5-items subscale 
Autonomous Orientation subscale and 4-items subscale Social Orientation of the 
Relationalitäts-Kontextabhängigkeits-Skala [Relationality-Dependency-Scale]; Gollwitzer, 




Schmidthals, & Pöhlmann, 2006), α =  .78 and α =  .60 respectively, and participants’ identity 
with students as a group (adapted 6 items scale Group identity; Leach et al., 2008) were all 
rated on a 6-point Likert-scale from 0 “not at all” to 6 = “exactly” α = .85.  
Priming manipulation check. To assess participants’ activated type of self-construal 
after the pronoun circling task, participants completed an adapted version of Kuhn & 
McPartland’s (1954) Twenty-Statements-Test, by writing 10 statements in response to the 
question “Who am I?” (as in, e.g., Kashima et al., 2011).    
Check of following manipulation instructions: Two items asked participants which 
categorical group they were in and whether they talked to participants from their experimental 
session when instructed to do so. 
Potential mediator. To see whether participants extended their self to include others in 
their self as a consequence of the manipulated group identity, participants answered two items 
adapted from Aron, Aron, Tudor & Nelson’s (1991) Inclusion of Other in the Self scale which 
asked about the overlap between the self and the “people with you in this session” and “other 
group A members”. 
Results 
Manipulation check  
For the “Who am I?” task, we calculated the proportional number of individual, 
relational, and categorical statements (see e.g. Kashima et al., 2011). We found no difference 
between the proportion of each type of statement and the self-construal priming conditions. 
Statements were on average 60% individual statements, 32% collective statements and 9% 
relational statements, regardless of self-construal prime. Although our priming and 
manipulation check task has commonly been used for cross-cultural research in the past, a 
lack of a measureable effect could be due to many reasons: 1) the self-construal priming 




manipulation failed11, 2) the “Who am I” manipulation check failed, and/or 3) the 
manipulation check was too long after the priming task (after the games and DV’s) that there 
was no longer a measureable effect. Nonetheless, we continue with the main analysis keeping 
these possibilities in mind. 
Dependent variables 
To test our main hypothesis, the second-order difference score (i.e., [Game 1 – Game 2] 
– [Game 3 – Game 4]) regarding the three DV’s (moral outrage, anger, punishment) was 
analyzed. Therefore, scores represented the relative care for the injustice of in-group members 
compared to just situation and compared to injustice toward the self. However, for the 
punishment variable, 68% of participants did not punish at all and only 11% had a positive 
difference score; therefore, this variable was not suitable to analyze as a dependent variable. 
Anger and moral outrage as raw scores correlated rs > .84 and the second order difference 
scores correlate r = .62. Given the high correlation between the scales, we averaged the two 
into one variable, which is Emotional Outrage, to test our hypothesis. 
Primary analysis 
In our preregistration document, we specified a 2x3 ANOVA. However, on closer 
examination, a significant amount of the variance in the DV anger, 33%, was due to 
differences between groups, while 67% amount of variance is due to differences between 
participants within groups. Therefore, we proceeded to test our hypothesis using multilevel 
modeling which can take into account the nested nature of the data (i.e., treat group as a 
random variable on level-2). 
We found no main effects of the group membership manipulation (B=0.05, SE(B)=0.23, 
p=.82) nor of either of the self-construal priming conditions (individual prime: B=-0.20, 
SE(B)=0.22, p=.36, relational prime: B=-0.18, SE(B)=0.23, p=.43) on emotional outrage. 
                                                 
11
 Some participants did not follow all of the directions in the priming task, by not circling all the words 
however there was no difference between these participants and the others in the “Who I am?” statements or 
other variables. 




Furthermore, no two-way interaction between them (group membership x individual prime: 
B=0.12, SE(B)=0.32, p=.72, group membership x relational prime: B=0.04, SE(B)=0.32, 
p=.90) was found.  
However, when we enter the previously designated potential moderators VS and 
covariate OS as standardized variables, we found the following: a main effect of OS (B=0.28, 
SE(B)=0.09, p=.003), and a marginal three way interaction between group membership, 
relational self-construal prime, and victim sensitivity (B=0.82, SE(B)=0.53, p=.065) on 
emotional outrage (see Table 2 for the results of the entire model). The plot of this interaction 
(see Figure 1) shows that looking specifically at the three-way interaction with the relational 
prime vs no prime contrast, those high in victim sensitivity show less relative emotional 
outrage when there was a match between the victim being in the relational group and a 
relational self-construal prime.  However, these results were not significant according to 
conventional levels, so interpretation of the results should be treated cautiously. 
 
Table III-2 
     Results for the analysis of moderators VS and covariate OS 
 
 
B SE(B) df t Sig. 
Intercept -0,30 0,53 141,00 -0,56 0,575 
Group type 0,50 0,81 141,00 0,61 0,543 
Relational prime contrast 1,17 1,01 141,00 1,16 0,248 
Individual prime contrast -0,25 0,74 141,00 -0,34 0,737 
Victim Sensitivity  -0,14 0,19 141,00 -0,75 0,457 
Observer Sensitivity  0,28 0,09 141,00 3,08 0,003 
Group type by Relational prime contrast -2,37 1,31 141,00 -1,80 0,074 
Group type by Individual prime contrast -0,42 1,13 141,00 -0,38 0,709 
Group type by Victim Sensitivity  -0,15 0,28 141,00 -0,54 0,588 
Relational prime contrast by Victim Sensitivity  -0,44 0,34 141,00 -1,31 0,192 
Individual prime contrast by Victim Sensitivity  0,03 0,26 141,00 0,13 0,897 
Group type by Relational prime contrast by Victim 
Sensitivity  0,82 0,44 141,00 1,86 0,065 
Group type by Individual prime contrast by Victim 
Sensitivity  0,18 0,38 141,00 0,48 0,633 
 





Figure III-1 Three-way interaction between group membership, relational self-construal prime, and victim 
sensitivity. 
Exploratory analysis 
Due to the fact that we do not have evidence that our manipulation of self-construal 
truly worked, we did an exploratory analysis to look at the measured self-construal 
(independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal) rather than the manipulated 
self-construal as independent variables. Looking again at the nest model as above, including 
OS and VS as covariate, we found a marginally significant interaction between group member 
type and interdependent self-construal scale (B=-0.24, SE(B)=0.13, p=.063), but not with 
group member type and independent self-construal scale (B=0.03, SE(B)=0.13, p=(.84), (see 
Table 3 for the results of the entire model). The plot of this interaction (see Figure 2) shows 
that for those in the categorical victim condition, when interdependent self-construal was 
high, there was more relative emotional outrage compared to those low on interdependent 
self-construal. This simple effect was marginally significant (B=-0.16, SE(B)=0.09, p=.094). 
For participants in the relational victim condition there was no significant difference between 




































     Results for the analysis of group type and independent and interdependent self-construal with 
covariates OS and VS 
 
B SE(B) df t Sig. 
Intercept -0,12 0,09 141,00 -1,31 0,191 
Group type 0,08 0,13 141,00 0,65 0,518 
Victim Sensitivity  0,26 0,07 141,00 3,64 0,000 
Observer Sensitivity  -0,11 0,07 141,00 -1,58 0,117 
Independent self-construal  -0,09 0,09 141,00 -0,95 0,344 
Interdependent self-construal  0,06 0,09 141,00 0,72 0,475 
Group type by Independent self-construal  0,03 0,13 141,00 0,21 0,837 
Group type by Interdependent self-construal  -0,24 0,13 141,00 -1,87 0,063 
 
 
Figure III-2 Interaction between group member type and interdependent self-construal scale. 
 
Discussion 
We conducted a between-subject experimental study in China that manipulated group 
membership: categorical group member vs. relational group member, and self-construal: 
individual self vs. relational self vs. neutral. First, we measured personality variables, which 
was followed by a minimal group paradigm and priming procedure. A trust game then served 






























It was important to manipulated self-construal, not only because it leads to less 
ambiguity about the casual relationship, but also because this method was clearer in the 
distinction between the relational self and the categorical self. However, we did not find the 
expected interaction between group membership and primed self-construal. This could be due 
to the priming procedure itself. There is evidence for the prime being less then successful in 
the results of the manipulation check, that is, the “Who I am?” statement task did not show the 
expected variation by priming condition. This could be due to the fact that these procedures 
have not been tested fully in China but also due to the limitations of priming culture in 
general. It is known from the literature that priming effects experimentally induced are 
qualitatively different from the effect culture has on psychological behavior in several ways; 
importantly, priming effects are fleeting, whereas the cultural influences are stable and lasting 
(Suh, Diener, & Updegraff, 2008). With this limitation in mind it was important to follow up 
by testing our main hypothesis with measured self-construal. 
With this analysis we found some support for our main hypothesis: participants low in 
interdependent self-construal. In other words, when the relational self is relatively 
unimportant to an individual, there was more emotional outrage when the victim was from 
their categorical group compared to when the victim was from their relational group. This 
supports the theory that we predict more moral outrage when there is a match between one’s 
self-construal, that is, the relational self, and group type, that is the relational group member 
harmed. However, this also points to a complicated relationship between the two scales for 
self-construal and the further differentiation between the relational and categorical self-
construal. The measured self-construal scales are not differentiated between individual self, 
relational self, and categorical self. However, we can presume from our results, in line with 
the hypothesis presented in the literature (Bewer & Chean 2007), that the low end of the 
interdependent self scale taps into the categorical self. That is, when the interdependent self-
construal is less relevant, the self for whom categorical groups are relevant is more important. 




However, much more research is need in the area of measurement of self-construal and the 
relationship between the different types of self-construal, so as to clarify if they are 
orthogonal concepts. 
In addition to our main hypothesis we also looked at a secondary research question 
regarding the moderating role of victim sensitivity. We found a marginal effect of victim 
sensitivity, however, in the opposite direction as predicted. Participants high in victim 
sensitivity showed less outrage when there was a match between the relational self and 
relational group type. Therefore, rather than expanding the self to include relevant others, 
people high in victim sensitivity showed more concern for their own injustice relative to 
others when the victim’s group matched the primed self-construal. Future research should 
look into the issue of when victim sensitive people include groups in the self. It is possible 
that the features of minimal groups have the opposite effect as real groups for people high in 
victim sensitivity. 
Although this study raises important question about manipulating self-construal and 
how that relates to measures of independent and interdependent self-construal, this study 
contributed to the exploration of new methods in the cross-cultural and self-construal 
literature. Very few studies have attempted priming procedures in China, and, to our 
knowledge, previous research has not attempted to apply the minimal group paradigm to 
relational groups. Future research should expand on this by looking at additional cultural 
samples, especially because the effects of cultural primes when there are differences in 
national culture is not yet fully understood. 
An additional caveat of these results is the reported effects are only marginally 
significant; therefore we take caution in interpreting them. Future studies should replicate 
these findings to verify the results. 
In conclusion, this research shows that the degree to which one is outraged over the 
injustice affecting another person contrasted to outrage at one’s own injustice is influenced by 




the interaction between self-construal and the shared group membership type to the victim. 
However, more research is needed to strengthen these findings. 
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Text for priming conditions  
Before you will get to see the results of several games, you will participate in the following 
short task. 
Please read the text below carefully.  
 “A day in the city” 
 “I go to the city often. My anticipation fills me as I see the skyscrapers come into view. I 
allow myself to explore every comer, never letting an attraction escape me. My voice fills the 
air and street. I see all the sights, I window shop, and everywhere I go I see my reflection 
looking back at me in the glass of a hundred window. At nightfall I linger, my time in the city 
almost over. When finally I must leave, I do so knowing that I will soon return. The city 
belongs to me.” 
(Prime of the individual self) 
 “My partner and I go to the city often. Our anticipation fills us as we see the skyscrapers 
come into view. We allow ourselves to explore every comer, never letting an attraction escape 
us. Our voice fills the air and street. We see all the sights, we window shop, and everywhere 
we go we see our reflection looking back at us in the glass of a hundred window. At nightfall 
we linger, our time in the city almost over. When finally we must leave, we do so knowing 
that we will soon return. The city belongs to us.” 
(Prime of the relational self) 
“Vehicles go to the city often. Cars fill the streets when skyscrapers come into view. Taxis are 
allowed in every comer in the city, taxis are on all the city streets. Trucks deliver goods to 
shops, many cars zoom by and the buses are full. Vehicles horns fill the air and street, the 
taxis are often the loudest. At nightfall there are fewer cars, but always some taxis. When 
there are finally less cars and trucks on the street, it is only temporary the cars, trucks and 
taxis will soon return. The city belongs to the vehicles.” 
(Prime of the relational self) 
 
Please read the text above once again and carefully circle all the pronouns you can find in the 
text. 
 (Prime of the individual self) (Prime of the relational self) 
Please read the text above once again and carefully circle all the vehicle words you can find in 
the text. 
 (No prime) 
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IV. Chapter 4: Survey Mode and Data Quality: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of 
Careless Responding Across Three Modes 
 
 
Zoe Magraw-Mickelson, Huan Wang and Mario Gollwitzer 
Abstract 
Much psychological research depends on participants’ diligence in filling out materials such 
as tests or surveys. However, not all participants are motivated to respond attentively, which 
leads to unintended issues with the quality of the data. Our question is: how do different 
modes of data collection - paper/pencil, computer/web-based, and smartphone - affect 
participants’ diligence vs. “careless responding” tendencies and, thus, the data quality? 
Results from prior studies suggest that different modes of data collection produce a 
comparable prevalence of careless responding tendencies. However, as technology develops 
and data are collected with increasingly diverse populations, this question needs to be 
readdressed and taken further by looking at cultural differences. The present research 
examined the effect of survey mode on careless responding across three waves in a repeated-
measures design. Following recommendations in the literature, we computed a careless 
responding index as a composite of eight indicators that capture aspects of a participant’s 
inattentiveness. In a sample of working adults from China, we found that participants were 
significantly more careless when completing computer/web-based survey materials than in 
paper/pencil mode. In a sample of German students, participants were significantly more 
careless when completing the paper/pencil mode compared to the smartphone mode. In a 
sample of Chinese-speaking students, we found no difference between the modes. This paper 
will discuss why these results deviate from past findings that investigated study modes and 
hypothesize about potential cross-cultural differences. 





Psychological research often depends on self-report surveys to collect data, which 
depends on participants giving meaningful answers. Participants giving answers without 
regarding the content of the questions is a source of measurement error that can lead to 
unusable data or even inaccurate conclusions. Furthermore, psychological research is 
expanding in two significant ways: technological speaking, there has been a distinct shift from 
paper and pencil surveys to those done on computer/web platforms, to the increasing use of 
mobile phone platforms. With this shift, some studies suggest that these are equally effective 
platforms (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; De Beuckelaer & Leievens, 2009; Dodou & de 
Winter, 2014). However, as humans’ familiarity with and the novelty of technology is ever 
shifting, the quality of data generated from different platforms warrants reexamination 
overtime. Second, while most studies that appeared in mainstream psychological journals 
were based on a homogeneous samples from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic (WEIRD) societies (see Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010), an increasing 
number of studies now include subsamples from different countries or cultures, or try to 
replicate their findings in these countries/cultures in order to scrutinize their external validity 
(e.g., Aknin et al., 2013).  
Developments in technology had facilitated many researches on  self-report data 
quality such as rudimentary data screening methods, i.e. straightlining or string responses 
(Zhang & Conrad, 2014) and cross platforms comparison (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; 
Yun & Trumbo, 2000). However, there is a research gap on the cultural influences of 
“careless responding”.  In a cross-cultural context of Germany and China, this article answer 
the question: how do different modes of data collection - paper/pencil, computer/web-based, 
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and smartphone – interact with cultural values to affect participants’ diligence vs. “careless 
responding” tendencies and, thus, the data quality? .  
Careless Responding: Definitions and Identification Strategies 
Careless responding (CR) is defined as data that “doesn’t reflect respondents’ true 
levels of the construct purportedly being measured” (Meade & Craig, 2012). In the literature, 
this has also been referred to as insufficient effort responding (Bowling et al., 2016; Curran, 
2016, 2016; Huang Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & DeShon, 2012), inattentive responding 
(Maniaci & Rogge, 2014), and satisficing (Fang, Wen, & Prybutok, 2014), all of which 
describe a response style that is random in regard to the item’s content. This is conceptually 
different than response bias, which is a nonrandom source of error. Although random (i.e., 
unsystematic) measurement error primarily affects the reliability of a measure, it can, under 
certain circumstances (e.g., large deviations from the mean), also increase the likelihood of 
systematically biased results (e.g., regression to the mean; cf. Huang, Liu, & Bowling, 2014; 
see also Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer, 2014). 
Typical methods of data screening, such as looking at response time and eliminating 
cases with impossibly fast times can catch some of the most extreme cases of careless 
responding; however, these methods can be fallible because they tend to overlook cases in 
which responses were careless, albeit within plausible response time ranges. Our approach is 
to look at an array of careless responding (CR) indices instead of a single indicator. This is 
advantageous for many reasons. First, any single method would miss other types of CR. This 
is highlighted in the fact that there is more than one style of responding that does not reflect 
the questions at hand. Second, many methods are designed to catch responders who are 
equally careless throughout the whole survey, in response to each and every question, which 
is often not the case. For example, a common method is to use single item questions, such as 
“use me” prompts (e.g., “In your honest opinion, should we use your data in our analyses in 
this study?”) or bogus questions (e.g., “I sleep less than one hour per night.”). Needless to say, 
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such approaches are likely to produce a type-1 error (i.e., falsely flagging a response as 
“careless”) or a type-2 error (i.e., failing to flag CR as such).  
A review of the literature came up with twelve common measures that are used to 
calculate a careless responding index: response time, long string max, long string mean, 
Mahalanobis distance, person total correlation, even-odd consistency, psychometric 
synonyms, psychometric antonyms, self-reported effort, a self-reported single ‘use me’ item, 
bogus questions and instructed response items (Bowling et al., 2016; Curran, 2016; 
DeSimone, Harms, & DeSimone, 2014; Huang et al., 2012; Huang,  et al., 2014; Huang, 
Bowling, Liu, & Li, 2015; Johnson, 2005; Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012; 
Ward et al., 2017). We will now take a closer look at these measures and what types of 
careless responding tendencies they capture. 
Response time is one of the most common data screening methods. It is normally 
calculated by determining the minimum time required to complete a survey or a block of 
questions. This cutoff value is then used to exclude participants who complete the survey in 
an impossibly or implausibly short amount of time. This identifies careless responders whose 
motive is to go through survey materials as quickly as possible. 
Long-string analysis: Long-string max and mean is the analysis of string responses, 
measuring the number of times a respondent answered with an unbroken sequence on a Likert 
scale. As an index, this can be calculated as the most identical responses in a row across 
measures, across pages of a survey, or as the mean of the longest responses across pages. This 
method identifies careless responders who put little or no effort into varying their responses. 
Slight deviations from a single response value may not be identified by this measure. 
Mahalanobis distances is used to identify outliers that arise due to careless 
responding (Bowling et al., 2016; Meade & Craig, 2012; Ward et al., 2017). By computing 
the participants distance from the average participants’ response pattern, this method 
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identifies unusual data points relative to other data points in the sample using a multivariate 
technique. 
Individual consistency: this set of indices can be grouped under the assumption that 
attentive participants will respond in an internally consistent way. There are different methods 
to determine individual consistency. First, Psychometric synonyms, items that have a high 
inter-person-correlation in the overall data set that are then correlated at the individual level, 
the logic being that participants who have low or negative correlations were not attentive to 
the content of alike questions. Similarly, psychometric antonyms find the intra-person 
correlation for the items that are found to be most negatively correlated across the data set. 
This could, for example, identify participants who ignored reverse coded items. Person-total-
correlation is another measure of individual consistency that measures each person’s 
consistency of responding with that of all other participants. A negative correlation for this 
measure identifies individuals who responded in a contrasting way to the pattern set out by all 
other participants. Even-odd consistency splits unidimensional scales into two subscales, 
even numbered and odd numbered items, and finds the correlation between the average of 
these two halves, measuring the consistency in answering items of the same scale.  
Self-report items: Self-reported effort asks participants to disclose how much effort 
they put into the task with questions such as “I worked to the best of my abilities in this 
study.” (Meade & Craig, 2012). A self-reported ‘use me’ item is usually a single item 
similar to self-reported effort in which the participant tells you if they think they were 
sufficiently attentive. These measures depend on the honesty of the participant and their 
attentiveness when the question is asked. However, these measures capture the fact that the 
participant is the one who knows best if they were careless in their responding.  
Instructed response items and bogus questions are similar in that they have a right 
or wrong answer and depend on participants reading the text of the question to get the correct 
answer. Instructed response questions tell the participant which response to select (e.g., 
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“Please select answer choice 5 for this question”) while bogus questions present a statement 
with only one plausible answer.  
 
Survey Mode, Cultural Norms, and Accountability 
The literature is mixed on how to classify careless responding; some argue that CR is 
an aspect of personality, with a considerable degree of consistency across time and situations, 
and meaningful associations with other personality dispositions, such as agreeableness 
(Bowling et al., 2016, Ward et al., 2017). However, there are also significant environmental 
factors that influence the amount of attention in the moment, such as survey mode (i.e., 
paper/pencil, computer-based) and cultural norms. 
One plausible assumption is that CR is more likely to occur in situations in which 
participants feel that they cannot be held accountable for their responses. Thus, CR should be 
less likely to occur in face-to-face interviews (where accountability is highest) compared to 
paper/pencil questionnaires that are distributed and collected by a researcher or other 
authority (where accountability is comparably weaker), and most likely to occur in online 
surveys that are completed in an entirely private environment (i.e., at home; Ward et al., 
2017). 
While this hypothesis makes a lot of intuitive sense, the research findings are mixed. 
For instance, Dodou and de Winter (2014) looked at the effect of survey mode (i.e., 
paper/pencil and computer-based) on social desirability indicators ‒ which should also be 
related to accountability concerns (cf. Paulhus, 1984) ‒ in a meta-analysis with 51 primary 
studies comprising, in total, more than 16,000 participants. Interestingly, these authors found 
no relation between survey mode and social desirability, which seems to suggest that survey 
mode is also unrelated to accountability. However, it should be noted that the vast majority of 
primary studies included in Dodou and de Winter’s (2014) meta-analysis was conducted with 
Western participants, and there are reasons to believe that culture plays a significant role in 
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social desirability concerns and the degree of accountability that is connected to a particular 
survey mode. More precisely, cross-cultural research suggests that “saving face” is an 
important concern in Asian cultures (Oetzel et al., 2001). Thus, one could argue that Asian 
participants might feel more accountable for their responses when they complete a 
paper/pencil-based questionnaire compared to a more anonymous online-based survey. 
Consequently, a higher degree of CR in computer/web surveys compared to paper/pencil 
questionnaires may be observable in Asian, but not Western, cultures. This hypothesis will be 
explored in the present study. 
New Developments in Collecting Online Survey Data 
Most of the priori methodological research on survey mode and data quality has 
focused on the difference between paper/pencil questionnaires versus computer/web surveys, 
where “computer” usually meant a stationary machine located in a specific, familiar 
environment (e.g., one’s study). However, with the increasing popularity of smartphones, 
many people do not even own a stationary machine anymore; more and more people do their 
online businesses exclusively on their smartphone. Consequently, more and more online 
surveys are now completed and even specifically designed for being completed on 
smartphones (Peterson, Griffin, LaFrance, & Li, 2017). This raises the question of whether 
careless responding is more or equally likely to occur when the online-survey is completed on 
a smartphone compared to a stationary computer. One plausible assumption could be that 
situational circumstances are much less standardized and much “noisier” (also in a literal 
sense) when the survey is completed on a smartphone compared to a stationary computer. 
Hence, careless responding should be more likely to occur when data are collected via 
smartphone than via computer. This hypothesis will also be explored in the present study.  
The Present Research 
The present study will look at careless responding in three samples ‒ a typical Western 
student sample (German university students), a sample of Chinese speaking students (from 
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two Chinese universities), and a sample of Chinese working adults ‒ to explore the effects of 
age and culture on CR. Furthermore, in a within-participant design, we will look at careless 
responding across three modes: paper/pencil, computer/web-based, and smartphone-based.  
The within-participant design we adopted for the present research is particularly beneficial 
because we can directly compare how the participants react to different modes beyond 
compounding individual differences, as past research has shown a connection between CR 
and personality variables (Bowling et al., 2016; Ward et al., 2017).  
The specific items and scales used in the survey were selected on the basis of the 
following rationale: first, it was important to have a typical psychological survey that a 
researcher would use. Second, we included a dimension related to survey engagement. Third, 
we included personality factors hypothesized to be related to survey engagement. Finally, we 
wanted to keep the overall length of the survey short so as to not create undue burden on our 
within-participant design. 
A careless responding (CR) index was calculated for each participant and each version 
on the basis of participants’ responses to these scales and items. CR values were then 
compared between survey modes (i.e., paper/pencil, computer/web, smartphone) and samples 
(German students, Chinese-speaking students, Chinese working adults). The following 
hypotheses were tested: 
H1: In all three samples, the degree of careless responding will be higher in the 
smartphone mode compared to the paper/pencil and computer/web mode. 
H2: In the Chinese students and the Chinese working adults samples, the degree of 
careless responding in the computer/web mode is higher than in the paper/pencil mode.  
Methods 
Participants  
This study included three samples from four different locations, in which participants 
were asked to complete a survey in a directed mode: Paper/pencil, online with a computer, 
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and with a smartphone12, about two weeks apart. Each sample was divided into three groups, 
and the order of modes in which the surveys were completed were systematically varied 
between groups (so that each mode occurred once at each order position; i.e., a Latin-square 
design to minimize artificial order effects). 
The sample of Chinese working adults (N = 78) were employees at a municipal clerk’s 
office in China. The procedure was carried out by the coordination office, and they received 
no reward for their participation. The sample of German students (N = 117) were primarily 
first-year psychology students. The procedure was administered through a mandatory course, 
and the paper/pencil version of the materials was followed by other unrelated survey measures 
for which the students received course credits for completing all parts. The Chinese speaking 
student sample came from two locations: university 1 (N = 74), wherein the procedure was 
administered through university language courses and second, from university 2 (N = 39), 
where the surveys were administered by a teacher in their organizational psychology course. 
Both Chinese-speaking student locations received no reward for participating. In all 
conditions, participants were told the survey was for university research and that their 
participation was completely voluntary. Participants were explicitly told that personal 
information that included email, ID numbers and phone numbers, were only for matching 
between the modes.  As soon as the three modes were matched to one participant, an 
anonymous code would be used and their personal information was deleted. Furthermore, we 
assured participants that their responses would not be seen by their employers or course 
instructors. 
Excluded from the analysis were entries which did not follow directions regarding 
completion mode (completing the smartphone version on the computer/web or vice versa), 
and therefore entered more than one response for a particular version (Chinese working 
                                                 
12 One participant in each student sample expressed that they did not own a smart phone and were directed to 
complete the remaining two modes only. 
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adults: N = 4, Chinese-speaking students: N = 22, Germany: N = 32). For these participants, 
only the dataset that was completed first was retained. Included in the calculation and 
examination of CR but excluded from the analysis of differences between modes were 
participants who completed only one version (Germany: N = 51, Chinese-speaking students: 
N = 42). Demographics of the samples are presented in Table 1. 
Table IV-1 
Sample information for the four sampling locations. 
Age  




Chinese working 78 21 56 36,03 9,78 57,7 
German students 117 18 49 21,07 4,64 88,8 
Chinese students, 
University 1 
74 19 22 20,23 0,79 90,5 
Chinese students, 
University 2 
39 20 24 21,13 1,08 25,6 
 
Materials  
The base of the survey included demographics (age, gender, education level, 
tenure/semester in university) as well as the following measures, all complete on six-point 
Likert scales ranging from 0 (“do not agree at all”) to 5 (“agree completely”): Agreeableness 
from Mini- International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Donnellan et al., 2006), consisting of 
four items (e.g., “I sympathize with others’ feelings”); social desirability with 6 items (e.g., “I 
sometimes tell lies”)  from the Balanced inventory of desirable responding (BIDR) Version 6 
short form (Stöber et al., 2002, BIDR used in China: Fang et al., 2014); a short harmony 
motivation scale (adapted from Leung, 2010,) which includes harmony enhancement, 5 items 
(e.g., “Being patient and willing to compromise is a show of respect to the other person.”) and 
disintegration avoidance, 5 items (e.g., “You should not create conflict. When you have a 
conflict, you should try to smooth it over and make the other person happy.”); the four 
subscales from the Justice Sensitivity Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2010, i.e., Victim Sensitivity, 
Observer Sensitivity, Beneficiary Sensitivity, and Perpetrator Sensitivity, 10 items each); 
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justice heuristics (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009), 6 items (e.g., “In general, I can count on my 
supervisor/instructors to be fair.”); attitudes towards surveys (Stocké, 2006, adapted), 3 items 
(e.g., “Participation in surveys is generally useful.”); technology ease of use (adapted from 
Saadé & Bahli, 2005,), 4 items (e.g., “Using [this questionnaire / this computer / this 
smartphone app] for this survey is easy for me to do.”);  feelings of anonymity, 3 items (e.g., 
“I felt anonymous completing this survey”); and one item for work stress (“Overall, the stress 
I feel at work is acceptable”); self-reported effort, 4 items (e.g. “I worked to the best of my 
abilities in this study.”) (Meade & Craig, 2012). 
Computing a Careless Responding Index 
Because this design included a paper/pencil survey, response time could not be 
calculated. Even-odd consistency was also not a good fit as an index for this data set because 
it requires a comparison between the odd and even questions across various sufficiently long 
univariate scales. This is known to be a limitation of this technique (Curran, 2016). 
Furthermore, we only included three instructed response items, as recommended by Meade 
and Craig (2012). These are preferable to bogus questions and because of the short length of 
our survey, we did not want to annoy participants with too many of this type of questions. 
Although we collected a Yes/No ‘use me’ question, we did not include this in the index 
because of its dichotomous nature.  
Therefore, we included eight indicators of careless responding in the composite index. 
In the following, we will describe the method used to calculate each of the indices.  
To calculate long string max and mean, we used three pages or blocks of questions 
that included different measures (Block 1: agreeableness and social desirability; Block 2: 
attitudes, ease of use, anonymous, effort; Block 3: harmony enhancement). Long string Max 
was the longest row of identical answers across all three blocks; Long string Mean was the 
average of long string answers across three blocks. 
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Mahalanobis distances. To calculate this measure, we averaged the Mahalanobis 
distances of 9 scales: Justice sensitivity scales, Agreeableness, Social Desirability, Harmony 
Enhancement, Disintegration Avoidance, Justice Heuristics. As seen in Table 2, for our data 
sets the correlation with Mahalanobis distances and other indices is rather low compared to 
those reported in past studies which report similar measures. This may be due to the 
distribution of the data, which is, skewed versus an even distribution. Past research has shown 
that Mahalanobis distances’ utility as an indicator is sensitive to the data’s distribution 
(Meade & Craig, 2012). 
Psychometric synonyms. Curran (2016) recommended identifying all inter-correlated 
pairs without repeat items above the cut-off of r = .60 between items. However, that strategy 
depends a great deal on the nature of the sample. Therefore, to establish some consistency 
across our three samples, we took the ten highest positively correlated item pairs, rs > .61. For 
psychometric antonyms, there are also recommendations for negative correlation cut-offs 
values r = -.20. However, we again decided to use a set number of pairs for each samples. 
Here, we used five pairs due to the fact that the survey was not very long and did not include a 
large number of reverse coded items rs < -.30. Once the pairs of items were identified for each 
sample, the intra-person correlation of those item sets was computed for each participant. 
When the correlation of synonyms or antonyms was not calculable due to the lack of variance, 
meaning either in the numerator or dominator, the participant had the same value for all items 
in the selected set, and the indices for that participant was entered as a missing value.  
Person-total-correlation scores were calculated across 60 items (i.e., justice 
sensitivity scales, agreeableness scale, social desirability scale, harmony enhancement, and 
disintegration avoidance scales) exactly as described by Curran (2016). 
For self-reported effort, we used a four-item measure as described above. For a full 
list of questions, see Appendix A. 
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For instructed response items, we included three questions per wave. An example of 
the questions is: “Please check ‘very accurate’ to show you are paying attention”. Answers 
that matched “very accurate” were coded as 0, and all other responses were coded as 1. The 
values were summed across three questions; therefore the possible range of this measure was 
0-3. 
For the self-reported ‘use me’ item, we used the single item from (Meade & Craig, 
2012): item “In your honest opinion, should we use your data in our analyses in this study?” 
Yes was coded as 0, and No coded as 1.  
To compute the CR index for each person, we multiplied person-total-correlation, 
psychometric synonyms, and self-reported effort by -1, so that all measures of CR are scaled 
in the same direction (i.e., higher values indicating a stronger carelessness). Next we z-
transformed (i.e., standardized) the eight indices separate by culture and then computed an 
aggregate score by averaging across indices. See Table 2 for the correlations between the 
indices.  
           Table IV-2a 
Correlations Among Variables for Chinese Working Adults Sample 
        
  
Variable  N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 
1. Long-string Max 78 1 
       
 2. Long-string Mean 78 ,900** 1 
      
 3. Mahalanobis distance 78 -0,088 -0,044 1 
     
 4. Psychometric synonyms 78 -0,118 -0,023 ,235* 1 
    
 5. Psychometric antonyms  76 0,134 0,145 -0,063 0,207 1 
   
 6. Person total correlation 78 0,19 ,230* ,225* ,397** ,520** 1 
  
 7. Self-reported effort 78 0,168 ,255* -,280* 0,104 0,142 0,036 1 
 
 9. Self-reported ‘use me’ 78 0,059 0,028 0,214 -0,103 0,101 0,096 -,320** 1 
 8. Instructed Response  78 0,145 0,005 -0,058 -,258* 0,061 0,119 0,105 0,031 
 Careless Responding Index 78 ,597** ,631** ,239* ,389** ,532** ,684** ,426** 0,018 ,331** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
            




         
 Correlations Among Variables for German students            
Variable    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 
1. Long-string Max 117 1 
       
 2. Long-string Mean 117 ,822** 1 
      
 3. Mahalanobis distance 117 0,012 0,117 1 
     
 4. Psychometric synonyms  117 -,215* -0,136 -0,029 1 
    
 5. Psychometric antonyms  115 -0,018 0,008 0,085 -0,052 1 
   
 6. Person total correlation 117 0,043 0,151 ,554** -,221* ,355** 1 
  
 7. Self-reported effort 116 -0,157 -0,151 -0,142 0,117 0,166 -0,103 1 
 
 9. Self-reported ‘use me’ 117 -0,067 -0,078 -0,013 -0,021 0,019 0,005 ,210* 1 
 8. Instructed Response 117 0,06 0,101 0,1 0,053 -0,051 0,045 0,171 0,094 
 Careless Responding Index 117 ,395** ,505** ,495** ,184* ,445** ,512** ,303** 0,059 ,515** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
            Table IV-2c 
         
 Correlations Among Variables for Chinese speaking students          
Variable    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 
1. Long-string Max 113 1 
       
 2. Long-string Mean 113 ,890** 1 
      
 3. Mahalanobis distance 113 -,422** -,308** 1 
     
 4. Psychometric synonyms 108 0,033 0,093 -0,05 1 
    
 5. Psychometric antonyms  113 ,247** ,195* -0,108 -0,029 1 
   
 6. Person total correlation 113 0,061 0,12 0,171 0,111 ,225* 1 
  
 7. Self-reported effort 113 ,300** ,247** -,288** 0,02 ,370** ,293** 1 
 
 9. Self-reported ‘use me’ 113 ,196* ,203* -0,013 0,077 ,222* 0,091 ,287** 1 
 8. Instructed Response 113 ,456** ,430** -0,11 0,052 ,233* ,208* ,215* 0,129 
 Careless Responding Index 113 ,665** ,686** -0,049 ,347** ,565** ,550** ,558** ,312** ,641** 









Ideally, we would have a 3 by 3 design with the three modes (paper/pencil vs. 
computer vs. smartphone; within-participants) by three cultures groups (German students vs. 
Chinese-speaking students vs. Chinese working adults; between-participants); however, due 
to the manner in which the CR index was calculated, specifically, the centering within each 
culture, the absolute value of the index is not comparable across cultures. For this reason, we 
instead ran one-factorial mixed models for each country, individually. Descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 3.  
We looked at the CR index to investigate the contrast of our main hypothesis we 
included two Helmert-coded contrasts: (1) paper/pencil = -1, smartphone = 2, and 
computer/web = -1; (2): paper/pencil =-1, smartphone = 0, and computer/web = 1. Thus, the 
first contrast compares the smartphone mode to the two other modes (as specified in 
Hypothesis 1), and the second contrast compares paper/pencil against computer/web (as 
specified in Hypothesis 2). Given that both Hypotheses were directional, the contrasts were 
tested for statistical significance on a 5% level (one-tailed). 
Chinese working adults. 
H1: We did not find evidence for H1, responses were not more careless in the 
smartphone mode compared to the other two modes in the Chinese working adult sample, B=-
.02, SE(B)=.02, p=.44. 
H2: We found evidence for H2, responses were more careless in the computer/web 
mode compared to paper/pencil mode in the Chinese working adult sample, B=.07, 
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SE(B)=.03, p=.025 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure IV-1 Differences between mode in careless responding for the Chinese working adults sample 
Chinese students. 
H1: In the Chinese student sample, we also did not find evidence for H1, responses 
were not more careless in the smartphone mode compared to the computer/web mode and the 
paper/pencil mode, B=.00, SE(B)=.02, p=.81.  
H2: In the Chinese student sample, we did not find evidence for H2, responses were 
not more carless in the computer/web mode compared to paper/pencil mode, B=.02, 
SE(B)=.03, p=.54 (see Figure 2). 
 






















































H1: In the German student sample, we also did not find evidence for H1, in fact we 
found the opposite: responses were even more careless when made on the computer/web and 
the paper/pencil mode compared to the smartphone, B=-.02, SE(B)=.01, p=.038. To follow-up 
on this effect, we tested the difference between smartphone and computer/web as well as the 
difference between smartphone and paper/pencil, separately. We found a significant 
difference in paper/pencil compared to smartphone, B=-.10, SE(B)=.04, p=.022, but not 
computer/web compared to smart phone, B=-.06, SE(B)=.05, p=.231. 
H2: Although not our initial hypothesis we did the same H2 analysis for the German 
students as the other two samples and found no evidence in difference in the degree of 
careless responding in the computer/web mode compared to the paper/pencil mode, B=-.03, 
SE(B)=.03, p=.28 (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure IV-3 Differences between mode in careless responding for the German student sample 
Individual indices   
Chinese working adults. 
Looking at the different indices individually, in line with H2 we found that, for 
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carelessness in the computer/web mode compared to the paper/pencil mode (B=.14, 
SE(B)=.07, p=.02, and  B=.13, SE(B)=.06, p=.02, respectively).   
Chinese students. 
There were no significant differences between the modes and any of the indices for the 
Chinese student sample. 
German students. 
Counter to H1 for the measure of psychometric synonyms, participants showed 
significantly more carelessness in the paper/pencil and computer/web mode compared to the 
smartphone mode, B=-.09, SE(B)=.05, p=.04. In self-reported effort, contrary to H2, German 
students were significantly more careless in the paper/pencil mode compared to 
computer/web, B=-.13, SE(B)=.07, p=.03. The instructed response items and ‘use me’ item 
significance was not calculated because there were so few in the German sample who missed 
these questions, and in some modes none at all.  
Additional exploratory findings  
In an exploratory fashion, we investigated gender differences in careless responding as 
a function of sample and survey mode. Broken down by sample, in the Chinese working 
adults sample, men were significantly more careless than women in the paper/pencil mode 
condition, B=-.38, SE(B)=.09, p<.001, in the computer/web mode condition, B=-.51, 
SE(B)=.12, p<.001, and in the smartphone condition, B=-.21, SE(B)=.11, p=.03. In both 
student samples, men were significantly more careless than women in the computer/web 
mode (German students: B=-.51, SE(B)=.10, p=.002; Chinese speaking students: B=-.34, 
SE(B)=.16, p=.017), but not in the other two modes, ps > .12. 
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Table IV-3 
Descriptive Statistics indices, in three samples 
         
  
 Chinese working adults sample Chinese speaking students sample German students sample 
     N (listwise) = 214     N (listwise) = 172     N (listwise) = 159     
    Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD Mean Min Max SD 
Longstring Mean 4,94 2,00 10,00 1,63 4,01 2,00 11,33 1,44 2,85 1,67 5,00 0,59 
Longstring Max 7,03 2,00 14,00 2,91 5,64 2,00 14,00 2,61 3,63 2,00 7,00 0,96 
Mahalanobis D. 7,08 0,87 23,29 4,63 6,85 0,94 32,51 4,93 7,03 2,31 23,96 3,30 
Psychometric synonyms 0,69 -0,31 1,00 0,30 0,74 -0,35 1,00 0,25 0,71 -0,22 1,00 0,24 
Psychometric antonyms  -0,66 -1,00 0,84 0,36 -0,46 -1,00 0,82 0,42 -0,75 -1,00 0,41 0,28 
Person Correlation 0,54 -0,40 0,88 0,22 0,52 -0,05 0,80 0,18 0,67 0,05 0,87 0,15 
Self-reported Effort 4,36 1,00 6,00 0,74 4,63 2,75 6,00 0,81 5,13 3,25 6,00 0,57 
Self-reported ‘use me’  0,08 0,00 1,00 0,28 0,07 0,00 1,00 0,26 0,02 0,00 1,00 0,16 
Instructed Response Items  0,48 0,00 3,00 0,68 0,47 0,00 3,00 0,82 0,03 0,00 1,00 0,17 
Careless Responding Index 0,01 -0,92 1,97 0,52 0,01 -0,80 2,44 0,55 -0,05 -0,87 1,64 0,40 




Past research has shown that careless responding does not reliably differ between 
different self-report assessment modes. We challenged these results by looking more closely 
at careless responding tendencies in three different modes (paper/pencil, computer/web, and 
smartphone) and in three different samples (German students, Chinese students, Chinese 
working adults). Looking at each of these three samples separately, and using an aggregated 
careless responding score consisting of eight different indicators, we found that (1) Chinese 
working adults were more careless when responding on a computer compared to when 
responding with paper and pencil; (2) German students were more careless responding with 
paper and pencil compared to smartphone; and that (3) there were no significant differences in 
careless responding between modes in the Chinese students sample. Thus, only one of our 
hypotheses (H2) was corroborated by the data, while H1 could not be confirmed. Contrary to 
the assumptions of past work in careless responding (Ward et al., 2017), we did not find 
evidence that smartphone surveys were completed with more carelessness than surveys 
completed on other platforms (H1), in fact it was the opposite with the German student 
sample. In the following section, we will discuss our findings against the background of other 
research that has been conducted in this area. 
Careless Responding in Chinese Samples 
Fang, Wen, and Prybutok (2014) found that university students in China were more 
likely to engage in satisficing behavior—defined as a suboptimal response style characterized 
as reduced cognitive effort when responding to a survey—on a computer compared to a paper 
and pencil survey. These results are consistent with our Chinese working adults sample but 
not the Chinese student sample. This points to generational and cultural differences in 
familiarity with different survey modes, in that there are generational differences in the way 
people interact with survey modes. The student samples used in past studies are represented as 
the working adults’ sample of the present study; this group might have a different relationship 
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to how students interact with technology today. This is plausible in that age cohorts are 
growing up with different set of technological norms than just a few years before.  
Careless Responding in the German Students Sample 
The results of the German sample were unexpected. Previous research has not found a 
similar pattern; however, we can speculate on the relationship between environment and 
careless responding. Our hypothesis relied on the assumption that participants would 
complete the smartphone survey in a more distractible environment. However, this might not 
have been the case. The German students received the paper and pencil survey in class, even 
though it was not related to their class work and may have completed it while still amongst 
their peers. It could be that participants felt more personally accountable when using their 
smartphone, or were in a more focused environment compared to the paper/pencil and 
computer/web mode and therefore less careless. Future research should collect more 
information about the environmental differences of where surveys are completed to better 
understand the differences between survey modes.  
A More Fine-Grained Analysis of Careless Responding 
Looking at single indicators of careless responding, we found similar patterns for the 
difference between the modes for each country; however, these differences only reached 
significance for person-total-correlation and psychometric antonyms in the Chinese working 
adults sample and psychometric synonyms and self-reported effort in the German student 
sample. This further supports the concept of a composite measure to capture different types of 
CR because looking at only one or a small number of indicators would not have shown the 
complete picture in the differences between modes in carless responding. 
We also found exploratory results related to gender. Although gender itself is a 
meaningless psychological variable and therefore unable to “explain” our pattern of result, it 
is important to note we found that men were more careless than women in all modes in the 
Chinese adult sample and in the computer mode for the other two samples. This could be 
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related to the fact that women are more agreeable than men (Lehmann, Denissen, Allemand, 
& Penke, 2013) and low agreeableness has been shown to be related to more careless 
responding (Bowling et al., 2016, Ward et al., 2017). However it is unclear why this 
difference would only be in the computer mode for two of the samples. Future research 
should explore this issue.   
Because the different indices are centered on each sample, we did not directly compare 
the degree of careless responding across samples. However, there is evidence that the two 
Chinese-speaking samples were more careless. Looking at the descriptive statistics of 
individual indices, the means (where comparable), the range and standard deviation (see 
Table 3), the two Chinese samples had worse values compared to the German sample. For 
example, the maximum of “psychometric antonyms” was higher in the Chinese samples 
compared to the German sample meaning that, in the Chinese samples, respondents gave 
more similar answers to reverse coded items. 
Limitations  
The limitation of this design is that although we can describe differences between 
modes and cultures, it is hard to look at the psychological mechanisms behind survey 
differences, using survey questions that depend on the participant’s response. We asked 
questions related to possible sources of differences in careless responding, such as ease of use 
and anonymity. However, if careless responders are not paying attention to the content of 
these questions we will not have reliable comparisons. Future research should look into novel 
ways to combat this issue. 
 In computing the careless responding index, we took the average of the centered 
values across eight indices. This is a strength, in that we took into account various types of 
careless responding, but it is also a limitation in that it assumes all the indices are equally 
good at identifying careless responders.  
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Cut-offs for exclusion criteria based on careless responding can be difficult to 
prescribe and are beyond the scope of this article. Some of the indices have clear dichotomous 
cut-offs; however, these do not catch all different types of careless responders. Composite 
indices can be very useful for that; however, more research needs to be done to provide 
recommendations that researchers can use to identify careless responders. This can be done 
through simulation studies which can control the percentage of careless responding and vary 
the patterns of randomness to see how a CR index performs. And with experimental studies 
that look at careless responding with novel and labor intensive measures which can be 
compared to a universally applicable index as the one used in this paper.  
Conclusion 
This research looked at careless responding in a typical research environment. Our 
results suggest that data quality is not equal across modes of data collection and it is not the 
same across different cultural and groups. From this rigorous research method, we learn that 
not all modes are equal, and that participants interact differently with different modes of data 
collection. More work needs to be done in this area, but the present study is a first, and, 
arguably, important step towards understanding situational factors, cultural factors, and 
gender in how careful participants are when completing surveys. 
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Self-Reported Effort scale 
1. I worked to the best of my abilities in this study. 
2. I put forth my best effort in responding to this survey. 
3. I would be interested in reading about the results of this study. 
4. I’m in a hurry right now. (R)
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V. Chapter 5: Comparing Classic and Novel Approaches to Measurement 
Invariance in an Eight Culture Sample 
 
Zoe Magraw-Mickelson, Alejandro Hermida, Chuma Owuamalam, Maas Misha'ari 
Weerabangsa, and Mario Gollwitzer 
Abstract 
Measurement invariance (MI) is vital to any comparison of heterogeneous groups. With 
multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MG-CFA), which is the standard practice for 
testing MI, there are widely acknowledged limitations, especially with a large number of 
groups for which strict invariance is difficult or impossible to achieve. New methods, 
specifically Alignment optimization method, give increased flexibility and new opportunities 
to make comparisons across a large number of groups. This article compares MG-CFA with 
Alignment method for MI testing with a demonstrative example of eight countries looking at 
eight different measures. We find with this medium size number of groups, strict MI is 
problematic; only partial invariance was achievable with MG-CFA and in half the measures, 
some of the countries were excluded. However, there is considerable possibility for group 
level comparisons without these drawbacks using Alignment method. We compared the 
implications of the relative difference between the output means according to the different 
methods and with additional country level variables. In this comparison, we find that for most 
measures, there are less significant latent mean differences when using Alignment method vs. 
partial invariance MG-CFA. Together, this demonstration suggests that Alignment method is 
a promising solution to give more confidence to the comparability of measures in multi-group 
comparison research. 
  




The ability to compare groups is a bedrock principle of any cross-cultural research 
projects or any research that wants to compare heterogeneous groups, be that across nations, 
genders, age groups, or time points. Researchers depend on statistical methods to answer 
questions of comparability, specifically measurement invariance, which is to ensure that 
participants with the same true-score on a latent variable respond in a similar manner to a 
manifestation of that variable, that is, without any systematic biases due to group 
memberships, age, or measurement occasion. Although there has been growing recognition of 
the importance of establishing measure invariance (MI), there are still challenges to be met for 
execution, namely what is acceptable as “partial invariance,” and what to do if it is not 
established? Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MG-CFA) is the most common 
method for testing MI, but this method has limits. With an increased number of groups, MG-
CFA becomes increasing impractical because it requires exact equivalence, that is all 
parameter exactly equal across all items, and therefore, testing for equivalence is often 
neglected. The Alignment method is an alternative approach to MG-CFA. In the present 
article, we will explore the use of the Alignment method to make possible what has up to now 
been more difficult to achieve: to compare latent means across many groups. 
This paper will first describe MG-CFA and contrast it to the Alignment method 
theoretically. Next, we will apply both methods to a set of data from eight countries across 
eight measures. We will use this example to reflect on similarities and differences between 
both methods and their results. Finally, we will inspect latent mean differences across 
countries based on both methods and compare the pattern of these differences to previous 
research in order to contextualize the meaning of our results in the framework of the 
conceptual knowledge of the variables at hand. 
Measurement Invariance: A Primer 
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Establishing full measurement invariance of a psychological self-report measure (a 
“scale”) validates the comparisons of groups by insuring that the central parameters defining a 
measurement model  that is, the factor structure (i.e. number of factors), loadings (i.e. unit of 
a scale) or  intercepts (i.e. original of the scale)  do not systematically depend on irrelevant 
factors, such as group, culture, or measurement occasions. Lack of MI can lead to erroneous 
conclusions, in that the observed mean differences are not due to latent mean differences but 
rather due to irrelevant differences between groups, such as response sets (Chen, 2008; van de 
Vijver & Tanzer, 2004). Some reasons for the lack of MI include sampling, translation issues, 
different interpretation of the questions, and cultural difference in social desirability and 
acquiescence (Heath, Martin & Sprekesen, 2009; van de Vijver & Tanzer, 2004). 
Given its importance for valid research practice, it is surprising how often MI is not 
tested in published research. In a review of cross-cultural research between 2008 and 2015 
only 17% of articles published in the Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology and only 1% of 
articles published in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin assessed measurement 
equivalence (Boer, Hanke, & He, 2018). Chen (2008) also found only 17% of cross-cultural 
research studies between 1985 and 2005 in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
tested measurement invariance. While some scholars have pointed to an inadequate education 
of the importance and execution of invariance testing (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998), one 
reason why measurement invariance is so often disregarded in cross-cultural research is that 
the methods used to scrutinize MI may often be difficult to apply or only feasible under 
certain circumstances. For instance, the traditional method of multiple-group confirmatory 
factor analysis (MG-CFA) is often unattainable for many groups (Byrne & van de Vijver 
2017; Kim, Cao, Wang & Nguyen, 2017; Marsh et al., 2016; Rutkowski & Svetina 2014). 
While the literature is not precise at what is meant by many groups, finding invariance 
becomes more difficult as the number of groups increases, as does the number of possible 
violations: in MG-CFA, the statistical null hypothesis of measurement invariance is defined as 
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exact equivalence of all parameters (i.e., zero deviation) across groups. This null hypothesis 
might be too strict (for a comparable argument, see Cohen, 1994), so MG-CFA is likely to 
reject models that are “practically comparable” if the deviation of parameters across groups is 
non-zero (Lomazzi, 2018). When researchers have unique, many-group data sets, and want to 
publish their findings, exact measurement equivalence practices are frequently impossible and 
therefore prohibitive to doing a comparative analysis of groups. This dilemma was described 
by Byrne and van de Vijver (2017): “As a result, these limitations have remained a major 
impediment to advancing our substantive knowledge of cross-group differences within the 
context of a wide variety of disciplines and in the conduct of numerous important large scale 
studies both nationally and cross-nationally” (p. 540). Therefore, establishing the utility of 
new methods is of utmost importance. 
Multiple-group confirmatory analysis is first attributed to the seminal work of 
Jöreskog (1971) and later extended to test invariance of latent factor means (Sörbom, 1974). 
The MG-CFA method for MI is tested in steps: after assessing model fit for each group 
separately, model fit is established across groups, that is, configural invariance or factor form 
invariance, which, if found, shows that the same items are associated with the same latent 
factor. Next, metric or “weak” factorial invariance is tested, which assumes that the items 
have similar factor loadings across groups, which in turn allows for predictive relationships to 
be compared across groups. This is followed by scalar or “strong” invariance which, when 
established, means the item intercepts are equivalent across groups and is sufficient for factor 
mean comparisons. Following this is residual invariance or “strict” invariance which 
compares the equivalence of construct variance; however, this level is rarely tested because it 
is broadly agreed upon as not necessary for latent mean comparison (Cheung, & Rensvold, 
2000). At each step, the more restrictive model is compared to the previous, lesser restrictive 
model, and when a significantly worse fit is found based on previously established 
benchmarks, then invariance is rejected (see Meredith, 1993; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). 
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Traditionally, the changes in the chi square statistic were used as an indicator; however, 
because chi square is found to be highly sensitive to sample size, it is recommended to use the 
change in CFI of -.01(ΔRMSEA <0.015; ΔSRMR <0.03, Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Chen, 
2007; Meade et al., 2008). However, with the issues of multiple groups, some further relaxing 
for the restriction for scalar invariance has been recommended (Kim et al., 2017; Rutkowski 
& Svetina, 2014). 
While MG-CFA is the most common method for testing MI, it has been most widely 
used in the context of two groups (Kim et al., 2017; Rutkowski & Svetina, 2014). There is an 
ongoing discussion in the literature and cross-cultural research field about the issues around 
how to handle a comparison of more than two to three groups. MG-CFA is now recognized as 
too stringent for numerous groups (in the context of large-scale cross-national studies, this 
usually refers to twenty or more groups, Byrne & van de Vijver 2017; Kim et al., 2017; Marsh 
et al.; 2016, Rutkowski & Svetina 2014). However, as it is the most normative standard for 
MI testing, it is a good benchmark to compare other methods. 
As mentioned above, the MG-CFA method is found to be impractical for a large 
number of groups because exact invariance is often not achieved in practice. Even though this 
is widely acknowledged as an issue with large scale projects (20+ groups), it is also a problem 
with small and midsized numbers of different groups, which means three or more groups 
(Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014; Marsh et al., 2016; van de Schoot, Kluytmans, Tummers, 
Lugtig, Hox, & Muthen, 2013). Particularly, in a comparison between 3 to 10 countries (or 
heterogeneous groups), the literature is vaguer as to the utility of alternative methods for 
testing measurement invariance.  
When a research question depends on group mean comparisons, what options are there 
when one fails to find strict MI? Typical solutions are to exclude items or groups, limiting the 
analysis to subgroups of countries, and partial invariance (explained below). The former is not 
ideal, firstly, because by deleting items, one sacrifices content validity.  Secondly, reducing 
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the number of countries or the breadth of comparison dimensions excludes what might be 
vital information to the hypothesis at hand (Lomazzi, 2018). This is especially drastic with 
midsized number of groups (see Davidov, Meuleman, Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014, for 
further stipulated on the possibilities with non-invariant data). 
Partial invariance occurs when only a subset of parameters is invariant, while another 
subset varies across groups. In Boer et al.’s (2017) review of literature in Journal of Cross 
Cultural Psychology mentioned above, out of the 64 studies in which the equivalence of the 
measurement model has been tested, 46 reported some form of partial invariances. The 
literature says that just one item with non-invariant intercept can lead to erroneous 
conclusions when observed mean differences (i.e. differences between groups on an aggregate 
measure) are interpreted (Meredith, 1993; Steinmetz, 2013). However, if item parameters are 
invariant for at least 50% of the items in the scale, one can compare latent means, that is, 
estimated means of the latent factor on which the items load (Byrne et al., 1989, Reise, 
Widaman, & Pugh, 1993, Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, Steinmetz, 2013). Although this 
is the implication of some simulation studies that investigate the consequences of partial MI, 
there is also debate about the soundness of the stepwise strategy (explained below) and 
conflicting results in simulation studies (Marsh et al., 2016; Rensvold & Cheung, 2001; 
Vandenberg, 2002; van de Schoot et al., 2013). Partial invariance stepwise procedure has an 
inherent risk of producing a model that deviates substantially from the true model because it 
depends on the post-hoc freeing of parameters. This added element of chance means the 
results might not be replicable (Lomazzi, 2018, Marsh et al., 2016; MacCallum, Roznowski & 
Necowitz, 1992). As Marsh et al. (2016) explain, “…there is no guarantee that the stepwise 
selection process, based on freeing factor loadings and intercepts to achieve an acceptable 
goodness of fit, will facilitate this objective of providing unbiased means” (p. 12).  
Due to the limitation of MG-CFA for a large number of groups, researchers have 
explored other methods, including multilevel confirmatory factor analysis (Davidov, Dülmer, 
Chapter 5: Comparing Classic and Novel Measurement Invariance   118 
 
 
Schlüter, Schmidt, & Meuleman, 2012), multilevel factor mixture modeling, ESEM (Byrne & 
van de Vijver, 2017), Bayesian approximation MI (Muthén & Asparouhov, 2013a) and 
Alignment optimization method (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). Based on a review of these 
methods by Kim et al. (2017), Alignment method was chosen as the best suited to be an 
alternative to look at MI in a mid-range number of groups. 
Alignment Optimization 
Alignment optimization was first introduced by Asparouhov and Muthén (2014) as an 
alternative to MG-CFA. The idea is that estimates of group factor means can be made without 
requiring exact MI; therefore, Alignment is a method of approximate rather than exact 
invariance. It is theorized that by taking some amount of non-invariance into account, 
Alignment optimization provides more reliable models (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2017; Marsh 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, in contrast to MG-CFA, Alignment starts with a common 
configural model that contains all group for which the intercepts and loadings are 
unconstrained rather than a baseline model for each group separately as with MG-CFA (Byrne 
& van de Vijver, 2017). From the configural model the process uses maximum likelihood 
(ML) to estimate an optimal set of measurement parameters and computes approximations 
based on that. This optimization procedure involves applying a simplicity function that works 
similar to the rotation criteria in EFA; that is, it simplifies the interpretation while the fit is the 
same as the configural model, i.e. the unrotated model. This allows for differences in model 
parameter estimates by using the most relaxed, thus best fit model. Means and variances of 
the latent variable can be computed on the basis of the optimal model.  
 The execution is a two-step process: first, a configural model that represents the best 
fitting model among all groups is established when fixing the factor means to 0 and fixing 
variances to 1, without constraining the loadings and intercepts. Rather than assuming 
invariance, Alignment operates with the assumption that there is a degree of non-invariance 
and the goal is to keep it to a minimum. In the next step, the factor means and variances are 
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freely estimated and undergo an optimization process for every group factor mean and item 
parameters (see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). Once the minimization point has been 
reached, the analysis compares factor means and factor variances across groups using a “post-
estimation algorithm” and identifies each model parameter (i.e., loadings and intercepts) that 
is significantly different from the average of that parameter across all groups. This is done 
with multiple pairwise comparisons (adjusted for alpha inflation). If estimates are not 
significantly different they are connected creating an invariant set to which subsequent 
groups’ parameters are compared to, while those that are significantly different are flagged as 
noninvariant. The output provides the latent means based on this model as well as the 
parameters flagged as non-invariant (see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014, for a detailed 
description of the statistical equations for the process). 
To our knowledge, there is only one simulation study that compares partial invariance 
with MG-CFA to Alignment. Marsh et al., (2016) found that the alignment method shows less 
bias for both scalar and partial scalar models. Our goal is to follow up this work with real data 
that compares the results of group-level latent mean comparisons under partial invariance 
found using MG-CFA or Alignment methods.  
The Present Research 
In the present study we want to investigate the implications of using traditional MG-
CFA in comparison to Alignment optimization for testing mean differences between samples 
from different countries for eight measures. Up till now, research on the difference between 
MG-CFA and Alignment has been mainly based on simulation studies or situations in which 
the number of groups was very large and MI testing using MG-CFA was feasible that is, the 
analysis showed too many mis-specified parameters that need to be adjusted so that partial 
invariance was also not feasible (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2017). Therefore, this study looks at 
a medium number of countries for which partial invariance is a feasible alternative and 
compares that to the analysis derived from the Alignment method in order to compare the two 
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methods in this context. To illustrate the resulting differences in implications, we also 
distinctly relate the results of the two methods to prior research and theorizing in order to 
scrutinize the validity of both methods. 
Country-level variables  
The goal of establishing measurement invariance is often to be able to compare and 
contrast the mean differences. Sometimes this is the goal of the research in itself, as in many 
large-scale research projects such as PISA (Program for the International Assessment of 
Student Achievement) in which countries are being compared (i.e., ranked) regarding 
education-oriented variables (i.e. Byrne & van de Vijver, 2017, Marsh et al., 2016). In other 
cases, the primary goal of the research is to foster our theoretical understanding of a 
psychological measure or to assist in the appropriate sample selection for a specific research 
question.  
Therefore, in our comparison of methods, we will also look at contexts in which the 
variables measured here have been studied at a cultural level in prior studies to see where our 
results are comparable with the results of these prior studies and whether the degree of 
comparability depends on whether MI has been addressed with the traditional MG-CFA or the 
Alignment approach. Horizontal/Vertical Individualism/Collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 
1998) are highly relevant constructs in cross-cultural research, so, although there are not many 
large scale cross-cultural studies with these variables, there is a theoretical framework that can 
assist with the interpretation of our results.  Not all of the variables measured here have been 
studied extensively on a cultural level. Social Dominance Ordination (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) have not 
explicitly been tested at the country level; however, past research shows their relationship to 
other variables that are measured at the country level such as economic equality and 
religiosity. Victim Sensitivity and Observer Sensitivity (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & 
Arbach, 2005) have very little past research comparing countries; therefore, our result will be 
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a unique contribution.  We take these previously developed variables and look at the 
relationship to other relevant cultural level variables to both compare the methods and to 
conceptually validate our findings.  
Methods 
Samples 
The data for this study is the secondary analysis on materials collected for an 
independent project. This multinational project involved researchers in eight countries that 
were all tasked with finding participants in their respective countries. The aim was 200 
participants per country; however, final participant numbers were varied due to the individual 
situation of the data collection location. In the case of the German sample, it was not possible 
to get more participants in the time frame allotted because recruitment depended on the size 
on the student sample pool at the time of data collection. The sample sizes, age range, and 
gender distribution can be seen in Table 1. All research groups were instructed to follow the 
translation-back translation process from originally English materials (preregistration 
document available at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/8MZCN). All participants completed 
the material on an online platform. The sample from Germany was collected by the first 
author. Participants were psychology Bachelor students who received course credits for their 
participation.  
Table V-1 
    
Sample Information  
   
Country Sample size Age mean  age SD  % female 
1. USA N= 130 26,01 5,40 53,4 
2. UK  N = 294 19,13 2,61 84,7 
3. Canada N = 72 25,96 4,83 40,8 
4. Germany N = 116 21,75 3,80 75,9 
5. India N = 177 20,90 4,59 52,0 
6. Malaysia  N = 169 19,35 2,20 47,6 
7. Nigeria  N = 205 21,92 3,35 49,0 
8. Peru  N = 91 23,61 4,27 51,1 
 
 




The measures we analyzed for the present study are the following eight scales: 
Horizontal/Vertical Individualism/Collectivism Scale – 6-point Likert Scale (1 = 
Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree) 4 items each. Horizontal Collectivism (HC) measures 
the degree to which people see themselves as similar to other people and emphasize common 
goals as well as interdependence (e.g. “To me, pleasure is spending time with others.” 
Vertical Collectivism (VC) measures the degree to which people emphasize the importance of 
the group and are willing to go along with the authority of the group even when it does not fit 
one’s own interests (e.g., “Family members should stick together no matter what sacrifices are 
required.”) Horizontal Individualism (HI) measures the degree to which people value both 
equality and freedom and want to be unique (e.g., “I’d rather depend on myself than others.”) 
Vertical Individualism (VI) measures the degree to which people want to be distinguished in 
order to gain status and value freedom over equality (e.g., “Competition is the law of nature,” 
Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).  
Social Dominance Ordination SDO-6 Scale (Hierarchy Items) – 7-point Likert Scale 
(1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree), 8 items. SDO measures one’s motivation for 
social hierarchy and group based dominance (e.g., “It is probably a good thing that certain 
groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom,” Pratto et al., 2000).  
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) short scale – 7-point Likert Scale (1 = Strongly 
Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree), 7 items. RWA measures the belief in the uncritical subjection 
to authority and defense of authoritative norms (e.g., “Our country desperately needs a mighty 
leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are 
ruining us;” Manganelli, Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007). See Tables 2a-h for the 
correlation between the variables for each country.  
Victim Sensitivity & Observer Sensitivity (Justice Sensitivity subscales) – 6-point 
Likert Scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree), 10 items each. Victim Sensitivity 
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(VS) measures sensitivity to being the victim of injustice, (e.g., “It bothers me when others 
receive something that ought to be mine”). Observer Sensitivity (OS) measures sensitivity to 
injustice toward others (e.g., “I am upset when someone does not get a reward he/she has 
earned,” Schmitt et al., 2005).  
 
Table V-2  
        
Correlation between measured variables for each country  
   
Table V-2a. 
        
USA N= 130 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,505** 1 
      
HC -,188* ,230** 1 
     
VC -0,042 0,156 ,402** 1 
    
HI 0,143 0,049 -0,066 -0,109 1 
   
VI ,344** 0,074 -0,085 0,069 0,148 1 
  
SDO ,177* -0,043 0,001 ,212* -0,029 ,429** 1 
 
RWA 0,125 -0,067 -0,021 ,362** -0,033 ,337** ,747** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 
 
Table V -2b. 
       
UK N = 294 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,394** 1 
      
HC -,148* ,324** 1 
     
VC 0,017 ,224** ,445** 1 
    
HI 0,065 ,116* 0,031 -0,055 1 
   
VI ,316** -0,029 -,191** -0,079 ,236** 1 
  
SDO ,194** -,144* -,218** -,143* -,118* ,269** 1 
 
RWA 0,001 -,135* 0,041 ,204** 0 ,217** ,330** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 








Table V -2c. 
        
Canada N = 72 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,393** 1 
      
HC 0,139 ,539** 1 
     
VC 0,213 ,263* ,497** 1 
    
HI 0,114 -0,084 0,005 -0,037 1 
   
VI ,496** 0,203 -0,009 ,234* 0,16 1 
  
SDO 0,128 -0,057 -0,129 0,045 0,024 ,396** 1 
 
RWA 0,13 -0,13 0,097 ,299* 0,159 ,323** ,597** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 
 
Table V -2d. 
        
Germany N = 116 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,410** 1 
      
HC ,236* ,498** 1 
     
VC ,244** ,313** ,494** 1 
    
HI ,195* 0,179 -0,077 0,04 1 
   
VI ,248** -0,005 -0,025 0,18 ,303** 1 
  
SDO 0,167 -0,152 -,193* 0,082 0,068 ,396** 1 
 
RWA 0,015 -0,087 -0,048 ,277** 0,077 ,371** ,565** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 
 
Table V -2e. 
       
India N = 177 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,456** 1 
      
HC 0,05 ,380** 1 
     
VC ,172* ,312** ,544** 1 
    
HI ,226** 0,132 ,367** ,273** 1 
   
VI ,449** 0,136 0,019 ,215** ,196** 1 
  
SDO ,160* -0,031 -0,142 -0,067 -0,118 ,355** 1 
 
RWA ,242** ,235** ,230** ,393** ,204** ,284** ,380** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 




Table V -2f. 
        
Malaysia N = 169 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,328** 1 
      
HC -0,059 ,512** 1 
     
VC 0,079 ,371** ,650** 1 
    
HI ,206** 0,147 0,126 ,171* 1 
   
VI ,426** -0,072 -0,147 0,004 ,266** 1 
  
SDO ,179* -,306** -,275** -0,133 0,012 ,369** 1 
 
RWA 0,079 0,101 ,270** ,326** ,227** 0,128 ,279** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 
 
Table V -2g. 
        
Nigeria N = 205 
       
  VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,594** 1 
      
HC 0,093 ,193** 1 
     
VC ,224** ,334** ,551** 1 
    
HI ,229** ,272** ,322** ,351** 1 
   
VI ,536** ,387** ,168* ,367** ,402** 1 
  
SDO ,142* 0,05 0,002 0,096 0,055 ,246** 1 
 
RWA ,158* ,201** ,381** ,474** ,361** ,254** 0,036 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 
 
Table V -2h. 
       
Peru N = 91 
       
 
VS OS HC VC HI VI SDO RWA 
VS 1 
       
OS ,643** 1 
      
HC -,227* 0,01 1 
     
VC 0,049 0,102 0,202 1 
    
HI ,214* 0,157 -0,133 -,228* 1 
   
VI ,426** ,236* -,224* ,367** 0,095 1 
  
SDO 0,133 -0,068 -0,043 ,214* -0,062 ,339** 1 
 
RWA -0,037 -0,109 0,027 ,387** -0,15 ,371** ,536** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
Horizontal Individualism VI = Vertical Individualism SDO = Social Dominance Ordination RWA = Right Wing 
Authoritarianism 




MG-CFA. For the multiple group confirmatory factor analysis, we followed a stepwise 
approach of establishing measurement invariance for each of the scales (see Meredith, 1993; 
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). We completed this analysis with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) and 
semTools for R (Jorgensen, Pornprasertmanit, Schoemann, & Rosseel, 2018). We looked at 
the fit indices that are usually reported in the literature and used values for acceptable model 
fit that have been suggested by Marsh, Hau, & Wen, (2004) : root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA; ≤.080), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; ≤.080), 
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI, >.90), and comparative fit index (CFI; >.90). However, these are 
recommendations for model fit rather than a golden rule; therefore, it is important that we 
compare the relative fit at each level of invariance (Marsh et al., 2016). Here we focused on a 
change of CFI of < .01 to represent acceptable difference in fit. 
If scalar invariance was not achieved, we proceeded to test for partial invariance. For 
partial invariance, we followed the stepwise approach by examining the mis-specified 
parameter, freeing one parameter at a time, starting with the largest value (Byrne, Shavelson, 
& Muthén, 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). For each parameter freed, we again 
checked the comparative fit. We repeated this process until half the parameters of the items 
were freed. If partial invariance was still not established, we began the process again by 
excluding countries with high modification indices or high chi-square values in the strict 
invariance model. Once we established partial invariance at the scalar level for all measures, 
we used these models to calculate the latent means and compared them with Germany as the 
reference group. We used Germany as the reference group because this was the sample 
collected by the primary author and where some of the scales were developed (i.e. VS and 
OS). 
Alignment. Using Mplus version 8.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 2018) and the syntax in the 
Appendix, we followed guidelines from Asparouhov and Muthén (2014) for the Alignment 
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optimization, imputing each measure in a separate analysis. We used FIXED alignment rather 
than FREE as recommended by Marsh et al., (2016), Kim et al., (2017), and Jang et al., 
(2017). The FIXED option fixes the latent means of one group, in this case Germany to 0 and 
variance to 1, thus serving as the reference group (see Asparouhov and Muthén, 2014, for a 
detailed discussion on the difference between FIXED and FREE options).   
Research has been mixed on the degree of acceptable non-invariant parameters with 
the Alignment method that still allows a valid comparison. In the original simulation study for 
the Alignment method, Asparouhov and Muthén (2014) mentioned 20% non-invariant 
parameters as acceptable; later, Muthén and Asparouhov (2014) adjusted to 25% as 
acceptable. Flake & McCoach (2018) stipulated there should be less than 29% non-invariant 
parameters. However, as this is a relatively new field, Muthén and Asparouhov (2014) 
recommended when above 25%, a Monte Carlo simulation should supplement the judgement 
of acceptability. Following this recommendation, Lomazzi (2018) found 21% acceptable. 
However, this is an ongoing open question for the Alignment method. 
Comparison  
Using the models resulting from the invariance testing by both methods, we compared 
the composite means and latent means. Furthermore, we related our findings to past research 
that looked at the variables of this study at a country level and we investigated their relation 
with other theoretically related variables. The validation criterion for each scale is based on 
previous theoretical knowledge of the variable and the predictions outlined below. 
HC/VC/HI/VI. These scales have been used the most in cross-cultural research; 
however, there are few large-scale studies that compare means across the relevant countries. 
Horizontal/vertical individualism and collectivism are thought to be individual level variables 
(Triandis, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991); therefore, there are not many large scales studies 
that compare these scales at a country level. However, the broad understanding is that these 
individual level variables correspond to country level difference. Hofstede (1980, 2010) has 
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looked extensively at country level variables. Therefore, we look at the relationship between 
HC/VC/HI/VI and both Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism (IND-COL) and power 
distance. IND-COL is predicted to be positively correlated with HI/VI and negatively 
correlated with HC/VC. Power distance is expected to reflect the hierarchy versus egalitarian 
aspects of the construct in that power distance is positively correlated with VC/VI and 
negatively correlated with HC/HI. We used the values found in Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov, (2010), which include country level values for all of our countries.  
SDO/RWA. In a review of the literature, there are some studies that have looked at the 
relationship between SDO and RWA across cultures and found they are related but distinct 
concepts especially in regard to the influence on prejudice (Duckitt, & Sibley, 2007; Perry, 
Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013). Therefore, we expect them to be correlated on the country level as 
well. For an overall theory of country-level differences, Fischer, Hanke, Sibley, (2012) 
completed a meta-analysis that measured SDO, looking at other country level variables in 
relation to the calculated country level means. They found a correlation between SDO and 
country level variables of gender equality, democracy, Gross National Income (GNI), and 
egalitarian values. We looked at the latter two, first with the GNI index including both the 
GNI country rank and national income expressed as purchase parity measures value in dollars 
(World Bank, 2017). This was followed by the same country-level scores from the Schwartz 
Value Survey of the egalitarian scale of Fischer et al., (2012). Participants rated the 
importance of the value responding to “as a guiding principle in MY life” on a 9-point scale. 
Schwartz (1994, 2006) explains this response format and sample information. We used the 
average scores of the student and teacher data. We predict that SDO will be significantly 
negatively correlated with Gross National Income (GNI) and egalitarian values. 
With the measure of RWA, few studies have collected data in non-western countries 
(i.e,. meta-analyses, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2008; Perry, et al., 2013). However, some research 
shows a positive relationship between RWA and religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer, & 
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Hunsberger, 1992); therefore, we looked at country level religiosity. To do this, we took the 
variable from the World Value Survey that measured “importance of religion” from 1 = “very 
important”; 4 =  “not at all important” (reverse coded). To have data from all the countries we 
have in our data, we had to look at both wave 5 (2005-2009) and wave 6 (2010-2014, 
Inglehart et al., 2014a, 2014b). Data for Canada and UK were from wave 5 and other 
countries from wave 6. Sample size for the countries in the present analysis was between 
1026 (in Canada) and 4019 (in India). We predict RWA to be significantly positively 
correlated with religiosity. Furthermore, we predict our measure of SDO and RWA to be 
positively correlated. 
VS/OS. These two scales are mostly absent in previous cross-cultural research or 
theory of culture level differences. Few papers have looked at culture and justice sensitivity 
scales. In Magraw-Mickelson and Gollwitzer (2018), VS was measured in Germany, Japan 
and the US; however, there was no comparison of group level means due to the lack of scalar 
invariance. In another comparison, Wu and colleagues (2014) looked at observer sensitivity 
(and beneficiary sensitivity) in China, Germany, and Russia. They found that Chinese 
participants scored lower on OS compared to German participants, whereas Chinese were not 
significantly different from Russian participants. Furthermore, OS was not related to the 
cultural variables individualism and collectivism. According to the literature, we would 
expect similar findings regarding VS. 
Results 
The results of the MG-CFA invariance testing can be seen in Tables 3-7. For each 
measure, first comes the single group solution and initial test of full invariance followed by 
the results for partial invariance. The results show that we found metric invariance13 for all 
measures but were unable to find scalar invariance. However, we did find partial scalar 
                                                 
13 For the SDO scale the CFI difference was -.0104, borderline acceptable value. 
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invariance with HC/VC/HI/VI and SDO; the necessary intercepts freed for the partial model 
are listed in the Table. For VS, OS, and RWA, partial scalar invariance was only found for a 
subset of countries (also listed in Tables 3-7). 
For the Alignment optimization, we first checked the overall degree of non-invariance 
for each scale. As mentioned above, the existing guidelines are that 25% of non- invariance is 
problematic or more strictly that those above 20% should require a closer look. None of our 
scales came close to this number. The highest degree of non-invariance across parameters was 
2% of intercepts for the SDO scale. Therefore, we concluded that Alignment optimization is 
feasible for all measures (see Tables 8-12). 
Comparison of mean differences 
Table 13 shows a comparison of the means and the significance of mean differences. 
First, listed in the table are the simple composite means for each measure for each country 
followed by the latent means found with MG-CFA scalar partial invariance and finally the 
latent means from the alignment optimization. Because scalar invariance was not established 
for any of the scales, the composite scores provide an invalid comparison (Meredith, 1993; 
Steinmetz, 2013). However, these means provide reference for the degree to which the 
composite means may be inaccurate. Although there were some shifts in the rank order of the 
countries between the composite mean, MG-CFA latent means and Alignment latent means, 
those position shifts were not significant. For example, the composite mean of the VS scale is 
lower in Peru than in the USA and in Canada, but the latent mean (estimated on the basis of 
the Alignment procedure) is higher in Peru than in the USA or in Canada. However, in all 
analyses the difference between these three countries is insignificant. However, there were 
numerous discrepancies in whether the mean differences between countries reached 
significance. For example, the composite mean of the VS scale for Nigeria was significantly 
greater than that of India and Germany; however, in the latent mean comparison (estimated on 
the basis of the Alignment procedure), although Nigeria was still ranked higher, the value was 
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not significantly greater compared to India or Germany. This is true for both the comparison 
of the composite means and latent means, and between the latent means achieved by different 
methods. Overall, there are more significant differences found when looking at the raw 
composite score compared to the latent means and in the MG-CFA latent means compared to 
the Alignment latent means, which points to a systematic directionality of the bias in the raw 
composite scores, in that mean differences is inflated the between countries. See Table 13 for 
all comparisons and differences in significance. 
 







           Measurement invariance testing for Collectivism-Individualism 
   Single Group Solutions χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Canada (n=67) 177,76 98 
    
.109 (.083 - .135) 0,109 0,826 0,787 
Germany (n=114) 155,61 98 
    
.071 (.049 - .092) 0,085 0,922 0,905 
India (n=169) 191,62 98 
    
.078 (.061 - .094) 0,094 0,894 0,87 
Malaysia (n=160) 198,58 98 
    
.081 (.065 - .098) 0,084 0,892 0,868 
Nigeria (n=187) 234,26 98 
    
.086 (.072 - .101) 0,080 0,862 0,831 
Peru (n=88) 170,37 98 
    
.091 (.068 - .114) 0,110 0,861 0,830 
UK (n=290) 299,43 98 
    
.085 (.074 - .096) 0,070 0,878 0,851 
USA (n = 129) 228,26 98 
    
.103 (.085 -.120) 0,087 0,846 0,812 
Measurement Invariance χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 1655,90 784 
    
0,087 0,081 0,876 0,848 
Equal factor loadings 1808,30 868 2,08 152,40 84 0,00 0,086 0,089 0,866 0,852 





‘VI1~1’ χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 1655,90 784 
    
0,087 0,081 0,876 0,848 
Equal factor loadings 1808,25 868 2,08 152,35 84 0,00 0,086 0,089 0,866 0,852 
Equal indicator intercepts 1912,03 903 2,12 103,78 35 0,00 0,087 0,091 0,856 0,847 




           
Measurement invariance testing for SDO 
       
Single Group Solutions χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Canada (n=67) 48,18 20 
    
.140 (.090 - .191) 0,055 0,931 0,904 
Germany (n=114) 47,49 20 
    
.109 (.069 - .149) 0,057 0,941 0,918 
India (n=169) 96,837 20 
    
.147 (.119 -.177) 0,060 0,877 0,828 
Malaysia (n=160) 33,70 20 
    
.064 (.021 - .100) 0,052 0,981 0,973 
Nigeria (n=187) 67,84 20 
    
.108 (.080 -.137) 0,060 0,881 0,833 
Peru (n=88) 56,56 20 
    
.141 (.098 - .185) 0,081 0,858 0,801 
UK (n=290) 157,69 20 
    
.153 (.131 - .176) 0,067 0,87 0,818 
USA (n = 129) 119,82 20 
    
.195 (.163 - .230) 0,060 0,898 0,858 
Measurement Invariance χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 628,11 160 
    
0,137 0,054 0,905 0,867 
Equal factor loadings 728,24 186 3,92 100,13 26 0,000 0,126 0,087 0,894 0,887 
Equal indicator intercepts 1165,34 258 4,52 437,10 72 0,000 0,15 0,112 0,815 0,840 
Measurement Invariance  
(-USA, -Nigeria, -Peru; 
SDO8 ~1, SDO5 ~1, SDO4 
~1, SDO7 ~1 ) χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 383,89 100 
    
0,131 0,052 0,913 0,878 
Equal factor loadings 428,83 128 3,35 44,94 28 0,022 0,119 0,077 0,908 0,899 
Equal indicator intercepts 467,73 140 3,34 38,90 12 0,000 0,119 0,080 0,900 0,900 
 
  




           
Measurement invariance testing for RWA 
       
Single Group Solutions  χ2 df   χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Canada (n=67) 30,31 14 
    
.127 (.064 - .190) 0,056 0,929 0,893 
Germany (n=114) 22,60 14 
    
.073 (.000 - .126) 0,043 0,972 0,959 
India (n=169) 39,05 14 
    
.101 (.064  - .139) 0,050 0,94 0,91 
Malaysia (n=160) 14,47 14 
    
.014 (.000 - .076) 0,035 0,999 0,998 
Nigeria (n=187) 16,69 14 
    
.031 (.000 - .077) 0,043 0,989 0,984 
Peru (n=88) 39,33 14 
    
.140 (.089 - .193) 0,056 0,925 0,887 
UK (n=290) 50,65 14 
    
.094 (.067 - .123) 0,043 0,95 0,926 
USA (n = 129) 24,73 14 
    
.077 (.019 - .125) 0,027 0,984 0,977 
Measurement Invariance χ2 df   χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 237,82 112 
    
0,085 0,038 0,962 0,943 
Equal factor loadings 308,74 154 2,00 70,91 42 0,003 0,080 0,071 0,953 0,949 
Equal indicator intercepts 591,94 196 3,02 283,20 42 0,000 0,113 0,096 0,881 0,898 
Measurement Invariance  (-
India and Malaysia 'RWA6 
~1', 'RWA1 ~1','RWA4 
~1','RWA2 ~1') χ2 df   χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 184,31 84 
    
0,089 0,038 0,961 0,941 
Equal factor loadings 235,49 114 2,07 51,18 30 0,009 0,084 0,070 0,952 0,947 
Equal indicator intercepts 267,79 124 2,16 32,30 10 0,000 0,087 0,073 0,944 0,942 
 
  




           
Measurement invariance testing for Victim Sensitivity  
     
Single Group Solutions χ2 df   χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Canada (n=69) 69,62 35 
    
.120 (.078 - .161) 0,078 0,849 0,806 
Germany (n=114) 47,66 35 
    
.056 (.000- .093) 0,054 0,961 0,949 
India (n=173) 120,21 35 
    
.119 (.096 - .142) 0,073 0,826 0,777 
Malaysia (n=162) 76,14 35 
    
.085 (.059 - .111) 0,050 0,939 0,921 
Nigeria (n=188) 132,11 35 
    
.121 (.100 - .144) 0,079 0,843 0,798 
Peru (n=88) 80,91 35 
    
.122 (.087 - .157) 0,084 0,838 0,792 
UK (n=282) 122,43 35 
    
.094 (.076 - .113) 0,055 0,903 0,875 
USA (n = 129) 97,48 35 
    
.118 (.090 - .146) 0,065 0,898 0,869 
Measurement Invariance χ2 df   χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 746,55 280 
    
0,105 0,060 0,887 0,855 
Equal factor loadings 831,44 343 2,42 84,89 63 0,034 0,097 0,080 0,882 0,876 
Equal indicator intercepts 1104,34 406 2,72 272,90 63 0,000 0,107 0,095 0,831 0,850 
Partial Invariance ( -India;  
'VS9 ~1', 'VS7 ~1', 'VS6 ~1', 
'VS8 ~1', 'VS3 ~1') χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 626,35 245 
    
0,103 0,059 0,895 0,865 
Equal factor loadings 704,88 299 2,4 78,53 54 0,02 0,096 0,080 0,888 0,882 
Equal indicator intercepts 764,74 323 2,4 59,87 24 0,00 0,096 0,084 0,879 0,882 
  
  




           
Measurement invariance testing for Observer Sensitivity 
     
Single Group Solutions χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Canada (n=67) 98,14 35 
    
.164 (.126 - .203) 0,096 0,766 0,699 
Germany (n=114) 92,36 35 
    
.120 (.090 - .150) 0,066 0,892 0,861 
India (n=169) 150,70 35 
    
.140 (.117 - .163) 0,092 0,753 0,683 
Malaysia (n=160) 110,51 35 
    
.116 (.092 - .141) 0,058 0,907 0,88 
Nigeria (n=187) 180,72 35 
    
.149 (.128 - .171) 0,088 0,768 0,702 
Peru (n=88) 73,85 35 
    
.122 (.076 - .148) 0,070 0,877 0,842 
UK (n=290) 206,21 35 
    
.130 (.113 - .147) 0,077 0,842 0,797 
USA (n = 129) 104,93 35 
    
.124 (.097 - .152) 0,070 0,898 0,868 
Measurement Invariance χ2 df 
 
χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 1017,40 280 
    
0,132 0,071 0,846 0,802 
Equal factor loadings 1069,00 343 3,12 51,60 63,00 0,847 0,119 0,082 0,848 0,841 
Equal indicator intercepts 1279,80 406 3,15 210,80 63,00 0,000 0,120 0,092 0,818 0,838 
Partial Invariance      (-
Nigeria; 'OS6~1', 
'OS1~1', 'OS3~1') χ2 df   χ2diff ∆df sig RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR CFI TLI 
Equal form 836,70 245 
    
0,129 0,069 0,858 0,817 
Equal factor loadings 877,19 299 2,93 40,49 54,00 0,913 0,115 0,080 0,861 0,854 
Equal indicator intercepts 950,95 335 2,84 73,76 36,00 0,000 0,112 0,084 0,852 0,861 
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Table V-8 
        Alignment measurement (non) invariance for intercepts and loadings 
for Horizontal/Vertical Individualism/Collectivism scales 
Intercepts/Thresholds 
     
HC1 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
HC2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HC3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HC4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI3 1 2 (3) 4 5 6 7 8 
HI4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI2 1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
VI3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI4 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
Loadings 
        
HC1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HC2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HC3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HC4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VC4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HI4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VI4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Table V-9 
        Alignment measurement (non) invariance for intercepts and loadings 
for Social Dominance Ordination scale 
Intercepts/Thresholds 
     
SDO1 (1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO4 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
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SDO5 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
SDO6 1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
SDO7 1 2 3 4 (5) 6 (7) 8 
SDO8 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
Loadings 
        
SDO1 (1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SDO8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Table V-10 
        Alignment measurement (non) invariance for intercepts and loadings 
for Right Wing Authoritarianism scale 
Intercepts/Thresholds 
     
RWA1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA6 1 (2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Loadings 
        
RWA1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RWA7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Table V-11 
        Alignment measurement (non) invariance for intercepts and loadings 
for Victim Sensitivity scale 
Intercepts/Thresholds 
     
VS1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS6 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
VS7 1 (2) 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
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        Alignment measurement (non) invariance for intercepts and loadings 
for Observer Sensitivity scale 
Intercepts/Thresholds 
     
OS1 1 2 3 (4) 5 6 7 8 
OS2 1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
OS3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 
OS4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS6 1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
OS7 1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
OS8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Loadings 
        
OS1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OS10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 
VS9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Loadings 
        
VS1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS4 1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 
VS5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
VS10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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Table V-13 
         Mean comparisons 8 countries 8 scales   
        RAW-Composite   MG-CFA   ALIGNMENT   

























8. Peru  4,85 6, 5, 3, 1 7. Nigeria  0,119 3, 5, 2, 6, 1 8. Peru  0,172 6, 5, 3, 1 
7. Nigeria  4,77 6, 5, 3, 1 8. Peru  0,056 3, 5, 1 7. Nigeria  0,149 6, 5, 3, 1 
2. UK  4,68 1 4. Germany 0,000 3, 1 4. Germany 0,000 
 
 
4. Germany 4,68 
 
2. UK  -0,149 1 2. UK  -0,005 1 
 
6. Malaysia  4,59 
 
6. Malaysia  -0,175 1 6. Malaysia  -0,147 
 
 
5. India 4,55 
 
5. India -0,256 
 
5. India -0,188 
 
 
3. Canada 4,48 
 
3. Canada -0,336 
 
3. Canada -0,221 
 
 
1. USA 4,47 
 
1. USA -0,480 
 
1. USA -0,286 
 
                    
Vertical 
Collectivism 
7. Nigeria  4,96 6, 5, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1 7. Nigeria  0,940 4, 3, 5, 2, 6, 8,1 7. Nigeria  0,747 5, 2, 4, 1, 3, 8 
6. Malaysia  4,66 5, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1 6. Malaysia  0,466 4, 3, 2, 8, 1 6. Malaysia  0,464 2, 4, 1, 3, 8 
5. India 4,43 1, 8, 3 5. India 0,176 3, 1 5. India 0,244 1, 3, 8 
 
2. UK  4,30 1, 8, 3 4. Germany 0,000 3, 1 2. UK  0,032 1, 3, 8 
 
4. Germany 4,28 1, 8, 3 2. UK  -0,048 3, 1 4. Germany 0,000 1, 3, 8 
 
1. USA 3,97 
 
8. Peru  -0,115 1 1. USA -0,382 
 
 
8. Peru  3,93 
 
3. Canada -0,504 
 
8. Peru  -0,462 
 
 
3. Canada 3,91 
 
1. USA -0,545 
 
3. Canada -0,533 
                     
Horizontal  
Individualism 
3. Canada 5,03 5, 8, 2, 6, 4 7. Nigeria  1,201 5, 8, 2, 6, 4 7. Nigeria  0,762 2, 6, 4 
7. Nigeria  4,98 5, 8, 2, 6, 4 3. Canada 1,398 5, 8, 2, 6, 4 3. Canada 0,711 2, 6, 4 
1. USA 4,88 8, 2, 6, 4 1. USA 1,227 5, 8, 2, 6, 4 1. USA 0,651 2, 6, 4 
 
5. India 4,69 6, 4 5. India 0,908 2, 6, 4 8. Peru  0,611 6, 4 
 
8. Peru  4,63 6, 4 8. Peru  0,779 4 5. India 0,441 6, 4 
 
2. UK  4,57 6, 4 2. UK  0,632 4 2. UK  0,313 4 
 
6. Malaysia  4,36 
 
6. Malaysia  0,478 4 6. Malaysia  0,084 
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4. Germany 4,23 
 
4. Germany 0,000 
 
4. Germany 0,000 
                     
Vertical 
Individualism 
7. Nigeria  4,48 5, 6, 8, 3, 1, 2, 4 7. Nigeria  1,688 5, 6, 8, 3, 1, 2, 4 7. Nigeria  1,834 5, 6, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4 
5. India 3,74 3, 1, 2, 4 5. India 0,960 1, 2, 4 5. India 1,015 8, 1, 2, 4 
6. Malaysia  3,65 1, 2, 4 6. Malaysia  0,879 1, 2, 4 6. Malaysia  1,012 1, 2, 4 
 
8. Peru  3,51 4, 2 8. Peru  0,695 2, 4 3. Canada 0,729 4 
 
3. Canada 3,37 4 3. Canada 0,694 4 8. Peru  0,572 4 
 
1. USA 3,30 4 1. USA 0,562 4 1. USA 0,545 4 
 
2. UK  3,23 4 2. UK  0,395 4 2. UK  0,430 4 
 
4. Germany 2,89 
 
4. Germany 0,000 
 
4. Germany 0,000 
   RAW-Composite   MG-CFA   ALIGNMENT   







 -USA, Nigeria, and 
Peru; SDO08 ~1, 
SDO05 ~1, SDO04 
















7. Nigeria  3,75 6, 5, 2, 3, 8, 1, 4 6. Malaysia  0,934 2, 3, 4 7. Nigeria  1,297 5, 2, 8, 3, 1, 4 
6. Malaysia  3,31 2, 3, 8, 1, 4 5. India 0,768 2, 3, 4 6. Malaysia  1,117 2, 8, 3, 1, 4 
5. India 3,21 2, 3, 8, 1, 4 2. UK  0,373 4 5. India 0,925 2, 8, 3, 1, 4 
 
2. UK  2,70 4 3. Canada 0,288 
 
2. UK  0,452 4 
 
3. Canada 2,64 4 4. Germany 0,000 
 
8. Peru  0,403 4 
 
8. Peru  2,57 4 
   
3. Canada 0,380 
 
 
1. USA 2,51 4 
   
1. USA 0,314 
 
 
4. Germany 2,10 
    
4. Germany 0,000 
   RAW-Composite   MG-CFA   ALIGNMENT   


























7. Nigeria  5,43 6, 5, 2, 8, 1, 3, 4 3. Canada 0,454 4, 3, 2, 8, 1 7. Nigeria  2,666 6, 5, 8, 2, 1, 3, 4 
6. Malaysia  4,71 2, 8, 1, 3, 4 4. Germany 0,000 1, 3, 4 6. Malaysia  1,876 8, 2, 1, 3, 4 
5. India 4,47 2, 8, 1, 3, 4 7. Nigeria  2,858 1, 3, 4 5. India 1,687 2, 1, 3, 4 
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2. UK  3,44 1, 3, 4 8. Peru  1,138 4 8. Peru  0,919 1, 3, 4 
 
8. Peru  3,44 1, 3, 4 2. UK  1,024 4 2. UK  0,732 1, 3, 4 
 
1. USA 2,82 4 1. USA 0,646 
 
1. USA 0,266 
 
 
3. Canada 2,60 
    
3. Canada 0,053 
   4. Germany 2,46         4. Germany 0,000   
  RAW-Composite   MG-CFA   ALIGNMENT   







-India;  VS9 ~1, 
VS7 ~1, VS6 ~1, 















7. Nigeria  4,15 5, 4, 1, 8, 6, 2 7. Nigeria  0,116 1, 6, 2 7. Nigeria  0,193 1, 6, 2 
5. India 3,95 
 
4. Germany 0,000 2 4. Germany 0,000 
 4. Germany 3,93 
 
8. Peru  -0,106 
 
5. India -0,003 
 
 
3. Canada 3,92 
 
3. Canada -0,100 
 
8. Peru  -0,053 
 
 
1. USA 3,89 
 
1. USA -0,195 
 
3. Canada -0,085 
 
 
8. Peru  3,87 
 
6. Malaysia  -0,209 
 
1. USA -0,155 
 
 
6. Malaysia  3,86 
 
2. UK  -0,257 
 
6. Malaysia  -0,214 
 
 
2. UK  3,85 
    
2. UK  -0,224 
   RAW-Composite   MG-CFA   ALIGNMENT   























8. Peru  4,40 6, 4, 1, 5, 3 8. Peru  0,387 6, 4, 5, 1, 3 7. Nigeria  0,330 6, 4, 1, 5, 3 
7. Nigeria  4,40 6, 4, 5, 1, 3 2. UK  0,223 3, 5, 1 8. Peru  0,313 6, 4, 1, 5, 3 
2. UK  4,25 1, 5, 3 6. Malaysia  0,049 
 
2. UK  0,188 1, 5, 3 
 
6. Malaysia  4,14 3 4. Germany 0,000 
 
6. Malaysia  0,021 
 
 
4. Germany 4,14 
 
5. India -0,021 
 
4. Germany 0,000 
 
 
5. India 4,02 
 
1. USA -0,046 
 
1. USA -0,117 
 
 
1. USA 4,01 
 
3. Canada -0,241 
 
5. India -0,152 
   3. Canada 3,90         3. Canada -0,242   
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Comparison to established research 
HC/VC/HI/VI.  For these measures, we looked at the comparison to Hofstede’s IND-
COL and power distance scale. We found no relationship between these scales and IND-COL 
measure for both methods. The mean individualism and collectivism values for each country, 
regardless of horizontal of vertical dimension were uncorrelated to the values for each country 
reported by Hofstede et al., (2010). For power distance, the latent mean found with partial 
invariance was significantly positively correlated with vertical collectivism (see Table 15), 
and for the Alignment latent means with vertical individualism (see Table 16). Power distance 
was not correlated with the horizontal aspects of individualism and collectivism. We also 
found vertical individualism positively correlated with GNI world rank and importance of 
religion for both our latent mean values, meaning that the vertical components on the 
individual and collective scales are related as predicted to power distance and also other 
measure that capture societal hierarchy. In the comparison of methods, although both vertical 
collectivism and vertical individualism have elements that should be related to power 
distance, some literature suggests that vertical individualism in particular reflects Hofstede’s 
conceptualization of power distance (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005), pointing to the 
validity of the Alignment method. 
Table V-14 
      Country values on additional variables 
















1. USA 91 40 58270 6 4,68 2,03 
2. UK  89 35 40530 18 4,92 2,64 
3. Canada 80 39 42870 16 4,80 2,25 
4. Germany 67 35 43490 15 5,01 2,74 
5. India 48 77 1820 140 4,45 1,41 
6. Malaysia  26 100 9650 61 4,41 1,19 
7. Nigeria  30 80 2080 136 4,79 1,13 
8. Peru  16 64 5970 82 4,84 1,71 
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SDO/RWA. As the literature would predict, we found SDO and RWA to be highly 
correlated at the country level. Looking at the GNI index, our findings are in line with the 
understanding of SDO for country income for alignment results but not for partial invariance 
results. We found no relationship to country level egalitarian values. Not explicitly predicted 
by the literature we reviewed, we also found a positive correlation to power distance and 
importance of religion for both latent means. We found a very similar pattern with RWA as 
SDO: positive correlation to power distance, importance of religion, and national income, but 
not in dollar amount in the partial invariant results. The prediction that SDO was significantly 
negatively correlated with GNI index was only true for the Alignment method, so although 
there are similarities, with specific predictions the Alignment method results were more in 
line with previous research. 
VS/OS. According to the literature, we would expect no systematic cultural level 
differences and minimal differences overall for both VS and OS. This is what we found in our 
analysis; minimal differences between the countries, even more so with the alignment results. 
However, because so little research has been done in this area, a much greater number of 
countries and samples that are more diverse should be surveyed before we conclude that VS 
and OS show minimal variation on the country level. 
145 
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Table 15 
              Correlation between country level latent mean found with MG-CFA and other country level variables 
    














VS       N = 7 1 
             OS       N = 7 -0,213 1 
            HC       N = 8 0,63 0,688 1 
           VC       N= 8 0,519 0,321 0,675 1 
          HI        N = 8 0,074 -0,384 -0,413 -0,183 1 
         VI        N = 8 0,457 -0,059 0,25 0,68 0,578 1 
        SDO    N = 8 0,338 -0,409 0,067 ,740* 0,292 ,825* 1 
       RWA   N = 6 0,497 0,712 0,509 ,831* 0,411 ,931** 0,811 1 
      Individualism-Collectivism -0,377 -0,493 -0,654 -0,663 0,148 -0,545 -0,415 -0,574 1 
     Power Distance 0,152 0,164 0,282 ,735* 0,003 0,698 ,779* ,884* -,826* 1 
    GNI $ in dollars -0,382 -0,418 -0,572 -,747* 0,014 -0,689 -0,607 -0,762 ,901** -,855** 1 
   GNI world rank 0,606 0,246 0,452 ,726* 0,181 ,786* 0,685 ,902* -,724* ,743* -,916** 1 
  Egalitarian vaule 0,348 0,218 0,401 -0,239 -0,208 -0,441 -0,672 -0,324 0,34 -,752* 0,457 -0,445 1 
 Important in life: Religion 0,256 0,079 0,176 0,648 0,325 ,859** ,800* ,851* -0,756 ,931** -0,806 ,799* -0,738 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 




         




              Correlation between country level latent mean found with Alignment and other country level variables 
    

















             OS 0,305 1 
            HC 0,491 ,920** 1 
           VC 0,395 0,361 0,276 1 
          HI 0,381 0,082 0,039 -0,251 1 
         VI 0,534 0,283 0,18 0,664 0,498 1 
        SDO 0,316 0,274 0,13 ,799* 0,186 ,925** 1 
       RWA 0,438 0,478 0,355 ,848** 0,139 ,884** ,960** 1 
      Individualism-Collectivism -0,398 -0,538 -0,57 -0,436 0,005 -0,508 -0,587 -0,694 1 
     Power Distance 0,202 0,246 0,148 0,671 -0,055 ,711* ,872** ,865** -,826* 1 
    GNI $ in dollars -0,452 -0,459 -0,486 -0,583 -0,075 -0,666 -,759* -,841** ,901** -,855** 1 
   GNI world rank 0,647 0,351 0,377 0,617 0,267 ,762* ,771* ,854** -,724* ,743* -,916** 1 
  Egalitarian vaule 0,188 0,35 0,507 -0,344 0,029 -0,465 -0,649 -0,516 0,34 -,752* 0,457 -0,445 1 
 Important in life: Religion 0,345 0,223 0,101 0,568 0,29 ,847** ,888** ,869** -0,756 ,931** -0,806 ,799* -0,738 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
VS = Victim Sensitivity OS = Observer Sensitivity HC = Horizontal Collectivism VC = Vertical Collectivism HI = 
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Discussion 
This study looked at data collected in eight different cultures to compare the utility of 
two different methods to test measurement invariance. Literature in measurement equivalence 
is clear in that the lack of scalar MI can lead to erroneous conclusions in comparisons of the 
composite means, and in the case of this data set, the mean difference from the raw scores was 
inflated. Lacking scalar invariance, we looked at the latent means derived from two methods. 
Past research has been mixed on the utility of partial invariance for comparing latent means; 
adding to this debate, we found differing results between latent mean comparisons using MG-
CFA and Alignment methods. In six out of eight scales, the MG-CFA method found mean 
differences where the Alignment method did not. The remaining two found the same number 
of significant differences. In Marsh et al. (2016), the difference of significance between 
groups comparing latent means estimated on the basis of MG-CFA (with partial invariance) 
compared to on the basis of Alignment also shifted, but the direction depended on the 
measure. Simulation studies point to evidence that the relative bias of partial MG-CFA 
compared to approximate methods is sensitive to the number and size of differences in 
intercepts as well as the sample size (Marsh et al., 2016; van de Schoot et al., 2013). 
The results we found here are in line with the idea that partial invariance is 
problematic, in part because the stepwise procedure is post-hoc and there is no guarantee that 
the process based on freeing parameters to achieve acceptable fit will identify the true model 
and unbiased means (Marsh et al., 2016). More research in simulation studies is needed to 
confirm that the Alignment method gives less biased means compared to MG-CFA. In 
addition, these limitations could lead to the lack of replication for real data: no studies that we 
know have looked at replication of results with real data using these methods. If the scales are 
in fact comparable as suggested by our results, we should find invariance with new data 
collected in similar samples. According to the partial invariance limitations, finding the same 
model with the same modification as the partial invariance solution is dubious. However, the 
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Alignment method contains no such limitations. In addition to the question around the validity 
of partial invariance model, for half the scales, a full comparison was not possible with MG-
CFA because we had to drop a country or more; this was not a problem with the Alignment 
method. 
The demonstration fostered the understanding of differences on a theoretical level by 
looking at the results in the context of past research on cross-cultural difference at a country 
level. This was a limited endeavor because research in the area of country level differences 
for our variables is incomplete. The results in this analysis for the two methods were quite 
similar; however, where differences were found, our results for the Alignment method fit the 
general patterns found in past research better than those with partial invariance. Somewhat 
surprisingly, it was difficult to decipher a pattern for most of the cross-culturally studied 
variables, namely HC/VC/HI/VI, and additionally, they showed no relationship to Hofstede’s 
IND-COL for either method. However, it is not completely unforeseen because literature has 
long called for a reexamination of individualism and collectivism constructs as a whole, 
particularly Hofstede’s approach (McSweeney, 2002). Specifically, the variables we 
measured are thought of in the literature as an individual level variable and not researched 
widely at country level. Hofstede’s power distance, on the other hand, was correlated with 
dimensions of the vertical scales as predicted; however, which dimension was significantly 
correlated differed with the method of analysis. The Alignment results showed a significant 
correlation with vertical individualism which is a better reflection on Hofstede’s 
conceptualization of the construct. Although the results for SDO and RWA were similar for 
the two methods, the predicted relationship to national income measure by GNI was found 
only in the Alignment method results. Finally, in VS and OS, we did not predict country level 
mean difference scores, and we in fact found less significant mean difference score using the 
Alignment method. Although these results show a stronger validation the Alignment method 
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analysis, more research is needed before we can understand these variables at the country 
level. 
Limitations  
A limitation to the method in this study is the sample size and sample makeup. Firstly, 
in methods validation, larger sample sizes are sometimes recommended for MI testing 
(Meade, 2005; Meade & Lautenschlager, 2004). Secondly, to be able to make a definitive 
statement about the country level means, it is necessary to have a representative sample, 
whereas our sample consists of mostly young adults and students.  However, the samples we 
obtained are representative of cross-cultural research. Often, when involving many different 
research groups in a project, there is a disparity in what collaborators deliver, and less than 
ideal sample sizes is the norm. Although a majority of undergraduates in the samples is a 
limitation in our conclusions about country level means, having sample groups that are similar 
in age and education and only differ in nationality leads to more conclusive findings with 
regard to the equivalence of the measurement scales used. Furthermore, both of these points 
are strengths as well as weaknesses because they represent common research practice, and lie 
at the heart of our question which is the utility of method for use in common research. Future 
research should both replicate these findings and compare them to further alternative methods. 
An additional caveat to all invariance testing is that it can only statistically insure 
statistical equivalence. Even if we can establish strict MI confirming that there is no bias in 
factor loadings and item intercepts across countries, we cannot guarantee conceptual 
equivalence or, in other words, lack of construct bias. The whole construct could differ in 
meaning across cultures. MI does not necessarily mean lack of all types of bias. For example, 
bias could influence all the indicators to the same degree, therefore having a biased estimation 
of the latent mean. Future research should investigate how to theoretically identify 
measurement bias that is not statistically identifiable.  
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In our contextualization of the results, although we looked at the correlation of the 
country level variable to provide context to our findings, the sample size here of 8 countries is 
not large enough to make any definitive conclusions. Much larger research projects should be 
implemented in this regard. However, this was a meaningful analysis because these results 
gave theoretical support to our methodological exercise. Furthermore, although not definitely 
conclusive, they support the assumption that Alignments results are more trustworthy. 
Conclusion 
Establishing measurement invariance is necessary for the comparison of homogeneous 
groups; however, it is often overlooked. Research has highlighted the limitations of the MG-
CFA for large scale studies and opened the door to exploring new methods for testing MI. 
This paper sheds light on the fact that this is also important for medium scale studies. Past 
solutions of limiting the countries in analysis of partial invariance are insufficient. This article 
demonstrates the strengths of Alignment method compared to MG-CFA, in that it is more 
flexible and therefore more likely to find invariance without the multiple corrections required 
with partial invariance, and still has less biased latent means. Furthermore, we found that 
across measures, the MG-CFA shows consistently more significant mean differences than the 
Alignment method. This difference in itself supports the argument that partial invariance has 
many significant limitations. Future research should replicate these findings and further 
explore what this means on a conceptual level. 
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Syntax for Mplus analysis victim sensitivity measure  
Title: Alignment 1 
Data: File IS "C:\Users \Documents\Mplus\all_Mplus.csv"; 
Variable: NAMES ARE ID sample vs01 vs02 vs03 vs04 vs05 vs06 vs07 vs08 vs09
 vs10 
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MISSING = ALL (9999); 
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ESTIMATOR = ML; 
ALIGNMENT = fixed(4); 
ASTARTS = 100 
MODEL: %OVERALL% 
F1 by vs01 vs02 vs03 vs04 vs05 vs06 vs07 vs08 vs09 vs10; 
OUTPUT: TECH1 TECH8 ALIGN;
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VI. Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The proceeding chapters outlined four studies that looked at cross-cultural social 
psychology, theory and methods. Part one focused on understanding the theory of 
individualism and collectivism, which is the most studied theory in the field. Part two looked 
at two areas for improvement in cross-cultural research methods. The latter two 
methodological studies draw directly from the challenges and limitations brought up in the 
studies looking at theory. Specifically, with the study in Chapter two, we were not able to 
compare some measures across countries because of the lack of measurement invariance. 
Chapter 5 proposes a new method of measurement invariance that shows promise for 
expanding the possibility of comparison using approximate rather than exact equivalence. 
Chapter 4 dealt with a problem that is often hidden in the literature, that is the quality of data 
and if this varies by data collection form and culture. Chapter 3 presented methodological 
problems that were not addressed in the other chapters but that should be a focus of future 
work, namely measurement and manipulation of self-construal. 
Summary 
Part 1 
Part 1 includes two chapters that take different approaches to the theoretical 
clarification in what it means to include others in one’s self-representation and how that is 
reflected in concern for the injustice of others. For the explanation of the limitation of the 
theoretical understanding of individualism and collectivism, I took the approach first 
proposed by Brewer and Gardner, (1996) and Kashima et al., (1995), that highlighted the 
importance of differentiating the relational self. While the overall concept of individualism 
and collectivism is the degree to which people identify with the group, the relation self 
clarifies the group as the connection to those with which one has a personal relationship. 
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Brewer and Chen (2007) are explicit in their explanation of the contrast between relational 
self and the group collective self, which is the importance of people and groups with whom 
one shares a social categorization.  
Results of Chapter 2 show that over in the three countries sampled, there was a 
universal hierarchy for the importance of the relational self over the group collective self. 
That is, when orthogonally manipulated, participants across nationalities reported more 
vicarious anger and outrage as well as vicarious vengeful intentions when participants were 
told they knew the victim personally compared to when they did not. On the other hand, we 
did not find a main effect of group collective connection; participants did not show more 
anger and outrage or vengeful intentions when the victim was a member of their categorical 
group, specifically a colleague from the same department. In this study, we also did additional 
analysis to investigate the moderation of individual difference in measured self-
representation. We found that in the German sample, there was a marginally significant group 
collective connection by individual self-representation interaction effect. Meaning, German 
participants high in individual self-representations reported more moral outrage when the 
victim had a collective group connection compared to when they did not.  
It is relevant to note here that we specifically measured self-representations with 
Brewer and Chen’s (2007) scale of individual, relational, and collective self-representation; 
we did not, however, find measurement invariance for this scale across countries, limiting our 
cross-cultural comparison. Furthermore, model fit was not very good, especially for the 
collective self-representation. This led to the decision not to use this scale in the next study, 
focusing on the more established scales of independent and interdependent self-construal. 
Additionally, the next study shifted to highlight the differentiating attributes of the group 
collective self namely shared group categorization. Therefore, the terminology changes to 
refer to the categorical self. 
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The study reported in Chapter 3 was intended to follow up the results found in Chapter 
2 in the German sample with regards to the interaction between individual difference and 
group type. Conducting a lab study in China, we both measured self-construal and 
experimentally manipulated it using a priming technique. Priming can be useful in 
establishing causality of cultural variables; however, it was also limiting in this situation 
because we could not clearly say if the priming manipulation in fact primed self-construal. 
For this study, we considered previous studies that primed self-construal and the 
corresponding manipulation check. The measures were selected based on this thorough 
literature review; however, that does not guarantee a successful prime. The discrepancies 
between our prime manipulation and manipulation check result could be due to three things 
that are unrelated to the hypothesis of the study: 1. There is a publication bias in the literature 
that does not reflect the true nature of priming self-construal, in that, studies which were 
unsuccessful are not published, skewing the perception that priming self-construal is possible 
and ‘works’ as expected. 2. Priming procedures are fleeting in that by the time participants 
arrived at the priming manipulation check, the effect already wore off. 3. Research in priming 
self-construal using pronoun circling task and “Who am I?” manipulation checks have 
primarily been done in Western cultures or in English – Oyserman and Lee’s (2008) meta-
analysis reported only one study conducted in Chinese – therefore lack of expected 
relationship could be because of cultural differences in the method.  
Chapter 3 further builds on Chapter 2 by exploring different conceptualizations of 
relational and categorical self. Focusing on the differentiation of defining groups by a 
relationship or category, we utilized the minimal group paradigm to establish two types of 
groups. First, drawing on the minimal group literature, participants were assigned a 
categorical group, “group A”; therefore, the categorical in-group members were define as 
other people in group A. Second, we tried a novel approach to connect strangers through a 
personal relationship. Participants were given the opportunity to talk to each other and discuss 
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personal connections; therefore, the relational in-group members were defined as other people 
in the same experimental session.  
With this design, we did not find evidence for our many hypotheses with the priming 
manipulation. However, we did find some evidence looking at the measured self-construal in 
that those low in interdependent self-construal showed more emotional outrage when a 
member from the participants categorical group was treated unfairly compared to those high 
in interdependent self construal. Although these finding should be treated cautiously, they are 
consistent with the first study in that the categorical group is relatively more important to 
people for whom the individual self is relatively important, or in other words, those for whom 
the relational self is relatively unimportant. Much more research is needed to clarify the 
relationship between these scales or develop a new scale that more clearly reflects the 
conceptualization of differences in self-construal. 
With the novel approach to relational minimal groups, it is not clear if the 
manipulation worked. The marginal results in relation to victim sensitivity point to some 
interaction between the relational minimal group and priming type, but overall the results are 
ambiguous. Future research that uses this method should include more comprehensive 
manipulation check items, for example, follow up questions in which the participant are asked 
what was discussed and what kind of connection they have. 
The context of these two chapters was the observation to the injustice of others. I 
utilized this context because considering that how injustice befalling others affects the 
individual’s emotional reaction is a concise way to determine who is relevant to the self. Due 
to this context, both studies also include other justice related variables. Specifically, 
predicating victim sensitivity, which is perceived injustice at one’s own disadvantage 
(Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005), would moderator our findings. In this 
regard, these two studies found somewhat conflicting results. In Chapter 2, we found that 
those high in victim sensitivity were more outraged when there was a relational connection 
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compared to when there was no relational connection. In Chapter 3, we found a marginally 
significant interaction between victim sensitivity, group membership type, and relational self-
construal prime, finding people high in victim sensitivity were relatively less emotional 
outraged when primed with relational self-construal and a member of their relational group 
was the victim of injustice. This discrepancy between the two studies may be due to the fact 
that in the second study, we measured relative emotional outrage of another person’s 
victimization compared to the participant’s victimization. Therefore, we can hypothesize that 
in situations of hypothetical or minimal groups, people high in victim sensitivity may have 
heightened outrage for relevant groups; however, not when in comparison to their own 
injustice. Future research should further explore when people high in victim sensitivity are 
also sensitive to the injustice of group members in experimental settings, including a 
comparison to their own disadvantage. 
Part 2 
Part 2 investigated cross-cultural psychology from a different angle. As outlined in the 
introduction and in the context of the studies in part 1, there are many methodological 
challenges we need to tackle before we can confidently compare cultures. The study in 
Chapter 4 emerged out of frustration with the collection of cross-cultural data and 
encountering issues with data quality. Observations of data collection lead me to theorize the 
possibility of cross-cultural differences in this regard. The goal of this study was to take 
advantage of research in the assessment of data quality (Curran, 2016; Meade & Craig, 2012) 
to reexamine the role on technology in data collection across various cultural groups. In light 
of the role of individual difference in careless responding (Bowling et al., 2016; Ward et al., 
2017), the within-participant design made it possible to attribute differences in careless 
responding to the different modes, be that paper/pencil, computer/web-based, or smartphone, 
in which participants completed the survey. In this regard, we found differences between 
modes for some cultural groups: the sample of Chinese adults and German students, but not in 
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the sample of Chinese students. This brings attention to the importance of looking at culture 
not only across national borders but also subgroups with a national culture. Age groups within 
countries were particularly relevant for this research question because it considered 
participants’ interaction with technology, an area in which there are understandable 
generational differences. Although these results were insightful, this study was not designed 
to definitively answer the question about the degree of careless responding between cultural 
groups. 
Chapter 5 took a different approach to the methodical issue in cross-cultural research, 
also directly out of experience, which are the challenges with measurement invariance. 
Measurement invariance allows us to test if the measurement scales we use in heterogonous 
groups are comparable. In the study in Chapter 2, we tested measurement invariance for all 
measures; for our main dependent variable of emotional outrage, we found our measure was 
comparable and subsequently compared the degree of moral outrage across countries. This 
comparison was not possible for the measurement of self-representations. This was the 
limitations for our three group sample using MG-CFA. With this small number of groups, this 
method of invariance testing was possible and desired. However, as the number of groups 
increases so does the difficulty of establishing full invariance even if the measurement scales 
are practically comparable (Marsh et al., 2017; Rutkowski & Svetina 2014). Rather than 
changing the analysis plan, as in the Chapter 2 study, or dropping countries from analysis as 
necessary in Lomazzi (2018), in which only 27 out of 59 countries were comparable, it is of 
utmost importance to understand new methods. This was the goal in Chapter 5: to compare 
Alignment method to partial invariance using MG-CFA. Results show that Alignment method 
is a promising alternative to partial invariance. 
Reflecting on these two distinct methodological considerations together, we can see 
that perhaps they are complimentary. Preliminary results (Magraw-Mickelson, 2018) showed 
that when we looked at the longitudinal invariance for the three waves of data collection, we 
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found invariance across waves for the Chinese adult sample (other samples were not large 
enough for this analysis) only when we exclude the 10% most careless responders. This is a 
promising avenue for the verification for careless responding indices; however, this was not 
included in the final manuscript in Chapter 4 because the 10% exclusion cut off was 
arbitrarily chosen. On the other hand, we did not check for careless responding in the 
measurement invariance study of Chapter 5. If there are significant differences between 
countries in careless responding, that may account for any between cultural differences. We 
did not measure careless responding because the data for this study was not suitable for a 
multi-dimensional index. Future research should clarify the utility if only select indices are 
identifiability as in Chapter 5 data set. However, the results are unlikely due to cultural 
difference in careless responding alone because of our overall findings of comparability to 
existing constructs in the literature. Nonetheless, the possibility of some noise due to careless 
responding cannot be discounted. Future cross-cultural research should both verify the quality 
of data with careless responding indices and the comparability with testing for measurement 
invariance.  
General Contributions 
In addition to taking on some of the big issues of the field, this body of work further 
contributed to the field of CCSP by not depending on past assumptions and being open to the 
unknown. That is, this research does not just assume cross-cultural differences but also 
uncovers cross-cultural similarity, looking at within-culture variations as well as between-
culture, and finally, asks fundamental methodical questions for any cross-cultural study. In 
Chapter 2, although the background of the framework in self-construal is an East-West 
difference, it was important to know that when considering the overall hierarchy of the self, 
there is actually cross-cultural similarity. This can contribute to the literature on the self and 
also how to approach differences, which perhaps occur not on the cultural level but the 
individual level within countries. Building on that, Chapter 3 looked at differences in self-
Chapter 6: Conclusion   167 
          Chapter 5: Comparing Classic and Novel Measurements Invariance         167 
construal within China. The field acknowledges that there is a lot of national heterogeneity 
within cultures (i.e. McSweeney, 2002; Voronov & Singer 2002); however, this can often be 
minimized when the goal of research is a cross-national comparison. Furthermore, when 
studies look at within-country psychological differences, this is most often within Western 
countries, going back to the issue of over reliance on WEIRD samples (Arnett, 2008; Cross et 
al., 2011; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). The study in Chapter 3 fills this gap by not 
only looking at differences within a non-Western culture, but also both measured and 
manipulated self-construal. Part two contributes to the literature by reexamining fundamental 
methodological assumptions. From the review in Chapter 4, it is evident that much of the 
research in the field has presumed modes of data collection that are essentially equal, and very 
few have looked at data quality and culture in conjunction. The results from this study upend 
this assumption and fill the gaps in the literature. Finally, Chapter 5 addresses the vital topic 
of measurement equivalence, shedding light on the fact that depending on partial invariance 
might be a flawed strategy and thus, introduces an alternative. 
General Limitation and Future Direction 
Although these are important contributions, there are also some limitations as these 
studies do not and cannot address all issues in full. I believe what is missing from these 
studies is what needed to further strengthen researchers’ approach to the field of cross-cultural 
psychology as a whole, beyond addressing the major topics introduced in Chapter 1, that is: 1) 
replications, 2) alternative methods, and 3) better scientific practices. I will first discuss how 
these apply to cross-cultural psychology as a whole and then individually for the studies.  
Central to strengthening the field is to understand what is so central to the replicability 
crisis debate in the first place, that is, replication. While social psychology as a whole focuses 
on the replication of fundamental findings, very little replication work has looked at cross-
cultural research. Part of the replication process for CCSP should be an expansion of 
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populations of interest, moving away from the over reliance on one country to represent a 
whole region and the focus on East-West comparisons. 
Also, it is problematic that, like many social psychology areas, cross-cultural social 
psychology is overly dependent on surveys to measure psychological constructs. It has long 
been recognized that it is important to verify results with different methods (Gelfand, 2012; 
Cohen, 2007). With CCSP, this is even more vital because each method has unique 
comparability drawbacks. As Gelfand (2012) says, “In cross-cultural research, all methods 
have additional cultural baggage” (p. 191). Therefore, findings in CCSP should be confirmed 
with more than one method, whenever possible. 
In the wake of the replicability crisis, in addition to the call for more attention to 
context and boundary conditions, there is also a heightened focus on better research practices; 
for example, the push for preregistration. Preregistration requires researchers to explain their 
hypotheses ahead of time, including methods, and analysis plan with the goal of increasing 
the credibility of research. This is beneficial to research because it prioritizes theory and 
method, distinguishes exploratory and confirmatory analysis, and reduces publication bias 
(van't Veer, & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). These goals are also of utmost importance to cross-
cultural psychology, in the sense that, as outlined in the introduction, the strength of the most 
commonly used theories such as Hofstede’s dimensions is an ongoing issue. Furthermore, I 
believe that cross-cultural psychology has an acute problem with publication bias, in that 
when results do not fit the IND-COL foundational hypothesis or when methods do not show 
differences, studies are not published. Practices like preregistration or data banks for null 
findings will help the field make progress and avoid pitfalls such as data ‘fishing’ and the ‘file 
drawer’ problem. 
These general limitations, namely lack of replications, diverse methods and 
preregistrations also apply to the present body of work. I will reflect on the present studies in 
the context of these limitations and talk about the best ways forward.  
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Replication 
I believe replication is the most important aspect that can strengthen this body of 
work. For Part 1, although Chapter 2 is a follow up of Chapter 3, in that it addresses the 
meaning of collectivism and the within-country difference in self-construal proposed by 
Chapter 2, they are different studies and the core findings of both chapters still need to be 
replicated. First, with Chapter 2, we found similarity across cultures; however, this study, 
which includes three countries, only had one from a non-Western sample. As Reid (2002) 
reminds us, one group or sub-group is not representative of a whole region or country. Just 
because the Japanese are similar to Americans and Germans in the hierarchy of the self, we 
cannot assume that in other non-Western countries we would find the same thing. Cross-
cultural research studies should always strive to include more countries.  
This is also seen in Chapter 4, which looked at only German and Chinese cultures. By 
adding age groups in the Chinese sample, the results demonstrated that a particular 
demographic group within a culture alone does not establish cultural norms. Future research 
on data quality should also include different age groups in Germany as well as other regions. 
Although Chapter 3 compares within-country differences in self-construal, the results should 
be replicated in another culture; data is currently being collected in Germany to this end. In 
addition, the findings would be strengthened with a conceptual replication, specifically using 
a different context of ‘unfair’ treatment; this is also taking place in an ongoing online study 
that looks at a different context and conceptualization of relational and categorical self.  
In part 2, Chapter 4 shows the importance of replication in that is reexamined the role 
of data collection mode for data quality. However, that opens the questions about of the rate 
of change, so that we must ask our self questions such as: How quickly does humans 
relationship to technology change in a way that will influence data quality? At what point will 
these results also be obsolete?  
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The results of Chapter 5 will be robust with the addition of an exact replication. The 
measurement invariance methods have not been compared with real data in the past, so 
replicating the findings is of utmost importance. Therefore, the next planned study will collect 
data in the same countries, with similar convenience samples, but with at least 200 
participants per sample. 
Diverse methods 
The above studies could also use more dimensionality in the methods. The 
dependency on surveys was supplemented by the methods section’s examination of survey 
comparability; however, there is still room for improvement. Chapter 3 was interesting in that 
it was a lab study that experimentally manipulated variables rather than only measurement 
with surveys; however, in the end, the priming manipulations did not work as well as was 
hoped. It is unclear if the priming, the priming manipulation check, or neither, were actually 
successful. Nonetheless, we learned that even though these are the most common methods for 
this type of research, they are also severely limited and new methods need to be explored.  
The conclusions of Chapter 4 had two limitations, both of which would benefit from 
an exploration of new methods. First, we found differences between modes but could not use 
psychological variables to explain those differences. Future studies should find different ways 
to measure personality variables that do not require responses that may have been written 
carelessly. Second, we could not describe the differences in the degree of careless responding 
definitively between countries and could not recommend a cutoff point. New methods should 
be formulated to tackle this issue. 
In this area of expanding methods, the one topic from the big questions described in 
the introduction that this set of studies was not able to touch on was the understanding and 
betterment of existing measures of self-construal. Future research should investigate questions 
related to the dimensionality of constructs, the relationship between existing measure, and if 
there is a better way to measure self-construal. 
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Preregistration 
Finally, in the interest of strengthening credibility with better research practices, only 
one of the studies, Chapter 4, was preregistered. Preregistration was especially important for 
that chapter because it was the most confirmatory of all the studies. Nonetheless, the other 
studies could have also been bolstered through these means. Chapters 4 and 5 were 
exploratory in nature, however, preregistration can also document that this is the case. It is 
most important that preregistration takes place in the next steps of replication.  
Overall, this collection of studies was progressive in confronting fundamental issues in 
the field of cross-cultural psychology, both in terms of theoretical framework and confronting 
methodological limitations. However, there are still improvements to be made, as these are 
only the first steps in what is a long journey.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, through a wide variety of studies, this body of work drew together an 
extensive sectional of important topics in cross-cultural social psychology. The contributions 
of this work are many: 1) Finding similarity in the hierarchy in self-representations where 
cross-cultural theories would assume differences. 2) Using a lab study whereas a great deal of 
research is done by survey and establishing the use of relational minimal groups. 3) 
Investigating culture and careless responding together and finding difference between modes 
that varied between national culture and age group. 4)  Finally, comparing old and new 
methods to establish equivalence which is necessary for any group comparisons. The steps 
taken here are important and, although there is more to be done, each step is significant on the 
road to a better understanding of cross-cultural social psychology. 
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